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I. INTRODUCTION

Like obscenity, "predatory lending" in the home-mortgage market
eludes a precise or uniform definition; the phenomenon instead frequently
evokes an "I know it when I see it" understanding among consumer
advocates, responsible lenders, and concerned regulators.' As a result,
accelerating debates about predatory lending between opposing
sides-consumer groups and banking industry representatives-have
focused on what sorts of lending behavior should be considered predatory
and how to isolate or valuate predatory lending's alleged impact on
borrowers, particularly those in low-income communities. 2 In addition, as
government institutions and market actors have begun to respond in
varying degrees to various constituencies, an important new contest has
emerged regarding which locus of regulatory power-federal or state-is
best suited to comprehensively reform a problem as significant, complex,
and not yet fully understood as predatory lending. In the last four years,
twenty-six states have enacted predatory lending legislation in varying
forms; 3 thus far, federal regulators and legislators have allowed these
legislative experiments to flourish, but federal preemption of this
remarkably vibrant and evolving legislative process is looming. This
Article argues that the promise of such state-by-state innovation has
important implications for regulatory development beyond the home loan
market, revealing in a concrete, measurable way the virtues of our federal
system of government.
Reports of predatory lending emerged first anecdotally, as a shadowy
practice of a particularly unscrupulous set of mortgage brokers and finance
companies to manipulate vulnerable low-income, elderly, and minority
homeowners into accepting mortgage products that would quickly and

1. Ellen Seidman, the former director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, has said "[y]ou
tend to know predatory lending practices when you see them, but trying to come up with a neat
definition is difficult." Ellen Seidman, Strategies for Combating Predatory Lending in Our
Neighborhoods, Remarks Before the Neighborhood Reinvestment Training Institute (Feb. 23, 2000)
(transcript available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/8/87073.pdf); see also Kurt Eggert, Heldup
in Due Course: PredatoryLending, Securitization,and the Holder in Due CourseDoctrine, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 511-13 (2002) (noting difficulty among commentators and regulators in
describing and understanding predatory lending).
2. Allen Fishbein & Harold L. Bunce, Subprime Market Growth and PredatoryLending,
in U.S. DEPT. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING PoLICY IN THE NEW MILLENIUM CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 273,280 (Susan M. Wachter & R. Leo Penne eds., 2001) ("Although there is broad
public agreement that predatory lending should have no place in the mortgage market, there are
differing views about the magnitude of the problem and even how to define practices that make a
loan predatory."), availableat http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/brd/13fishbein.pdf.
3. See infra Part V.A.
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inevitably result in devastating home foreclosures. 4 Only around the end
of the 1990s did community groups and consumer advocacy organizations
begin to compile these stories and recognize persistent, core patterns
among them. They then demanded legislative reform to address what they
contended was an exploding problem that could not be remedied by the
federal and state consumer protection laws then on the books.'
Some regulators and legislators initially balked at attempts to regulate
an area as broad, complex, and important as the residential mortgage
market to ameliorate a problem they believed could not even be defined
or an impact that could not be precisely evaluated.' More recently,

4. See, e.g., Lynn Bonner, 'PredatoryLending'Problemis Severe, SenatorsAre Told, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), June 4, 1999, at A3; Julie Johnsson, As Economy Booms, So Do
Foreclosures:Home Loan Defaults Go Through the Roof in Cook County, CRAIN's CHI. BUS., Sept.
20, 1999, at 1; Glenn J. Kalinoski, NYFocuses on HEL Fraud,NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 13,
1999, at 1; Myron Levin, HittingHome: Critics Say California'sLax Regulation ofLoan FirmsIs
Allowing UnscrupulousBusinesses to Prey on Unwary Homeowners, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1998,
at D 1; Joan McQueeney Mitric, 'Predatory'Lending Practices TargetElderly; Homeowners Short
of Cash Are Warned of Risks in Using House as Collateral,WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1998, at Z22;
Ted Sickinger, Payingthe PriceforaLoan: MinoritiesFillFinancialVoid by Turning to Subprime
Lenders, Often at a Higher Cost, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 1, 1999, at Al; Richard W. Stevenson,
Spending It: Focus on Home EquityLoans-PredatoryLending;How SerialRefinancingsCan Rob
Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, § 3, at 10; Editorial, Wrap up PredatoryLending; It's Time for
Florida'sLegislatorsto Stop Those Who Are out to TakeAdvantageofPoorConsumersby Lending
Them Money at Ridiculously High Rates of Interest, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 24, 1999, at A12.
5. See, e.g., DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., TWO STEPS BACK:
THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT (1999) (documenting rise of abusive home lending practices, called predatory
lending, and their contribution to the explosion of foreclosures in vulnerable communities); NAT'L
TRAINING & INFO. CTR., PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS: SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING AND
CHICAGOLAND FORECLOSURES 5 (1999) [hereinafter PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS] (correlating

dramatic rise of foreclosures in metropolitan Chicago area to increase in "subprime" and abusive
lending), availableat http://npa-us.org/preying/preying.html; see alsoASS'N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR
REFORM NOW, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING INAMERICA (2004) [hereinafter
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL] (describing series of typical practices that constitute predatory lending
and the impact of those predatory practices on low-income, minority, and elderly homeowners),
availableat www.acorn.org/fileadmin/CommunityReinvestment/Reports/S andE_2004/sepa
rate-and-unequal_2004.pdf; CAL. REINVESTMENT COMM., STOLEN WEALTH: INEQUITIES IN
CALIFORNIA'S SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET (2001) (documenting the rise of predatory lending
in California and correlating it to high incidence of residential foreclosures), available at
http://www.calreinvest.org/publications/CRC-StolenWealthReport.pdf; RICHARD D. STOCK, CTR.
FOR BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, PREDATION IN THE SUB-PRIME LENDING MARKET: MONTGOMERY

COUNTY (2001) (documenting the rise of predatory lending in Montgomery County, Ohio and
correlating it to high incidence of residential foreclosures), available at
http://www.myfairhousing.com/cber/; KEN ZIMMERMAN ET AL., N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUSTICE,
PREDATORY LENDING INNEWJERSEY: THE RISING THREAT TO LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS (2002)
(documenting the rise of predatory lending in New Jersey and correlating it to high incidence of
residential foreclosures), available at http://www.njisj.org/reports/predatorylending.pdf.
6. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
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however, a variety of definitions, or core features, of predatory lending
have emerged. Some focus on the excessive cost of credit extended to
borrowers;7 others identify certain abusive or extortionate loan terms or
practices that collectively make a loan predatory.' Framing the problem
through the lens of law and economics, Professors Engel and McCoy
define predatory lending with reference to both unreasonable cost and
abusive practices. 9 Definitions are particularly elusive because the

WORKING PAPER, ECONOMIC ISSUES INPREDATORY LENDING 6 (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter OCC
WORKING PAPER] (noting that "disagreements over the definition of predatory lending have often

served to confuse the debate over this issue" and that "without a precise definition, many of the
published figures on predatory lending abuses become less convincing"), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOuS. AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 106TH CONG., PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES: STAFF ANALYSIS OF
REGULATORS' RESPONSES (2000) (recommending that no additional regulations of predatory

lending should be undertaken because no adequate definition exists to describe the practice),
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/predlend/predlend.htm.
7. See ROBERT E. LrrAN, THE BROOKINGS INST., A PRUDENT APPROACH TO PREVENTING
"PREDATORY" LENDING 1 (2001) (stating that predatory lending "has come generally to refer to
mortgages extended under terms that are more onerous to borrowers than if they were more fully

informed about the loans themselves and the alternative sources of finance that may be open to
them"), available athttp://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1 26; OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3,
AVOIDING PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES IN BROKERED AND PURCHASED LOANS
2 (2003) [hereinafter OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3] ("[Al fundamental characteristic of

predatory lending is the provision of credit to borrowers who simply cannot afford the credit on the
terms being offered."), available at http://www.namb.org/goverment-affairs/front/ 2003_occ_
advisoryltr.pdf.
8. See Press Release, Woodstock Institute, Report Finds Dual Market in Refinance Loans:
Subprime Lenders Dominate Lending in Minority Neighborhoods (Nov. 15, 1999) ("Predatory
lending practices include but are not limited to fraudulent, high-pressure, or misleading marketing;
the 'packing' and financing of unnecessary fees; and 'flipping' or overly frequent refinancing with
fees being repeatedly rolled into the loan."), available at http://woodstockinst.org/document/
2stepsback.html; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 2-12 (2000) [hereinafter HUDTREASURY JOINT REPORT] (declining to establish precise definition of predatory lending but
identifying set of mortgage lending practices that are unreasonable and should be regulated),
available at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl 8/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE
CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 18 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting
that predatory lending has "no universally accepted definition" but attempting to highlight core
practices that may constitute predatory lending), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04280.pdf; ZIMMERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 ("Predatory lending refers to a wide array of
practices that disproportionately affect low-income, elderly, and minority homeowners and result
in unjustified increased payments, inability to refinance loans, and, in too many cases, equity
stripping and foreclosure.").
9. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1255, 1260-61 (2002). They suggest that
predatory behavior includes loans that: (i) are structured to result in seriously disproportionate net
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classification of lending behavior as predatory or fair depends invariably
upon context. Any definition, therefore, must be flexible and accommodate
context and not only should identify core objective criteria but also should
focus on the intent of the lender as well as the impact on the victim."°
Likewise, any attempt to regulate this vague practice should be mindful of
a potentially negative impact-what one banking industry representative
has referred to as "unintended consequences"-on the residential mortgage
market. Specifically, the lending industry is concerned that regulation may
hurt precisely those financially vulnerable populations that the legislation
is meant to help by driving up the cost of and drying up access to both
legitimate and illegitimate credit."
In spite of these classification difficulties, reform has recently arrived,
and it has arrived quickly. The most aggressive response, however, has not
been at the national level, as some might have expected, but in a flurry of

harm to borrowers; (ii) engage in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices; (iv) lack
transparency; and (v) require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. Id. at 1260.
10. Engel and McCoy's five-part criteria certainly fit this flexible framework. The California
Mortgage Brokers' Association recently adopted a definition of predatory lending, more sweeping
than other industry organizations had been willing to suggest, which incorporates deceptive intent
of the lender, absence of legitimate economic justification, and impact on a victim. See Don Jergler,
Brokers Clarify to Save Consumers: Group Defines Predatory Lending to Control Any False
Practices,LONG BEACH PREss-TELEGRAM, Aug. 6, 2004, at Al 6 (reporting adoption of definition
of predatory lending by California Mortgage Brokers' Association as a practice of "intentionally
placing consumers in loan products with significantly worse terms and/or higher costs than loans
offered to similarly qualified customers in the region for the primary purpose of enriching the
originator and with little or no regard for the costs to the consumer"). Relying in part on a definition
adopted by a recent New Jersey court decision, I would define predatory lending as a set of loan
terms or practices, engaged in by lenders, mortgage brokers, and home improvement contractors,
usually through aggressive or deceptive sales tactics, that are so disadvantageous or abusive that
the borrower is subjected to an unreasonable risk of default or foreclosure. See Assocs. Home
Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 536-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); see also Baher
Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home
OwnershipSecurityAct of2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645,649 n. 10 (2004) (adopting same definition).
I will attempt to define those practices and loan terms that constitute predatory lending in Part II.B.
of this Article.
11. ROBERT E. LiTAN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE RISKS OF PREMATURE STATE
REGULATION OF PREDATORY LENDING 3 (2003), availableat http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/

D881716A- 1C75- 11 D5-AB7B-00508B95258D/2887 1/PredReport20099 1.pdf; see also Seidman,
supranote 1, at 3. The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision indicated her concern regarding
this issue:
I want to emphasize the importance of stepping carefully in this area. Often, in the
effort to put a halt to one problem, another may be inadvertently created. For
example, in our zeal to declare some practices illegal, we must avoid overreaching
and chilling the operations of the legitimate sub-prime market.
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state and local legislative initiatives. 2 In 1999, North Carolina became the
first state to pass comprehensive legislation to regulate the terms and
conditions of high-interest-rate mortgages. 3 Since then, twenty-five other
states and eleven localities have passed laws intended to address, in some
way, the practices associated with predatory lending."l The subsequent
state responses have been varied, reflecting the relative perceived
seriousness of the predatory lending problem in their jurisdictions, the
respective demands and strengths of local community groups and banking
representatives, and a host of other local conditions and variations among
jurisdictions. Some states have tweaked North Carolina's aggressive
approach by regulating secondary market actors who frequently finance
predatory behavior without fear of liability; others have more modestly
built upon the floor set by federal residential mortgage regulations; and
others have simply chosen not to regulate residential mortgages at all,
perhaps because lending abuses have not been as prevalent in those states
or because those states are hesitant to overregulate the sensitive residential
mortgage market dynamic.
Although I hope to make the substantive case that an aggressive
legislative response to predatory lending is necessary, an important
corollary proposition of this Article is, in a sense, procedural. I believe that
the regulatory response is currently occurring at the correct locus of public
policy decisionmaking in our federal system-the state legislature. Indeed,
the current state and local legislative response appears to be an exemplary
manifestation of what Justice Brandeis has famously identified as a chief
virtue of federalism: allowing states to serve as laboratories for
experimentation with public policy. 5
Scholars have long posited that state governments enjoy the advantages
of responsiveness, flexibility, and innovativeness and that they can
maximize local preferences without consequence to the rest of the nation
by tailoring reforms to local conditions.' 6 Thus, state predatory lending
legislation would appear to be a good empirical test of these hypotheses.
Regulatory responses-or "experiments"--to predatory lending are

12. See discussion infra Part V.A.
13. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part V.A.
15. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.").
16. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALoGUE 84-95 (1995); Deborah Jones
Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1988); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof
FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341, 352-53; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (book review).
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particularly appropriate at the state or local level because: (i) the problem
is both immature and difficult to define; (ii) its economic and social costs
on borrowers are hard to isolate or evaluate; and (iii) the positive or
negative effects of any particular regulatory strategy are thereby hard to
quantify abstractly or in isolation; rather, they require empirical
assessment. As a result, the recent efforts by federal regulators to preempt
some aspects of state predatory lending legislation and emerging
congressional attempts to more broadly preempt this legislation are at a
minimum premature, and they may even be counterproductive.
My Article thus proceeds on eventually intersecting tracks. It depends
almost as much on a defense of the experimentation rationale for
federalism as it does on an analysis of predatory lending practices. In
recent years, scholars have lamented the merely abstract defenses of
federalism reflected in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and have
called for efforts to understand how federalism really works and how its
purported benefits should be valued. 7 In this Article, I attempt to offer a
partial answer to those questions by demonstrating that the federalist
legislative response to predatory lending is a concrete example of the value
of federalism. At the point of this intersection, I urge federal regulators or
legislators,'" as well as scholars, to observe this valuable example of
federalism in action and to forebear on imposing a federal solution in the
name of uniformity.
In Part H of this Article, I offer a comprehensive description of the
residential subprime lending market from which predatory lending
emerges, and I chart its explosive growth. I describe the interrelated forces
that have driven the subprime market's growth, including the changing
consumer credit demand; the emergence of alternative, under-regulated
lending institutions; and that market's reliance on the powerful, new
financial tool of mortgage securitization-a process which both provides
the subprime market with enormous liquidity and insulates it from the
risks associated with predatory behavior. A full understanding of the
subprime market is critical because a countervailing goal of any sensible
predatory lending reform is to ensure that access by consumers to
legitimate subprime credit is not unnecessarily diminished in the fervor of
reform.
In Part III, I demonstrate the ways in which the subprime market is not
efficient. This analysis suggests, contrary to industry analysis, that

17. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1997); Larry

Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994).
18. The role of courts is not relevant to this argument since I am not addressing interpretation
of whether a particular congressional enactment was intended, explicitly or implicitly, to preempt
state law. The question I am interested in is whether or to what extent policy makers should
exercise their discretion to avoid intentionally preempting state efforts.
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carefully tailored legislative restrictions on some aspects of the market will
not diminish the availability, cost, or profitability of subprime lending. I
describe how these inefficiencies allowed predatory lending to emerge
from the subprime sector and detail some practices and loan terms that,
depending on context, can fairly be classified as abusive. In Part IV, I
describe the failure of pre-existing consumer protection laws, regulatory
efforts, or the market itself to respond to this new complex problem. In Part
V, I describe the remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, emergence of state
reforms in twenty-six jurisdictions as an interactive and innovative process
and offer a rough taxonomy of the state experimentation. These state laws
isolate a core set of abusive lending practices and terms, offering an
encyclopedia of predatory lending and suggest that the variations among
them require observation and assessment. As a result of this
experimentation and early empirical studies of state efforts, I argue that
emerging attempts by regulators and federal legislators to preempt state
laws in the name of uniformity are premature and potentially misguided.
Finally, in Part VI, I place this process within the broader debate on the
value of federalism generally and the state experimentation rationale for
preserving state autonomy in particular. I deconstruct arguments
supporting the virtues of state experimentation to test whether the state
responses to predatory lending validates them. I conclude that states
should enjoy independence, free from federal preemption, to experiment
with solutions to predatory lending and certain other economic or social
problems in order to advance what I believe is a preeminent value of
federalism-producing good public policy.
II. THE HOME EQUITY GOLD RUSH

Predatory lending is a recent phenomenon that has emerged from a
contemporaneous explosion of subprime home mortgage lending. The
remarkable increase in the availability of subprime credit should generally
be regarded as a positive development, to the extent that it has allowed a
broader segment of the population, including low-income and minority
borrowers, access to financing to purchase a home or collaterize its value
for extra, necessary cash.' 9 Although subprime loans are by no means

19. Fishbein & Bunce, supra note 2, at 274.
The growth in subprime lending over the past several years has benefited creditimpaired borrowers, including those who may have blemishes on their credit
record, an insufficient credit history, or nontraditional credit sources. Subprime
lenders have allowed these borrowers to access credit they could not otherwise
obtain in the prime credit market.
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predominantly or even typically predatory,2" virtually all predatory loans
are subprime. The difficulty in devising a regulatory response to predatory
lending lies in balancing the impulse to protect vulnerable borrowers from
its devastating effects against the potential of disabling the complex and
dynamic subprime market, which can help those same borrowers in need
of legitimate credit.2 '
A. The Explosion of the Subprime Lending Market
1. Subprime Loans
A subprime loan provides funds to a borrower whose credit risk is
assessed to be too high to merit a conventional loan carrying lower
costs-a prime loan.2 2 When extending credit, subprime lenders generally
assess a prospective borrower's ability to repay the loan, a process called
"underwriting," although, unlike lenders in the prime market, subprime
lenders subscribe to no uniform underwriting standards. 23 Rather, a
20. See Equity Predators:Stripping,Flippingand Packing Their Way to Profits: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) [hereinafter Equity Predators
Hearing] (opening statement of Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman, Senate Special Committee
on Aging) ("Most subprime lending institutions operate in an appropriate, ethical, moral,
compassionate and legal manner. They provide a vital service to those borrowers who may be
unable to take advantage of traditional lending institutions because ofsuch things as poor credit and
insufficient income."); see also SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY AND
ALLEGATIONS OF PREDATORY PRACTICES 3 (2000) (distinguishing the vast majority of subprime
lending from predatory lending practices).
21. See Seidman, supranote 1, at 3 (warning that anti-predatory lending legislation must not
chill "the operations of the legitimate sub-prime market. The flow of responsibly delivered credit
to underserved markets is critical to their survival and any legislative or enforcement
solutions . . . must proceed with this caution in mind"). The subprime lending industry has
repeatedly expressed concern about possible "unintended consequences" of good faith legislative
efforts-taking away credit and thereby hurting the low-income and minority borrowers who
predatory lending regulations are meant to help. See ROBERT E. LITAN, A PRUDENT APPROACH TO
PREVENTING "PREDATORY" LENDING 11 (2001); Donald C. Lampe, Wrongfrom the Start? North
Carolina's "PredatoryLending" Law and the Practicevs. ProductDebate, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 135,
143-46 (2004).
22. See JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING
MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 29 (1997). Banking regulators generally
designate a subprime borrower as having one or more of the following: two or more thirty-day
delinquencies in the last twelve months; judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge off in the
past twenty-four months; bankruptcy in the last five years; and a high default probability measured
by a "FICO" credit score of below 660 out of a possible 950. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY ET AL., EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2-3 (2001). A
conventional loan is one that is not guaranteed by a government agency, such as the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) or Veteran's Administration (VA). THE HANDBOOK OF
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 3 (Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 5th ed. 2001).
23. See infra note 126. This lack of uniformity, however, and lack of competitive pricing in
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subprime lender employs its own underwriting matrix that designates a
borrower as subprime after evaluating a credit score based on the Fair
Isaacs & Company (FICO) scoring system, income and asset level as
compared to level of debt, and anticipated stability of the borrower's
employment.24 The lender assigns the borrower a letter grade of A-, B, C,
or D, representing correspondingly increased risk; the lender then charges
more for loans it considers riskier."
Legitimate subprime loans carry interest rates or origination charges
higher than conventional prime loans in order to compensate for generally
greater risks and loan servicing costs. 26 Specifically, lenders demand
higher interest rates to compensate them for the increased servicing costs
they believe are associated with subprime borrowers' higher risk of
delinquency, default, and, ultimately, foreclosure.27 In addition, subprime

the subprime market contribute significantly to borrowers' vulnerability to abuse. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 8, at 21; infra Part III.A. 1.
24. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 34-35; see also James D. August et al., Survey of Finance
Companies, 1996,83 FED. RES. BULL. 543, 549 (1997) ("Subprime loans include those with more
lenient underwriting standards (such as high loan-to-value ratios), those made to borrowers with
blemished credit histories, and those with both characteristics.").
25. HUD-TREAsURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 33-34. Borrowers will usually qualify
for A credit if they achieve a FICO score of 650 or greater out of 850. Id. at 33. According to the
National Home Equity Mortgage Association, the majority of subprime borrowers-sixty
percent-who may have minor payment delinquencies are assigned an A- underwriting grade. Id
at 34. Thirty percent are classified as B credit, nine percent as C credit, and only one percent as D
credit. Id. A more recent analysis published in Inside B&C Lending states that A- loans represent
78% of all subprime loans, B loans represent 7.5%, C loans represent 5.4%, and D loans represent
8.8%. Brokers ContinueDominationofSubprime Market at Midway Mark, INSIDE B&C LENDING,
Sept. 15, 2003, at 1, 2.
26. Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, What About Subprime
Mortgages?,MORTGAGE MARKET TRENDS, June 2000, at 1, 8 ("While subprime mortgages may
have higher default probabilities, they also have higher interest rates, which should compensate for
their higher credit risk and administrative costs."); HUD-TREAsuRY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8,
at 27-28; OCC WORKING PAPER, supranote 6, at 10 ("In order to offset the greater risk, as well as
the higher servicing and other costs associated with subprime lending, providers charge higher
interest rates. In fact, according to traditional investment theory, subprime lending should provide
higher expected returns than prime lending specifically due to the higher risk.").
27. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 67, 69 (describing higher origination costs and higher
servicing costs associated with increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure). Delinquency and
foreclosure rates do appear to be empirically higher for subprime loans. According to the HUDTREASURY JOINT REPORT, between January 1998 and September 1999, subprime delinquency and
foreclosure rates averaged 13.5% and 2.6%, respectively, compared to prime delinquency and
foreclosure rates which averaged 2.8% and 0.24%, respectively. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT,
supra note 8, at 34-35. Serious delinquency rates (loans that are ninety days past due or in
foreclosure) for subprime mortgages in the aggregate were 10.44% for subprime borrowers in 2002
as compared to a 0.55% comparable rate for prime borrowers. OCC WORKING PAPER, supra note
6, at 9. Delinquency and foreclosure rates are much closer, however, when high-rated, A- subprime
borrowers are compared to A rated prime borrowers. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note
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lenders believe they are entitled to origination charges---costs assessed as
points on the balance of the loan, up-front fees, a higher interest rate, or all
three-for higher origination costs associated with subprime loans. These
higher origination costs result from more intensive reviews of credit
histories, higher loan rejection rates, and greater fixed costs such as
appraisals and marketing.28
In the absence of comprehensive data on the subject, Professor Cathy
Lesser Mansfield's study of interest rates of the larger subprime lenders
revealed that the median interest rate for a cross-section of subprime
refinance loans examined between 1995 and 1999 fell between 2.20 and
4.06 percentage points higher than conventional prime mortgage rates.29
A study of other subprime lending rates conducted in August 2003
demonstrates a spread of almost two percent in interest rates of the
weighted average of all subprime loans over prime loans.3 ° Other estimates
suggest an even bigger spread.3" It does not appear that recent studies also
have attempted to trace the spread in points and fees paid by subprime
borrowers as compared with those paid by prime borrowers, though there
is consensus that the difference is significant. One frequently cited study
estimates that 2.5 times as many subprime borrowers as prime borrowers
report paying two or more points on their loans.32 Consumer advocates

8, at 35. As discussed in detail below, it remains important but difficult to isolate whether subprime
loans accurately reflect an inherent market risk of default associated with their borrowers or
whether overly-costly subprime rates are what push borrowers unnecessarily over the brink of
default or foreclosure. See infra Part III.A.
28. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 28. Moreover, because subprime loans
tend to be issued in smaller amounts (averaging $58,000 to $85,000 for subprime versus $133,000
for prime), origination costs represent a greater proportion of overall subprime loan values. Id.
29. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulationandthe Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L.
REv. 473, 536-37 (2000); see also WEICHER, supra note 22, at 16 (reporting that subprime loans
are on average three percentage points higher than prime loans, but that large variations, between
two to six percent, exist among grades of subprime loans).
30. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER 14, (Oct. 6,
2003) [hereinafter CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER]. According to this study, the spread
between the prime rate and A- rates was 1.71%; between the prime rate and B rates was 2.28%; and
between the prime rate and C rates was 3.17%. Id.
31. See id. at 14 n.43 (citing unpublished analysis of Mortgage Information Company data
which estimates the spread to be 420 basis points, or 4.2 percentage points); John Hechinger, Home
Bound. Nasty SurpriseHauntsSome Folks' Mortgage: A PrepaymentPenalty,WALL ST. J., Aug.
1, 2001, at Al (stating that subprime loans carry on average interest rates that are three to six
percentage points higher than prime rates).
32. Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending, an Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 533, 540 fig. 3 (2004). These figures do not account for fees associated
with prepayment of loans. Because prepayment fees or penalties are assessed on refinance loans
by subprime borrowers much more frequently than on prime borrowers, estimates of the extent of
points and fees in the subprime market are necessarily conservative. See infra Part III.C. 1.
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have claimed that points and fees in some subprime loans "routinely"
reach between five and ten percent.33
2. The Explosion
The size of the subprime lending market has been hard to track with
precision, in large part because the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) 34 does not require lenders to designate their loans as subprime or
otherwise list loan criteria, such as interest rate or points and fees, that
would identify a loan as subprime. 35 Nevertheless, all estimates document
a stunning expansion of the subprime lending market both in absolute
dollar values and as a percentage of the overall home lending market. In
1983, subprime lending represented only 1.4% of the national mortgage
market, a rate that remained steady through the 1980s and into the early
1990S. 36 By 1994, subprime lending amounted to $35 billion and
represented less than 5% of all mortgage originations. 37 The rate of
subprime growth increased steeply thereafter: from 1995 to 1996 alone,
subprime lending grew approximately 50%, from $65 billion to $96
billion, approaching 10% of the overall mortgage market.38 By 1999,
subprime loans had increased to $160 billion, representing a 13% share of
the mortgage origination market.39 The growth of the subprime market has
not since abated. Subprime lending grew to an estimated value of $173
billion in 2001 and in 2002 to over $200 billion.' The market grew almost
another 50% in 2003 alone, to $330 billion, and it shows strong signs of
continued expansion for the near future.41

33. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 47.
34. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2000).
35. See Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime Foreclosures:The Smoking Gun of Predatory
Lending?, in U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 2, at 257, 260, available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/brd/12bunce.pdf; PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 5, at 10 (determining the subprime market is not straightforward). HUD has used a
combination of industry trade publications and HMDA data to identify lenders who predominantly
originate subprime loans, and most estimates of the increase in subprime lending reflect assessment
of expansion of subprime lenders themselves. Bunce et al., supra, at 260.
36. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 527.
37. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 257.
38. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 37. In 1997, the subprime market continued to grow at an
annual rate of approximately twenty-five percent. Id. According to an estimate, between 1995 and
1997 subprime lenders "more than tripled their market share" of the mortgage origination market.
PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 6.

39. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 257.
40. LrrAN, supranote 11, at 4.
41. Subprime Lenders Shatter Records in '03 and Get Set for More in '04, INSIDE B&C
LENDING, Feb. 9, 2004, at 1; Subprime MBS Rings in the New Year on the Heels of a Record '03,
INSIDE B&C LENDING, Jan. 12, 2004, at 1.
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B. Financingthe Gold Rush: Securitizationand Transformation
of Consumer Credit
A dynamic involving many interrelated demand and supply factors has
driven the subprime lending explosion. These factors include an increase
in residential property values which has offered a bountiful source of
equity to be collateralized for cash; changes in the tax code that incentivize
consolidation of consumer debt into home equity; the rapid emergence of
new mortgage service providers; and the mammoth growth of the process
of securitizing mortgage products, which has supplied billions of dollars
to subprime mortgage lenders. The availability of large sources of
subprime credit is generally desirable; however, this gold rush for
subprime home equity presents commensurate opportunities for abuse. For
example, the transformation of consumer credit has frequently left
financially unsophisticated borrowers confused about the consequences of
their borrowing; the predominant suppliers of subprime credit have been
largely underregulated; and, the securitization process, to a large extent,
has insulated mortgage service providers and secondary mortgage note
holders from liability for abusive lending practices.
1. The Transformation of Demand for Consumer Credit
Despite its higher costs, subprime lending is often praised on the
grounds that it provides access to credit for borrowers who otherwise
would not be able to access it because of a credit blemish.42 It is also said
that subprime lending provides an opportunity for previously excluded
borrowers to improve their credit rating and eventually refinance-or
"graduate"-to a prime loan.43 As a consequence, some argue that
subprime lending also has led to a growth in home ownership among lowincome and minority groups.' While the rate of minority and low-income

42. See PredatoryLendingPractices:
HearingBefore the House Comm. on Banking andFin.
Servs., 106th Cong. app. at 379 (2000) [hereinafter Predatory Lending Practices Hearing]
(prepared statement of Professor Cathy Lesser Mansfield) (reading into record text of letter inviting
her to testify, which read, "[a]n essential element of the continued growth of the U.S. economy is
the democratization of credit of which subprime lending is an important part. Subprime lenders
provide credit to borrowers who do not qualify for a prime rate due to poor credit history or low
incomes"); HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 27.
43. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 95, 105, 106 (recommending
proposals that would permit subprime borrowers to move into low cost conventional loans or
"graduate" over time).
44. Federal Reserve Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Community and
Consumer Affairs Department Conference on Predatory Lending (Dec. 6, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20001206.htm) (stating that
access to subprime lending "gives people from all walks of life a shot at the American
dream--owning a home and getting capital gains").
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home ownership has increased in the past decade, it is far from clear that
such increase is significantly attributable to the growth of subprime
lending.45 In fact, the vast majority of subprime loans are not used to
purchase homes but are in the form of home equity loans collateralized by
first liens on already-owned homes. According to data from the mortgage
industry, eighty-two percent of subprime borrowers used their loans for
refinancing an existing loan rather than to purchase a house.46 Studies
conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
and studies involving communities in Chicago and New Jersey confirm the
vast predominance of non-purchase lending in the subprime market and
the remarkable growth of non-purchase subprime lending as compared to
non-purchase prime lending;47 this conclusion is confirmed by studies of
communities in Chicago and New Jersey.4" Of the subprime refinance

45. In his remarks praising the growth of minority home ownership, Federal Reserve
Governor Gramlich cites only to statistics demonstrating an increase in conventional-not subprime
-home-purchase lending of seventy-five percent for low-income borrowers and ninety-five percent
for African American borrowers in the period from 1993 to 1999. Id. Professor Mansfield further
explained that
discussions and comments about subprime mortgage lending start with the
assumption that the credit product being discussed is one of two kinds: the
subprime purchase money loan- in other words a loan used by the borrower to
become a homeowner; or the second mortgage used primarily for needed home
repairs. These are most certainly the credit products needed by lower-income
borrowers. Unfortunately, neither of these products is the primary product being
offered by subprime mortgage lenders.
PredatoryLending PracticesHearing,supra note 42, app. at 379 (prepared statement of Professor
Cathy Lesser Mansfield).
46. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 31 (citing estimates from the Mortgage

Information Corporation). This data would therefore suggest that only eighteen percent ofsubprime
mortgages are used to purchase a home.
47. HUD analysis demonstrates that nonpurchase (home equity) loans steadily represented
80% of all the subprime lending in the country and, overall, increased more than 880% between
the years 1993 and 1998. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN].

Specifically, the total number of subprime loans increased from 104,000 loans in 1993 to 997,000
in 1998. Id. The number of subprime home equity loans increased from 80,000 in 1993 to 790,000
in 1998, indicating that subprime home equity loans consistently represented a proportion of
approximately 80% of all subprime loans in each of those years. Id.
48. A study of the subprime lending market in the Chicago area records a 1524% increase
in subprime home equity (or nonpurchase) lending (rising from 3137 loans in 1991 to 50,953 in
1997) compared to a 14.6% increase in non-subprime home equity loan origination. PREYING ON
NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 4, 17; see also IMMERGLUCK & WILES, supra note 5, at 5

(estimating that, between 1993 and 1998, the number of subprime nonpurchase loans in Chicago
metropolitan area increased by 890%). In New Jersey, between 1993 and 2000, subprime lenders'
market share of loans increased from 0.5% to 5.5% (totaling 5958 loans in 2000) for home
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loans, fifty-nine percent were "cash out" home equity loans, where the
borrower obtained funds to consolidate unsecured debt (usually credit card
balances), to finance home improvements, or to make purchases unrelated
to the property.a9 Indeed, subprime lenders often aggressively market
home equity loans as debt consolidation products5 ° or "upsell" a borrower
into progressively larger and unnecessary loan products.5
Non-purchase loans can be a useful way for homeowners to leverage
otherwise illiquid home equity for cash. 2 The passage of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, which eliminated the federal income tax deduction of
consumer interest for all purposes except home mortgages, made mortgage
debt more attractive to consumers to fund expenditures previously funded

purchases, 25.3% to 41.8% (totaling 4899 loans in 2000) for home improvement loans, and from
1.14% to 26.6% (totaling 14,546 loans in 2000) for refinance loans. ZIMMERMAN ETAL.,supra note
5, at 6. In New Jersey, thus, home-purchase loans represent only 23% of the overall subprime
market. See id.
49. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 31 (citing estimates from Mortgage
Information Corporation).
50. Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES.
BuLL.241,249 (1998) ("Subprime home equity loans are commonly marketed as bill-consolidation
loans, particularly as a means to pay off credit card debt."). Subprime lenders have seized upon
higher incidence of consumer debt, access to credit cards, and decreased personal savings of many
borrowers, rather than upon an interest in home ownership. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.6
(describing predatory practice of"asset-based lending" or lending based on an individual's equity
in a home without regard to the borrower's ability to make repayments).
51. PredatoryMortgageLending: The Problem,Impact,andResponses:HearingBefore the
Senate Comm. on Banking,Hous., and UrbanAffairs, 107th Cong. 57 (2001) [hereinafter Predatory
MortgageLending Hearing] (prepared statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of
Iowa). Miller noted:
Consumers who buy household goods with a relatively small installment sales
contract are moved up the "food chain" to a mortgage loan by the lender to whom
the retailer assigned the contract; door-to-door contractors come by unsolicited
with 'offers to arrange manageable financing for home improvements;
telemarketers offer to "lower monthly payments" and direct mail solicitations
make false representations about savings on consolidation loans. Another
aspect . . . is "upselling." ("Upselling" a loan is to loan more money than the
borrower needs, wants, or asked for.)
Id.; see also CAL. REiNvESTMENT COMM., supra note 5, at 22 (reporting survey of subprime
borrowers in which 37.9% responded that the idea to take out a loan secured by their home came
from a solicitation by the lender or broker); STOCK, supra note 5, at 24 (reporting data from study
ofsubprime borrowers in foreclosures proceedings in Dayton, Ohio, in which 42% of respondents
were encouraged to borrow more money than they intended).
52. Canner et al., supranote 50, at 241; see also 147 CONG. REc. S15470 (2003) (statement
of Sen. Sarbanes) ("Homeownership has been the path to building wealth for generations of
Americans, wealth that can be tapped to send children to college, pay for a secure retirement, or
simply work as a reserve against unexpected emergencies.").
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by credit cards or personal loans.53 In the years immediately following the
Tax Reform Act, prime home equity loans were financed as second
mortgages; in recent years, however, seventy-five percent of all home
equity lending has taken the form of a first-lien mortgage.54 The demand
side of the mortgage market has thus been significantly transformed: the
vast bulk of subprime loans are used as if they were consumer loans but
are secured by primary residences. Lenders hold an interest not just in
consumer debt, but also in a secured interest in a home, with far graver
consequences for a borrower should the borrower default. This
transformation has been of major significance for the poor and minority
constituencies who disproportionately access subprime lending.55
The consequences associated with this transformation are exacerbated
when one acknowledges that a significant premise supporting arguments
for a vibrant unregulated subprime market-that higher cost loans are
accurately calibrated to higher credit risk-is not entirely sound.56 Indeed,
as described below, a substantial proportion of these home equity loans are
predatory; that is, they are more costly than is justified by the borrower's
financial situations, they impose abusive terms that impede the borrower's
ability to fulfill repayment obligations, or they are otherwise unnecessary
to fulfill a borrower's credit needs.57 Thus, the optimistic picture suggested
by the subprime market's contribution to greater home ownership or by
allowing poor credit risks to graduate to prime loans is incomplete: a
significant portion of subprime lending either is unrelated to securing
financing for home purchases or, much worse, strips equity from
homeowners and contributes significantly to avoidable foreclosures.5"
2. Securitization and Mortgage Lending Supply
A subprime loan typically does not involve a borrower's trip to the
local bank. The subprime market exists in a metaphorical pipeline, through
one end of which borrowers receive money arranged by mortgage brokers
or home improvement contractors and lent by finance companies,
mortgage bankers, or insured depository institutions.59 Those lenders are
supplied by commercial and investment banks who, in turn, pool and
securitize many similar mortgage loans and sell them to private or

53.
514, 100
54.
23.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Canner et al., supranote 50, at 242 (discussing Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).
HUD-TREASURYJOINTREPORT, supranote 8, at 30-31; Mansfield, supranote 29, at 522See infra Part III.A.3.
See infra Part II.A. 1.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.D.
HUD-TREAsuRy JoINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 37-40.
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institutional investors such as mutual and pension funds.6 ° These investors
supply billions of dollars of mortgage financing for subprime borrowers.
Any solution that attempts to limit the abuses of the subprime market and
predatory lending should attempt to comprehend and account for this
complex process.
a. Brokers, Contractors, and Finance Companies
Prior to the 1990s, mortgages were almost exclusively originated and
financed by heavily regulated, traditional bank-and-thrift depostitory
institutions.6 ' Indeed, the increased federal regulation of thrift institutions
after the savings and loan crisis in the late 1980s caused most banks and
thrifts to cease holding risky subprime loans in their portfolios.62 By 1990,
this change created a significant market opportunity for nondepository
institutions to finance subprime loans.6 3 Since 1990, mortgages, including
the majority of subprime mortgages, increasingly have been arranged by
mortgage brokers and funded by nondepository institutions such as
mortgage bankers and finance companies, particularly for home equity
lending. 64 In 2001, HUD estimated that there were 178 institutions that
primarilyengaged in subprime loan originations. Of that group, fifty-nine
percent were independent mortgage companies (mortgage bankers and
finance companies), twenty percent were nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies, only ten percent were federally regulated banks and
thrifts, and the remaining ten percent were "other types of financial
institutions. 65 Today, those new financial institutions, as well as mortgage
60. Id. at 37.
61. Federal thrift (savings and loan) institutions and their subsidiaries are regulated by the
Office of Thrift Supervision. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 30 n. 1. Federal banks and their
subsidiaries are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. National Credit
Unions are regulated by the National Credit Union Association. Id.
62. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 42-43.
63. Id. at 43-44.
64. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 526 (documenting rapid growth of nondepository lenders
in the 1990s and stating finance companies "are now the most active group of subprime,
nonpurchase money lenders").
65. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. HUD used data available as of November 2003
as the basis for these statistics. Id. at 22 n.4. Another analysis suggests that twenty of the top
twenty-five subprime lenders are nondepository institutions such as finance companies that are not
regulated by federal agencies. DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, WHY PREPAYMENT
PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN SUBPRIME HOME LoANS 2 (Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Policy Paper

No. 4, 2003), availableat http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/PPPPolicyPaper2.pdf. The
implications from this estimated dispersal, which suggest a very limited role of banks and thrifts
in subprime and predatory lending, have been controversial. The OCC, in announcing that it will
preempt state regulations of subprime lending by national banks and their state-chartered
subsidiaries, has claimed that, as only ten percent of the total subprime market, banks and thrifts
have an insignificant role in predatory or abusive lending practices and that, therefore, such state
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brokers and unscrupulous home improvement contractors who often act as
their intermediaries to borrowers, are far less regulated than banks and
thrifts.66 Accordingly, they are frequently the source of abuses in the
subprime industry.
In particular, the rapid growth of subprime lending has heavily relied
on mortgage brokers, who now account for approximately half of all
subprime loan originations.67 A mortgage broker's role is to arrange
financing for borrowers with loan providers such as finance companies and
mortgage bankers, as well as with banks, thrifts, and credit unions. 8
Mortgage brokers rarely provide their own funds for loans.69 Instead,
brokers will either close the loan in the name of the lender, use "table
funding" provided by a prearranged buyer of the loan, or access a line of
credit from a nondepository institution.7° Brokers typically make money
by charging the borrower for services provided in the form of direct fees
or percentage points off the total loan amount.7 In addition, brokers often

regulations are unnecessary. See infra Part V.C.I.b. The OTS has similarly preempted the
application of state predatory lending laws to national thrifts and their state-chartered subsidiaries.
See infra Part V.C. L.a. Critics of this analysis suggest that banks and thrifts and their subsidiaries
are significantly engaged in subprime lending. See, e.g., CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING
PAPER, supra note 30, at 7-10. Specifically, a leading participant in the debate over subprime

lending, The Center for Responsible Lending, contends first, that these HUD statistics only account
for institutions that primarily engage in subprime lending and that numerous banks and thrifts
nonetheless are still heavily engaged in the practice, id. at 7-8 & n. 19, and, second, that OCC does
little to regulate the twenty percent of nonbank subsidiaries of banks and thrifts, which are
admittedly primarily engaged in subprime lending, id. at 10. In any event, there is little current
regulatory oversight over the majority of finance companies, mortgage bankers, and brokers who
originate subprime loans. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. GAO REPORT, supranote 8, at 48 (noting that nondepository lending institutions do not
face the regular inspection and reporting requirements imposed by federal regulators on banks,
thrifts, or credit unions); IMMERGLUCK & WILES, supra note 5, at 40 (commenting that the "shift

of mortgage lending from depository institutions to mortgage companies has drastically reduced
the proportion of home lending being examined by bank and thrift regulators").
67. Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing,supra note 51, at 255 (statement of Neill A.
Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
68. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
69. Id. at 39 n.42.
70. Eggert, supra note 1,at 538.
71. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 40. The mortgage broker industry claims
the work brokers do is substantial, value added, and highly rewarding. PredatoryMortgageLending
Hearing,supra note 51, at 255 (statement of Neill A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of
National Association of Mortgage Brokers). Fendly stated:
Mortgage brokers often do an amazing amount of work on [subprime]
loans. .

.

. They work with borrowers to help them understand their credit

problems, work out problems with other creditors, clean up their credit reports
when possible, and review many possible options for either purchasing a home or
utilizing [their] existing home equity as a tool to improve their financial situation.
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negotiate with the lenders to obtain a "yield spread premium" on the loan,
representing the marginal difference between the lower loan value the
lender offered to the broker for the loan and the actual rate the broker
entered into with the borrower.72 Mortgage brokers contend that the
availability of yield spread premiums gives them the flexibility and
personal financial incentive to offer borrowers advantageous "no cost" or
73
"low cost" loans-loans with no or low fees or points assessed at closing.
A perverse incentive provided by yield spread premiums, however, is to
steer a borrower to a higher-priced loan not correlated to the borrower's
real credit risk. The empirical reality of such spreads in the subprime
market is that brokers do not discount their up-front fees, let alone
adequately inform borrowers about them.74
Indeed, as described more fully below, brokers frequently engage in
aggressive and misleading techniques to solicit and induce vulnerable
borrowers to enter into unnecessary and unfavorable loans, engage in
outright fraud and manipulation in loan processing, and generally
contribute significantly to the predatory lending problem. 75 Brokers are
unregulated at the federal level, and states have only recently begun to
require of brokers licensure and compliance procedures.76 Another
prominent facilitator of lending for subprime borrowers is a home
improvement contractor, who can arrange financing for a borrower either
independently or through a cooperating lender.77

Id. (statement of Neill A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of National Association of
Mortgage Brokers). Brokers do all of these things "primarily because they enjoy helping people."
Id. at 340 (prepared statement of Neill A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of National
Association of Mortgage Brokers).
72. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 40.
73. PredatoryMortgageLendingHearing,supranote 51, at 341 (prepared statement ofNeill
A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of National Association of Mortgage Brokers)
(responding to criticism over yield spread premiums, by contending that they allow borrowers to
receive tangible benefits in the form of low upfront costs).
74. In a comprehensive study of yield spread premiums, which looked at the variation in
pricing between loans in which yield spread premiums were present and those in which they were
not, the authors concluded that "[t]his price dispersion strongly suggests that yield spread premiums
are not simply another form of mortgage broker compensation, but rather that the payments
constitute a deceptive device that the mortgage broker industry employs to extract unnecessary and
excessive payments from unsuspecting borrowers." HOWELL E. JACKSON & JEREMY BERRY,
KICKBACKS OR COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS 9 (2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ hjackson/pdfs/j anuarydraft.pdf.
75. See infra Part III.B.1.
76. Eggert, supra note 1, at 554 (describing generally the underregulation of mortgage
brokers). In addition, because so many brokers are heavily undercapitalized, they are judgment
proof even if they violate the law and their abuses are caught. Id. at 612-13.
77. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
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b. The Force of Securitization
A critical part of the dynamic process fueling the growth of subprime
lending has been the enormous sums of financing created by securitizing
mortgages. Put simply, securitization involves pooling many residential
mortgages and issuing a security to be sold to investors (with an interest
rate corresponding to a class of risk associated with a particular pool)
backed by the collateral in the loans.78 The government-sponsored entities
(GSEs) of Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and
Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) spearheaded
the securitization process in the 1970s by purchasing thousands of highquality loans "conforming" to set criteria, packaging them in pools, and
selling interests in the pools as securities in the secondary market with a
federal government-backed guarantee of financial security.7 9 Soon after,
the private sector began securitizing mortgages, aided by investor
confidence in credit ratings issued by private agencies for mortgagebacked securities.8 ° Purchasers of these Wall Street-issued
securities-including institutional investors-have come to dominate the
residential mortgage industry, funneling enormous sums of money to
finance the growth of prime and subprime loans and to support the
enormous increase in new mortgage service providers.8 ' As Professors
Engel and McCoy observe, the securitization of private loans has "singlehandedly transformed the financial-services market."8 2
Securitization is a multi-step process. A lender-finance company,
mortgage banker, or depository institution that originates a loan or is
assigned a loan by a mortgage broker-assigns the loan to a "special
purpose vehicle" (SPV), typically assuming the form of a trust, which
holds a pool of mortgages of various risk classes.8 3 The transfer is meant

78. MIrCHEL H. KIDER & DON J. HALPERN, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET GUIDE § 4.02
(2d ed. 2004); see also Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:Evolution,
CurrentIssuesandNew Frontiers,69 TEx. L. REV. 1369, 1373-82 (surveying a variety of types of
asset securitizations).
79. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 78, at 1383-88 (describing government efforts to
securitize loans and create a secondary market in order to finance growing home-purchase market).
80. Id. at 1388-93.
81. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1273-74. In 1999 "[t]he top eight Wall Street
underwriters of subprime securities accounted for three-fourths of all subprime issues." HUDTREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 43. In 1999, leading Wall Street firms resold $60 billion
of subprime mortgages. James H. Carr & Jerry Schuetz, FinancialServices in Distressed
Communities: Framing the Issue, Finding Solutions, in FANNIE MAE FOUNDATIONS, FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMuNIrIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 14 (2001).

82. Id. at 1273.
83. Eggert, supra note 1, at 539.
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to separate risks associated with the originator from the asset. 4 The SPV
then packages and issues the mortgage-backed securities.8 5 The securities
are sold to an underwriter, typically a Wall Street investment bank, which
underwrites the pooled loans, obtains a loan rating from a credit rating
agency, sets the price of the securities, and sells them to investors.86 The
task of managing the loans that make up the pool--collecting loan
payments and distributing income to investors-is typically assigned by
the SPV to third parties, known as servicers8 7
A necessary component of this process is participation of credit-rating
agencies-most prominently Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Moody's
Investors Service, Inc. (Moody's)-who evaluate the credit risk of
mortgage-backed securities based on an evaluation of prospective cash
flow, loss probability, and loss security and who assign a credit rating to
the securities. 8 Investors and issuers rely heavily on credit ratings to set
the prices of securities and determine minimum acceptable returns on
investment.8 9 Indeed, credit rating agencies have driven much of the debate
over recent state predatory lending regulatory efforts, expressing concern
that extending liability to secondary market mortgage noteholders would
render the securities too risky to be rated.90 For example, after the Georgia
Legislature passed an aggressive anti-predatory lending ordinance in 2002,
which credit rating agencies perceived would impose uncertain extreme
and overly-based liability on secondary-market financing of residential
mortgages, rating agencies refused to assign a risk rating to virtually all
residential mortgages originating in the state. In response to the resulting
threat by the mortgage industry to stop issuing any mortgages in Georgia,
the legislature amended the law to ameliorate the rating agencies'
concerns.

91

Securitization has played the dominant role in the growth of the
subprime lending industry. The volume of securitized subprime loans has
increased from $11 billion in 1994 to $83 billion in 1998, while the
proportion of subprime loans that were securitized and sold to the

84. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133,
135 (1994).
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also David Reiss, Strangled by an Invisible Hand: How Rating Agencies Kill
State Predatory Lending Legislation 15-19 (Jan. 21, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
87. KIDER & HALPERN, supra note 78, § 4.03[41.
88. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 78, at 1401 & n.150.
89. Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 136.
90. See infra Part V.A.2.b.
91. See Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to Mute State Laws: Republican'sProposalto
Police PredatoryLending Would Set Weaker NationalStandards, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at
A4.
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secondary market to unsecuritized subprime loans increased from thirtytwo percent to fifty-five percent in those years, respectively.92 In 2002,
sixty-three percent of new subprime mortgages, representing a volume of
$134 billion, were securitized; and in 2003, securitizations of subprime
mortgages continued their rapid expansion, reaching $203 billion.93
The relationship between the secondary market and subprime lending
players is reciprocal. On the one hand, securitization has driven the
concomitant growth in subprime lending and nontraditional mortgage
service providers,94 giving such loan originators quick access to enormous
capital resources from public or private institutional investment markets. 95
By securitizing loans, lenders can obtain an immediate cash infusion,
which reflects the value of the loan, from the sale of the security pools;
unlike in the traditional savings and loan mortgage process, securitized
lenders need not wait for long-term returns from periodic payments from
the borrower on the mortgage note.96 Likewise, such originating lenders no
longer need the vast depository reserves that a bank possesses; even
undercapitalized companies can originate subprime loans, sell them on the
secondary market, and finance another loan organization.97 At the same
time, the secondary market institutions funding this process benefit from
the growth of subprime lending because secondary market noteholders
prefer the higher rates of return associated with subprime loans. 9

92. HUD-TREASURY JoiNT REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.
93. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 72-73; Subprime MRS Rings in the New Year on the
Heels of a Record '03, supra note 41, at 1.
94. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 41 ("The securitization of subprime
mortgages was a major reason for the rapid growth of finance companies and new entrants into the
[lending] industry during the mid-i 990s.").
95. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1274.
96. Eggert, supra note 1, at 546.
97. Id.; see also Canner et al., supra note 50, at 249 ("Most subprime lenders place heavy
reliance on securitization of their loans to fund their operations."). As Professor Eggert has
described, "[t]hrough securitization, the source of capital for mortgage funding has been transferred
from the savings industry, which used deposits to fund loans, to the capital markets and the
portfolios of institutional investors." Eggert, supranote 1, at 536. In addition to providing a great
source of liquidity for nondepository lending institutions, securitization of subprime loans has
created other obvious efficiencies. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 78, at 1400 (describing
benefits of securitization generally in mortgage markets). Securitization makes mortgage-backed
securities attractive to investors because of their diversified risk and should, in theory, drive down
rates for borrowers either as a result of the increased supply of lenders offering subprime products
or because the trend toward uniformity generally caused by securitization should decrease lender
origination costs. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1274.
98. LITAN, supranote 11, at 1 (explaining that a reason for the growth of subprime lending
"is that many loans are now 'securitized', [sic] or sold to investors in the capital markets, who are
accustomed to demanding higher interest rates on securities backed by loans that carry greater
risks"); see also Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 26, at 11 ("All in all, subprime lending
should have higher expected profits than prime lending because of its higher risk."); OCC
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Much of what is attractive about securitization to lenders and investors,
however, masks its great danger. Securitization's chief economic virtue is
that it separates the owner of the asset from its originator and thereby
insulates the noteholder from liability.99 In particular, the operation of the
holder-in-due-course rule protects good-faith purchasers of a note from
liability for any wrongdoing by the loan originator and precludes the
borrower in foreclosure from asserting against the secondary market note
holder claims or defenses the borrower could have asserted against the
originator.'00 The separation creates dangerous incentives. Lenders can feel
free to originate loans with abusive terms or without regard to whether the
borrower can afford the loan because the lender can quickly sell it off and
shift costs of foreclosure to the secondary market; brokers, who understand
that a loan will eventually be sold by the originating lender, can similarly
deceive borrowers in order to get up-front fees or make loans that carry an
unreasonable risk of default. 01 At the same time, the secondary market's
isolation from liability eliminates incentives that might otherwise exist to
police abusive terms and practices engaged in by originating lenders;
instead, lenders can collect all of the profits from predatory loans with
little risk of legal or financial consequence.2
III. PREDATORY BEHAVIOR IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET

Predatory lending has emerged from the complex dynamic fueling the
expansion of subprime lending. Though the vast majority of subprime
loans cannot be characterized as predatory, virtually all predatory loans are
subprime. What transforms a subprime loan into a predatory one is of
course at the heart of the definitional question,10 3 and any attempt to

WORKING PAPER, supra note 6, at 10. Similarly, to the extent that brokers rely on the liquidity that
securitization provides brokers and other mortgage originators, brokers have a strong incentive to
satisfy investor demand by originating higher cost loans.
99. See Eggert, supra note 1,at 536 ("At the center of the process of securitization is the
isolation of a specific group of assets from the organization that owned them, so that the assets are
legally completely independent from their former owner and free of any bankruptcy or liability
risks of the former owner."); Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,24 (1996)
(noting that "the asset-securitization strategy puts ownership of the company's valuable assets in
an entity separate from the one that is at risk for liability" and describing asset securitization as "a
powerful new strategy for judgment proofing"); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 76
(suggesting that this separation can complicate efforts to combat predatory lending).
100. See infra Part IV.G.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 131-38.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 131-38.
103. See Donna Tanoue, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Congress for
Community Economic Development (Oct. 13, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2000/spl3OctOO.html) ("There is room for
legitimate debate on how best to differentiate between subprime and predatory lending. At the same
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describe predatory lending comprehensively or categorically will
inevitably fail. Though the answer to this question depends heavily on
context, certain core features can be identified: (i) credit is provided when
it is not needed or on terms not justified by a borrower's credit risk or in
order to exact rents; (ii) there is a subjective intent of a broker or lender to
mislead, deceive, or exploit a financially unsophisticated borrower; and
(iii) the terms of the credit or practices of the lender put a borrower at
unreasonable risk of default or foreclosure. " In this section, I will attempt
to highlight some of the market inefficiencies and opportunities for rentseeking in the subprime lending market (including the disproportionate
impact of subprime lending on minority communities) and describe sets
of unfair practices and loan terms that are typically attributed to predatory
lending and that unfairly push borrowers toward foreclosures. One
estimate has suggested that predatory lending practices such as those that
I describe cost borrowers over nine billion dollars annually.10 5
A. Excessive Rates and Fees: The Myth of Subprime Efficiency
Subprime lenders contend that higher rates and fees appropriately
compensate them for costs associated with higher risk of default,
delinquency, and foreclosure (as well as for higher origination and
mortgage servicing costs) that subprime borrowers create. 0 6 While lenders
should, of course, be compensated for the increased credit risk of a
particular borrower, evidence suggests that subprime underwriting criteria
are so vague and discretionary that subprime rates and fees are not
efficiently calibrated to borrower risk and can0 often
be set at levels that
greatly exceed the appropriate risk premium.' 7 Indeed, data may even
suggest a different causal connection: instead of higher subprime borrower
rates of default, delinquency, and foreclosure driving up rates and fees for
those borrowers, subprime borrowers' higher rates of default, delinquency,
and foreclosure may actually be driven too high by inflated costs,
unreasonable loan terms, and by steering borrowers to inappropriately
priced loans.

time, there is no question that predatory lenders are doing a brisk-and profitable-business among
vulnerable segments of the population.").
104. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (defining predatory lending).
105. ERIc STEIN, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST
OF PREDATORY LENDING 2 (2001), availableat http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant 10-

01.pdf.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
107. See infra Part III.A. 1.
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1. The Rate-Risk Disparity
A subprime loan is predatory when it includes costs and fees that far
exceed reasonable market return for the credit risk associated with that
borrower or when it erects barriers that limit the borrower from accessing
lower-priced conventional loans in the prime market.' As previously
described, subprime residential mortgage rates are significantly higher
than conventional rates, and of course, vary across subprime borrower
grade. 0 9 Estimates suggest that rates on subprime loans, on average, are
at least two percentage points higher than prime loans;" 0 other estimates
suggest the difference is significantly higher.I" All estimates, moreover,
112
acknowledge a wide interest rate range depending upon borrower grade.
This variation in mortgage pricing is enormously significant for lowincome borrowers in particular. For example, a three percent point spread
(nine percent compared to six percent) in a loan with $200,000 principal
and thirty-year maturity will cost a borrower an additional $148,000 in
interest, or approximately an additional $400 per month of the life of the
loan.
Nevertheless, regulators should hesitate to undertake reforms that will
affect pricing in the subprime market if the market is operating
efficiently-that is, if loan prices are accurately calibrated to borrower
credit risk. On the other hand, if traditional market failures, such as
information asymmetries and predatory or rent-seeking behavior, prevent
an efficient matching of borrowers and lenders, reforms are justified
without fear of counter-productive effects on the market. Because
numerous factors strongly indicate that the subprime market is not
operating efficiently, legitimate subprime regulation would not necessarily
drive up mortgage prices or drive out credit.

108. See LITAN, supra note 7, at 6; OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3, supra note 7, at 2-3;
ZIMMERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; see also Eggert, supra note 1, at 514 (describing excessive
rates and fees as the "heart" of predatory lending).
109. See supra Part II.A. 1.
110. See CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER, supranote 30, at 14 (weighted average
of two percentage points higher); Mansfield, supranote 29, at 537 (at least 2.2 percentage points
higher).
111. See CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER, supra note 30, at 14 n.43 (citing
unpublished analysis of Mortgage Information Company data which estimates the spread to be 420
basis points, or 4.2%); WEICHER, supra note 22, at 16 (stating that subprime loans are, on average,
three percentage points higher than prime loans); Hechinger, supra note 31, at Al (subprime loans
carry on average interest rates that are three hundred to six hundred basis points higher than prime
rates).
112. See SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supranote 5, at 47 (those with "perfect credit are regularly
charged three to six points higher than market rates"); WEICHER, supranote 22, at 16 (range of two
to six percentage points); Mansfield, supranote 29, at 537 (range of 2.2 to 4.06 percentage points);
Hechinger, supra note 31, at A l (range of three to six percentage points).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

27

FLORIDA
REVIEW
Florida Law Review,
Vol. LAW
57, Iss.
2 [2005], Art. 3

[Vol. 57

First, studies have demonstrated that many subprime borrowers are
priced into loans that do not reflect their actual credit risk. The Chairman
of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, estimated in 2000 that up to half of
borrowers of A- subprime loans could have qualified for a lower-cost
conventional mortgage.' 1 3 In 1996, Freddie Mac estimated that between
ten and thirty-five percent of borrowers in subprime market could have
qualified for a conventional mortgage." 4 In the same year, an industrysponsored poll conducted of fifty of the then most active subprime lenders
found that up to fifty percent of their subprime borrowers could have
qualified for prime loans." 5 Moreover, a 2004 study by Fannie Mae
economists demonstrated that non risk factors significantly affect pricing
of high-grade subprime loans." 6 Specifically, the study compared a group
of A- prime loans purchased by Freddie Mac and a pool of privatelyowned A- subprime loans and determined that one percent of the price
difference between the two sets was attributable to noncredit risk factors,
such as race, financial sophistication, and age." 7 The finding that non risk
113. Franklin D. Raines, Remarks to New York Society of Security Analysts (Oct. 11,2000)
(transcript available at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/speeches/speech.jhtml?replD=/media/
speeches/2000/speech_ 138.xml&p=Media&s=Executive+Speeches&counter=5). In a 2004 speech,
Chairman Raines echoed this assessment. See Franklin D. Raines, Remarks to Fifth Annual Fair
Lending Conference (Sept. 29, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/
speeches/speech.jhtml?replD=/media/speeches/2004/speech_246.xml&p=Media&s=Executive+
Speeches&counter=4) (stating that half of subprime borrowers are "a notch" away from accessing
conventional loans).
114.

FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MARKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER

AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES (1996), availableat http://www.freddiemac.com/

corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm; see also Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 26, at 10
(noting that sixteen percent of A- borrowers had high credit scores, above 680, which suggests that
they could have qualified for prime loans).
115. Half of Subprime Loans Categorized as 'A' Quality, INSIDE B&C LENDING, June 10,
1996, at 7.
116. Lax et al., supra note 32, at 564.
117. Id. The study compared the interest rates on sub prime loans rated A- by subprime lenders
with the interest rates on loans purchased by Freddie Mac and rated A- by Freddie Mac's
underwriting model. Id. Despite the same A- rating, the loans originated by subprime lenders bore
interest rates that were 215 basis points higher. Id. In order to account for differences in credit risk,
the study assumed that default rates for subprime borrowers were four times higher and that the
higher servicing costs of subprime loans would account for a twenty-five basis point difference. Id.
Even accounting for those risk factors, the study concluded that one hundred basis points, or one
percentage point of the difference in price for A- loans, could not be attributed to risk. Id. The OCC
Working Paper focuses on this study, perhaps recognizing the significance of its findings in the
literature of predatory lending, and attempts to minimize its conclusions. See OCC WORKING
PAPER, supra note 6, at 12-14. The OCC changes various assumptions in the Zorn study (i.e.,
attributing forty basis points, rather than twenty-five, to servicing costs and starting with a lower
price differential of 196, rather than 215, basis points) and concludes that only forty-five basis
points in the difference between prime and high grade subprime loans are not attributable to risk.
Id. In response to the OCC analysis, the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) argues that the
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factors contribute significantly to subprime mortgage pricing has been
confirmed in a contemporaneous study.'18 As documented by Professors
Engel and McCoy" 9 and discussed below, 20 numerous information
asymmetries and barriers to entry in the subprime market-and its
predatory subset-allow lenders to persistently charge rates unrelated to
credit risk.1 2' To illustrate one example here, the subprime lending market
is heavily segmented. Because many subprime lenders specialize
exclusively or predominantly in subprime loans, 22 even if a borrower
interested in a loan from that subprime lender could qualify for a prime
loan, that subprime lender would have no incentive to lose that borrower
or refer her to another mortgage provider; in fact, the subprime lender
would have an incentive to keep that borrower in the dark and profit from
her lack of connection to traditional lending sources.
A second reason the pricing of subprime loans is not efficient is the
proven price discrimination against vulnerable groups. As described in
detail below, race is a highly significant predictor of who gets a higherpriced subprime loan. 123 Other significant populations disproportionately
affected by subprime lending are the elderly 24 and the financially
unsophisticated.125 Third, if pricing were accurately tied to risk, one would

OCC has changed assumptions without legitimate justifications (and that the basis point spread may
be even larger than Zom assumed) and otherwise has significant methodological flaws, including
ignoring the role that excessive fees have in driving subprime market inefficiency. See CRL
COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER, supra note 30, at 10-16. The CRL further accuses the OCC
of being biased in its analysis regarding the failures of the subprime market and the effectiveness
of state legislative reforms in order to justify the OCC's separate decision, described below, to
preempt much state predatory lending legislation. Id. at 3-7.
118. Marsha J. Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitionsand Outcomes,
29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 370-72 (2004). This study also demonstrates that subprime
borrowers are generally less satisfied than prime borrowers with their respective mortgage lenders,
which the authors suggest is another indication of market inefficiency. Id. at 376-81; see also
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets Revisited, 82 TEX. L. REV. 439,
443 (2003) (noting the "marked discontinuity" between prime rates and the best subprime rates and
arguing that "[i]n a true risk-based pricing system, prices would either be graduated or display far
smaller discontinuities between prime and subprime loans").
119. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1280-83.
120. See infra Part III.A.2.
121. See also JACK GUTrENTAG, UNIV. OF PA., ANOTHER VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 6
(2000) ("[L]oan prices are substantially higher than those the borrowers could have obtained on
identical transactions had the borrowers been knowledgeable, and able to shop alternative sources
effectively."), availableat http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/ papers/01/0123.pdf.
122. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
123. See infra Part III.A.3.
124. Lax et al., supra note 32, at 545, 546 fig. 9 (demonstrating marked increase in subprime
lending to persons over age fifty-five). This corresponds to legions of studies and anecdotes
regarding the prevalence of predatory lending among the elderly.
125. See Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 368, 371 (demonstrating that a host of nonrisk
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expect to see more uniform underwriting standards and efficiently
calibrated pricing rather than the apparently ad hoc and discretionary
pricing that often currently occurs. As compared to prime lenders, the
subprime industry employs underwriting standards that are far from
uniform, either across the industry or for each individual lender.'26
According to Weicher's review of industry guidelines, "the only general
agreement" in the industry is "that standards vary across firms," allowing
individual lenders to weigh underwriting criteria differently.' 27
Correspondingly, the range of interest rates offered by subprime lenders
varies enormously over time. In Professor Mansfield's study, the range of
interest rates offered by a cross-section of subprime lenders was between
5.0% and 17.99% in 1995; by 1999, the already substantial range increased
to between 3.0% to 19.99%.28 By contrast, the spread of rates on
conventional mortgages was consistentlybelow two percent. 29 The pricing
spread in the subprime market, driven in part by inconsistent underwriting,
can have a tendency to push a borrower into a loan with costs that are
higher than necessary to secure a particular loan. 30 Indeed, a prominent
concern in the predatory market is the practice of some lenders to extend
credit without regard to a critical underwriting criterion-a borrower's
ability to repay the loan.
Fourth, the subprime market dynamic creates perverse incentives that
can hurt borrowers. For example, mortgage brokers, who originate half of
subprime loans, often have strong incentives-in the form of yield spread

factors, including financial sophistication, explains subprime pricing, and suggesting that some
borrowers may be inappropriately "channeled" into higher cost loans).
126. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 34 ("In sharp contrast to conditions in the prime mortgage
market, there are no generally accepted credit standards for subprime home equity lenders.").
127. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 35. For example, a history of two thirty-day delinquencies
may cause one lender to rate the borrower A- while another rates the same borrower B-a variation
that would correspond to substantial additional cost to a borrower. Id. Even individual firms have
shifted underwriting standards that either change over time or allow the lender significant discretion
in grading a prospective borrower's credit risk. Id. (noting that lenders' subprime underwriting
"matrices are themselves only general guidelines").
128. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 536. The median interest rate of subprime loans over that
period was between 2.2 and 4.06 percentage points higher than conventional mortgages. Id. at 537.
129. Id. at 536.
130. Id. at 545 (noting, "[a]t the very least, pricing does not appear to be based on a legitimate
assessment of risk and provision for an acceptable profit for the lender," and even worse, "it is not
clear that pricing in the modem subprime home equity market has any basis at all"). Mansfield also
noted, "[1lenders will not carefully correlate price to risk when they can just as easily charge
whatever rate they choose." Id. at 544. But see GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MICHAEL STATEN,
REGULATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE

PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S

PREDATORY LENDING LAW 14-15 (Credit Research Ctr., Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No.
66, 2002) (suggesting that data in North Carolina reveals that allegedly predatory loans are priced
to reflect risk), available at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/pdf/ RevisedWP66.pdf.
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premiums-to steer borrowers to loans with higher costs than even the
lenders' underwriting standards would justify and, therefore, which are
made without regard to borrower creditworthiness.' 3' These yield spread
premiums loans do not, despite mortgage broker assertions, result in
offering loans to subprime borrowers that have no or low fees;132 indeed,
studies have indicated they are a tempting and frequently employed rentseeking device. 3 3 In addition, securitization in the financing of the
subprime lending industry creates strong incentives for subprime lenders
to package and sell higher-cost loans for a secondary market that is eager
for high rates of return.' 34 This is particularly significant when coupled
with the fact that the securitization process actually dilutes the risk to
noteholders for abusive or unfair practices of brokers or lenders.' 35 Finally,
lenders often build other nonrate-related structures into a subprime loan to
protect them from the risk of default 36 and foreclosure.' 37 One economist

131. See supratext accompanying notes 72-74 (explaining that yield spread premiums are fees
that lenders give to borrowers in exchange for placing borrowers in a higher-cost loan); GAO
REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (suggesting that yield spread premiums create potential for broker
abuse).
132. See JACKSON& BERRY, supranote 74, at 6; STEIN, supranote 105, at 11 n.35 (noting that
the HUD-IA forms for subprime loans, in which yield spread premiums were labeled, also
uniformly contained high fees).
133. JACKSON & BERRY, supra note 74, at 9 (stating that variation in pricing between loans
with YSPs and loans with other forms of compensation "strongly suggests that yield spread
premiums are not simply another form of mortgage broker compensation, but rather that the
payments constitute a deceptive device that the mortgage broker industry employs to extract
unnecessary and excessive payments from unsuspecting borrowers").
134. See LrrAN, supra note 11, at 1 (citing industry executive who explained that subprime
lenders rely on financing from the secondary mortgage market which is "accustomed to demanding
higher interest rates on securities backed by loans that carry greater risks"); supra note 98. Indeed,
profits from subprime lending industry are high enough that, at least for some lenders, the credit
risk-profit correlation does not seem a tight fit.
135. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
136. Defaults rarely end in foreclosure; most are corrected by borrowers within three months.
Margot Saunders, The Increase in PredatoryLending andAppropriateRemedial Actions, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 111, 124 (2002). Defaults do, however, cost lenders lost interest for that month as
well as administrative time and the expense to collect. Id. To compensate for that loss, lenders
routinely charge five percent of the payment due as a late fee, assessed on top of the monthly
payment. Id.; ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A
GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 26 (2002) [hereinafter STOP PREDATORY LENDING].
137. Because foreclosure sales typically recoup less than the market value of the home,
subprime lenders insist on lower loan-to-value ratios-approximately sixty to seventy-five
percent--than are demanded for prime loans-about eighty percent. STOP PREDATORY LENDING,
supra note 136, at 26; see also WEICHER, supranote 22, at 60 (noting that the median loan-to-value
ratio for subprime loans is seventy percent). Even in cases where subprime lenders do not recover
the full value of the loan, NCLC contends that losses are typically no more than one percent of loan
balances per year and, accordingly, insufficient to justify interest rates that are two to four percent
higher than conventional. STOP PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 136, at 26-27.
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has estimated that charging rates unrelated to credit risk has cost American
borrowers $2.9 billion annually.138
2. Financing Excessive Points and Fees
Lenders and brokers in the subprime market also charge points and fees
that often exceed any reasonable market justification. Conservative
industry estimates suggest that subprime lenders charge on average 1.5%
to 3% more in points and fees than prime lenders.139 One prominent
consumer advocacy group claims that subprime lenders "routinely" charge
up to eight percent of the loan in points and fees."4 Another estimate
suggests that 750,000 mortgages per year are financed with points and fees
above five percent of loan value.'41 Substantial anecdotal evidence from
reported cases, news reports, and witness testimony suggest that the
assessment of points and fees in the subprime industry is very often not
correlated to actual costs and is otherwise an enormous source of borrower
exploitation.142
In the conventional loan market, points and fees averaged 1.1% of the
loan in 1999143 and appear accurately correlated to origination costs" or,
importantly, are part of a negotiated trade-off allowing the borrower to
finance the loan amount at a lower interest rate.'45 While such a trade-off
also can occur in the subprime market, the presence of high points and fees
frequently makes a subprime loan predatory when those charges are

138. STEIN,supra note 105, at 9-11.
139. The Courchane study concluded that, of subprime borrowers who pay points, sixty
percent pay between two and four points. See Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 376.
140. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 47 (finding an estimate based on the
assumption that many subprime lenders service loans charge just below the eight percentage points
and fees threshold that would trigger the regulatory protections for a borrower mandated by the
federal Home Ownership Equity Protection Act); see also Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 376
(finding that five percent of subprime borrowers pay over six points, compared to virtually none
in the prime market).
141. STEIN,supra note 105, at 7.
142. See, e.g., PredatoryMortgageLending Hearing,supra note 51, at 12-20 (statements of
Carol Mackey, Paul Satriano, Leroy Williams, and Mary Podelco, private citizens); SEPARATE AND
UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 47-48 (collecting witness testimonials); Mansfield, supra note 29, at
546-47 & nn.447-52 (summarizing findings in litigation that subprime lenders routinely charge
more than eight percent in points and fees and that the larger subprime lenders such as United
Companies Lending and Delta Funding systematically charged points and fees above ten percent
and sometimes as high as twenty percent).
143. CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER, supra note 30, at 15 (citing Peter Mahoney,
The Role of Automated Underwriting in Expanding Minority Home Ownership, Address at the
Fannie Mae Conference (June 8, 2000)). Indeed, in that efficient market, total points and fees paid
to prime lenders have decreased from 1.6% in 1993 to 1.1% in 1999. Id.
144. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 546.
145. WEICHER, supra note 22, at 67-68.
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simply stacked on top of already high interest rates. 46 Predatory lenders
rely on a lack of price competition, information asymmetries, and a variety
of hard sell or confidence tactics to discourage borrowers from shopping
around for better rates, 147 avoid explaining the reason for assessing
additional costs, or outright mislead borrowers about the terms of the
loan.'48 Thus, points and fees of predatory lenders do not correlate
reasonably to servicing or origination costs, nor do they derive from a
legitimate arms-length transaction with a borrower possessed of access to
adequate information in the mortgage marketplace. Rather, the imposition
of high points and fees is often a source of pure exploitation and a classic
form of rent-seeking. 141
Points and fees either are paid directly in cash by the borrower to the
broker or lender from the proceeds of the loan amount, or they are folded
into the total amount financed by the borrower. Refinancing high points
and fees is particularly harmful to borrowers because, by adding to the
loan amount while the house value remains the same, the borrower
depletes equity in the home.' 50 One study suggests that loans with points
146. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269-70 ("Predatory lenders ... subvert th[e]
conventional tradeoff [between upfront fees and lower interest rates] by layering points or
prepayment penalties on top of high interest rates on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."); see also Equity
Predators Hearing, supra note 20, at 32-33 (statement of "Jim Dough," anonymous former
employee of a predatory lender) ("The practice is to charge the maximum number of points legally
permissible for each loan and each flip... and [finance companies are] required to rebate any point
income on [flipped] loans ....

").

147. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1283 (describing predatory lenders' ability to exploit
their disproportionate market power and rely on chicanery or misinformation).
148. Id.
149. To corroborate this theory of rent-seeking behavior, Professor Mansfield discussed an
incriminating document produced by a major subprime lender in Newton v. United Companies
FinancialCorp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998). It read:
Mortgage brokers make their money on points that customers pay when their
loan is closed. Legislation designed to protect the consumer is continuing to put
pressure on the brokerage business. Disclosure of front-end and back-end fees is
forcing brokers to justify these fees. In the future this may lead to brokers
charging fees in accordance with the amount of service they provide the customer.
Mansfield, supra note 29, at 547 & n.456. In addition, artificially high points and fees are
frequently the cause of the higher servicing costs associated with subprime borrowers' higher rates
of default and delinquency rather than the effect of those purportedly higher rates. See NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., HOW TO AVOID PURCHASING OR INVESTING IN
PREDATORY MORTGAGE LOANS (2001), at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/

test-and comm/fdic.shtml.
150. See STEIN, supra note 105, at 4. Stein stated:
The problem of excessive fees for the subprime refinancing borrower is twofold: the fees seem painless at closing and they are forever. They are deceptively
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and fees above a threshold of five percent of the loan costs borrowers $1.8
billion a year.151
3. Disproportionate Impact on Racial Minorities
Studies have demonstrated a strong inverse correlation between income
and mortgage costs in the subprime market.'52 At first glance, it seems
intuitive that subprime lending is heavily concentrated among low- and
moderate-income borrowers: such persons may tend to have higher debtto-asset ratios or perhaps shorter credit histories that would make them a
legitimately higher credit risk. However, a most disturbing aspect of the
explosion of subprime lending is its vastly disproportional presence in, and
impact upon, minority communities. HUD analysis reveals that in 1998,
over half of all mortgage lending in predominantly African American
neighborhoods was subprime, compared to only nine percent in
predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods; in other words, African
American borrowers are five
times more likely to obtain subprime loans
53
than Caucasian borrowers.

costless to many borrowers because when the borrower "pays" them at closing,
he or she does not feel the pain of counting out thousands of dollars in cash. The
borrower parts with the money only later, when the loan is paid off and the equity
value remaining in his or her home is reduced by the amount of fees owed. And
fees areforever because, even if another lender refinances a family who financed
exorbitant fees or who are subject to a prepayment penalty into a better loan just
one week later, the borrowers' wealth is still permanently stripped away.
Id. (first emphasis omitted).
151. Id. at 7. While the study advocates for a cap on financing of points and fees at three
percent, the study uses a five percent threshold because it is the rate above which Fannie Mae, the
North Carolina General Assembly, and Washington Mutual bank have determined a loan is abusive.
Id.
152. According to HUD estimates in 1998, twenty-six percent of refinance mortgages in lowand moderate-income neighborhoods were subprime, as compared to the national average of eleven
percent and an average of seven percent in upper-income neighborhoods. UNEQUALBURDEN, supra
note 47. In the poorest communities, forty-four percent of refinances were subprime. Id. A Fannie
Mae study concludes that lower-income borrowers are twice as likely to get subprime, rather than
prime, financing. Lax et al., supra note 32, at 545, 546 fig. 8. Despite preliminary expectations,
however, this correlation may not be perfectly efficient. Income is not strongly correlated with
FICO scores, see id., and low-income borrowers may be stuck with more costly credit than is
justified by their actual risk because of their financial unsophistication, see infratext accompanying
notes 171-83, or because of other inefficiencies in the provision of subprime credit, see supratext
accompanying notes 120-45.
153. A study by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) of
sixty-one metropolitan areas demonstrated that 27.6% of all refinance loans to African Americans
were subprime, compared to 6.7% subprime refinancing for Caucasians-a fourfold difference.
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 16. Latinos received 17.1% of refinance loans from
subprime lenders. Id. at 16. The study found, in addition, that neighborhood tracts with greater
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Even where the variable of income is controlled, African Americans
are disproportionately burdened by higher-cost loans. According to HUD,
thirty-nine percent of upper-income African Americans refinance with
subprime loans, compared to only six percent of upper-income Caucasian
borrowers.154 Indeed, upper-income African Americans are more than two
times as likely as low-income Caucasians to turn to subprime
refinancing.155 In New York City, low-income African American
borrowers are four times as likely as low-income Caucasian borrowers to
obtain a subprime home-purchase or refinance loan, and upper-income
African American borrowers in New York are more than twice as likely as
low-income Caucasiansto have a subprime loan.' 56 A study of the Chicago
metropolitan area housing market similarly concluded that race is the
strongest noncredit risk factor-a factor stronger than income, debt,
education, or home value in determining whether a borrower will obtain
a subprime or prime loan. 57 Studies of mortgage markets in other
jurisdictions have confirmed these conclusions.5 8

concentrations of African Americans saw markedly increased incidence of subprime lending. Id.
at 27.
154. UNEQUALBURDEN, supra note 47. According to ACORN's study, African Americans are
approximately four times as likely as Caucasians to receive subprime refinance loans, across four
income categories, while Latinos are between two and two-and-a-half times as likely to get
subprime refinancing than Caucasians across those income categories. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL,
supra note 8, at 22.
155. UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 47. ACORN's recent study confirms this result, finding
that 19.6% of refinance loans to upper income African Americans and 13.4% of refinance loans to
upper income Latinos are subprime, while 11.2% of refinance loans to low income Caucasians are
subprime. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 22.
156. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CAPirALACCESS 2002: LENDING PATTERNS INBLACK AND WHITE
NEIGHBORHOODS TELL ATALE OF TWO CITIES 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.schumer.senate.

(demonstrating
gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/specialreports/cap%20access%202002.pdf
disproportionate prevalence of subprime lending in all economic sectors of African American
communities in New York and concluding that "many who would qualify for prime loans are
instead accepting subprime loans-in other words, a significant proportion of black residents in
New York City are being unnecessarily channeled into more expensive financing") (emphasis
omitted).
157. IMMERGLUCK & WILES, supranote 5, at 26-27. The study demonstrated that fifty-eight

percent of refinance loans obtained in predominantly African American neighborhoods were
subprime compared to only about ten percent in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods, id.at 19,
and that a significantly disproportional number of subprime loans went to African Americans even
when the study compared neighborhoods with comparable incomes, id. at 25. This study also
concluded that subprime lenders solicited borrowers in African American neighborhoods at rates
grossly disproportional to marketing in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods. Id. at 25 tbl. 6,
26 (demonstrating that seventy-four percent of refinance applications in African American
neighborhoods are from subprime lenders compared to just twenty-one percent in predominantly
Caucasian neighborhoods).
158.

See, e.g., CALVIN BRADFORD, CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL

DISPARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET (2002) (cataloguing data demonstrating racial
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Economic literature appears in near consensus that African Americans
generally obtain credit on disadvantageous terms. 5 9 Economists do not
necessarily agree that the persistence of the racially disparate availability
of good credit is the result of intentional discrimination. Several conclude
that there are structural impediments minorities face in accessing good
credit. 6 ° Others suggest that many lenders perpetuate existing disparities
by relying on empirical data that African Americans, as a class, are a
greater credit risk; or, in other words, many lenders use race as a proxy for
credit risk. 6 ' The studies and data regarding disparate impact are, in
addition, corroborated by direct evidence of targeting vulnerable members
of African American communities and of discrimination by subprime
lenders against African American borrowers.'62
disparities in access to subprime credit in numerous geographic markets); ZIMMERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 7 (concluding that, after controlling for several important variables, including
borrower income, African American borrowers in the Northern New Jersey area are 2.5 times as
likely to obtain subprime refinancing than Caucasian borrowers and are three times as likely to
obtain a supbrime home improvement loan than similarly situated Caucasian borrowers); Tom
Shean, Study Points out AlarmingRise in Use of Subprime Mortgagesby Minorities,VIRGINIANPILOT, Mar. 25, 2004, at DI (describing disproportionate use of subprime lending by African
Americans in Virginia); Jeff Crump, Subprime Lending in the Twin Cities: An Empirical Analysis
slide 18 (2001) (multimedia presentation) (with permission of author) (presenting findings that, in
the Twin Cities of Minnesota, African Americans are three-and-a-half times more likely to have
a subprime loan than Caucasians, even while holding income constant), available at
http://www.cura.umn.edu/programs/Housing-Forum/2004/Crump-presentation.pdf.
159. See RANDALLM. SCHEESSELE, BLACK AND WHITE DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
REFINANCE LENDING 2-3 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Working Paper No. HF-014, 2002),
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/workpaprl4.html; Gary A. Dymski, Is
DiscriminationDisappearing?Residential Credit Market Evidence, 1992-98, 28 INT'L J. SOC.
ECON. 1025, 1025-26 (2001); Gary A. Dymski, Why Does Race Matter in Housing and Credit
Markets? CurrentResearch and Future Directions, in RACE, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
157-60 (Patrick L. Mason & Rhonda Williams eds., 1997); Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro,
Group Reputation and Persistent (or Permanent) Discrimination in Credit Markets, 11 J.
MULTINATIONAL FIN. MGMT. 483, 484 (2001).
160. RACE, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES, supra note 159, at 157-85; Ronald E. Wienk,
Discriminationin Urban Credit Markets: What We Don't Know and Why We Don't Know It, 3
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 217, 218-22 (1992).
161. Paul Huck, Home MortgageLending by Applicant Race: Do HMDA FiguresProvide a
DistortedPicture?,12 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 719, 719-20 (2001); Scalera & Zazzaro, supranote
159, at 484.
162. A study by the Urban Institute prepared for HUD employed "paired testing" to compare
the quality of mortgage-related services to African American and Caucasian borrowers and
concluded that similarly situated minorities were quoted higher rates and received less information
about loan products and time from loan officers. URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (1999), availableat http://www.hud.gov/lib
rary/bookshelfl 8/pressrel/newsconf/menu.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Testers, both Caucasian
and minority, with substantially similar credit status, attempted to obtain loans from the same
lender. In most cases (four out of five of the cities where testing occurred), the Caucasian testers
received more favorable terms than the minority testers, despite the similarity in their credit
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At best, this evidence demonstrates that subprime financing is
frequently not correlated with credit worthiness; in other words, borrowers
with similar credit profiles are receiving different loan products. More
troubling, however, is the likelihood that subprime lenders-and predatory
lenders-are deliberately targeting African Americans to exploit their
vulnerability and historic disconnection from financial markets. 63 While
the presence of prime or traditional lenders in these communities has
steadily fallen,"6 subprime lender concentration in African American
neighborhoods has exploded.'65 As the joint HUD-Treasury study
concluded, "[m]any of those served by the sub-prime market are
creditworthy borrowers who are simply stuck with sub-prime loans or subprime lenders because they live in neighborhoods that have too few credit
or banking opportunities."'"
The disproportionate presence of subprime lending in African
American communities amounts to a discriminatory denial of quality

status. Id. In Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001), the appellate court ruled that allegations were sufficient to support the claim that
the lender "participated in the targeting of inner-city borrowers who lack access to traditional
lending institutions, charged them a discriminatory interest rate, and imposed unreasonable terms."
In a civil lawsuit brought by the federal government against alleged predatory lender Delta Funding
Corporation, the government alleged that Delta instructed its brokers to deliberately charge African
American women higher rates than Caucasian borrowers with similar credit histories. GAO
REPORT, supra note 8, at 39 & n. 19 (citing United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CVOO-1872
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
163. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 258.
It does not seem likely that these high market shares by subprime lenders in
low-income and African-American neighborhoods can be justified by a heavier
concentration of households with poor credit in these neighborhoods. Rather it
appears that subprime lenders may have attained such high market shares by
serving areas where prime lenders do not have a significant presence.
Id.
164. According to a study by the Department of the Treasury, the number of banking offices
in low- and moderate-income areas decreased twenty-one percent between 1975 and 1995, while
the total number of those offices in the country increased twenty-nine percent. LrrAN ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT 87 (2000). The study further demonstrated the importance
of the physical presence of a bank in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods for those residents
to obtain mortgage funding. Id.; see also Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor,21 YALE J. ON REG.
121, 130-41 (2004) (describing lack of conventional banking resources available in poor and
minority neighborhoods and its detrimental effect on their access to good credit).
165. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supranote 5, at 6, 16-22. In Chicago, for example, subprime
loan activity grew by almost thirty times in black neighborhoods as compared to two-and-a-half
times in Caucasian neighborhoods in the period between 1993 and 1998. IMMERGLUCK & WILES,
supra note 5, at 28.
166. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 48.
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credit or, as one civil rights activist has called it, a form of "reverse
redlining."' 167 The cumulative effect has been to increase both the number
of foreclosures on African American residences and the speed at which
they have occurred. 6 As a result, once thriving African American
neighborhoods have been destroyed. 69 To the extent that home ownership
is a step in accessing the metaphorical American dream and its more
tangible component parts of financial stability, social prestige, and
community membership, the explosion of subprime lending and its
concomitant contribution to residential foreclosures in minority
communities can also properly be framed as an important, modem civil
rights issue. 7 °
B. Unfair andAbusive Lending Practices
Predatory lenders have been successful not because they offer a
valuable product for which there is a large, genuine market demand;
indeed, there is little real price competition in the predatory market. 7 '
Rather, their success comes from deliberately preying on communities that
are the least connected to the economic mainstream-the elderly, the poor,
the uneducated, and minorities-and the most vulnerable to abuse.17 2 In
167. Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 51, at 346 (prepared statement of
David Berenbaum, Senior Vice President, Program and Director of Civil Rights of the National
Community Reinvestment Coalition). African Americans invest far greater proportion of their
wealth into home ownership-in 2000, sixty-two percent of African American homeowners' net
worth resided in their homes as compared to thirty-one percent for Caucasian homeowners.
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 8, at 9. As a result, foreclosures and equity stripping practices
associated with predatory lending have a significantly magnified effect on African American
households and their aspirations for economic advancement.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 233-41.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43. See generally PredatoryLending Practices
Hearing,supranote 42, app. at 128-34 (prepared statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer); Bunce
et al., supra note 35, at 262-67; IMMERGLUCK & WILES, supra note 5, at 10 (describing effect of
foreclosures on African American neighborhoods in the Chicago area); ZIMMERMAN ET AL., supra
note 5, at 7-8 (documenting effect of foreclosures on African American communities in northern
New Jersey); Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Mortgaged Lives: A Special Report:
Profitingfrom Fine Printwith Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
170. This perspective becomes clearer when one remembers that subprime lending has done
little to actually increase home ownership. As described, over eighty percent of subprime loans are
refinancings and are thus made to borrowers who already own a home. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-49; see also PredatoryMortgageLending Hearing,supranote 51, at 349
(prepared testimony of David Berenbaum, Senior Vice President, Program and Director of Civil
Rights of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition) ("[S]tatistics show the biggest gains
[in home ownership] for minorities occurred in the first part of the [1990s] when [Community
Reinvestment Act]-related lending surged-as opposed to the second part of the decade when subprime lending soared.").
171. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1280-84.
172. Id. at 1280-81. Engel and McCoy describe typical victims of predatory lending as
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this subsection, I describe some of the ways in which predatory lenders
target vulnerable communities and some of the lending practices lenders
use to extort economic rents. In the following subsection, I will describe
a series of terms that are frequently associated with predatory loans-and
not with conventional loans-which put borrowers at an unreasonable risk
of default or foreclosure. This sequencing is slightly artificial because the
concepts-deceptive intent and harmful impact-are obviously
interconnected in the operation of the real world market.
1. Aggressive and Misleading Marketing and Sales Techniques
Predatory lenders have developed specialized techniques to identify
their targets. Some rely on census data to determine heavy minority
presence and HMDA data to assess whether there is insubstantial prime
market activity in an area;' 73 some search deed registries to see who has
paid off or nearly paid off a mortgage and, therefore, has substantial
equity;174 some also search tax records 75 to see who may be delinquent
and in need of money;' 76 and some obtain databases of persons sorted by
age, gender, and race)" Once they identify targets, predatory lenders
engage in highly aggressive direct marketing techniques, almost always
advertising a way to consolidate outstanding debt, refinance a home, afford
home repairs, or obtain needed cash.' 78

historically excluded from the home-mortgage market because of credit rationing
and discrimination. They may need credit but not be aware that they are eligible
for loans. Many do not know that there are less expensive sources of credit. And
when lenders and brokers give these borrowers estimates and loan documents, the
borrowers may not be able to comprehend the information.
Id.
173. Id. at 1281.
174. Id. at 1282.
175. A study of subprime activity in Los Angeles County in 1999 demonstrated that property
tax delinquency is a more dominant factor than income in determining which households have
subprime loans. BILL PITKIN & NEAL RICHMAN, UCLA ADVANCED POLICY INST., SUBPRIME
LENDING AND NEIGHBORHOOD CONDITIONS IN THE CITY OF Los ANGELES 18 (2001) (on file with
author).
176. Engel & McCoy, supranote 9, at 1282; Equity PredatorsHearing,supranote 20, at 32
(statement of "Jim Dough," anonymous former employee of a predatory lender) (describing a
frequent finance company tactic of approaching current clients who are delinquent as a way of
inducing them to refinance to avoid foreclosure, but extracting points and fees in the process).
177. Eggert, supra note 1, at 516.
178. Predatory lenders may employ workers to "blitz" a neighborhood with misleading phone
calls and solicitations. Id. Other lenders send individuals "live checks" which, if deposited, offer
victims a few thousand dollars in cash but force them into a high-cost loan with harsh terms.
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 56; see also Equity PredatorsHearing,supra note 20,
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Victims of predatory lending frequently have little connection to or
experience with financial markets, which makes them perfect targets of
unscrupulous lenders.179 Many victims also are elderly, infirm, or reluctant
to either venture far from their home or to use the phone to access better
credit offers; others have no relationships with a bank, or have few
connections to family or friends with the sophistication to advise them on
mortgage products. 8 ' Thus, they are obviously vulnerable to manipulative
sales tactics"" or outright fraud engaged in by predatory lenders." 2 Often,
lenders rush customers into consummating a deal and even changing the
previously agreed upon terms of the deal, before the competition can
appear, by establishing a strong personal obligation on the borrower's part

at 31 (statement of "Jim Dough," anonymous former employee of a predatory lender).
[Flinance companies ... use three primary methods to obtain new customers.
First, they often send guaranteed loan vouchers to potential customers....
Second, finance companies often run different types of promotions using the
mail to seek business from new customers....
Third, finance companies obtain many of their customers by participating in
retail sales installment loans.
Id.
179. See Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 371-72 (describing data that demonstrates that
subprime borrowers are less familiar with mortgage products and financial terms than are prime
borrowers); see also Equity PredatorsHearing,supra note 20, at 31 (statement of "Jim Dough,"
anonymous former employee of a predatory lender) ("[M]y perfect customer would be an
uneducated widow who is on a fixed income, hopefully from her deceased husband's pension and
Social Security, who has her house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult time
keeping up with her payments ... ").
180. See SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 45-46; Barr, supra note 164, at 123-41
(describing poor and minority communities' lack of access to traditional financial services);
Courchane et al., supranote 118, at 372 (demonstrating that subprime borrowers generally search
less than prime borrowers for mortgage products and feel far less than prime borrowers that they
have choices in mortgages products).
181. As Professors Engel and McCoy explain:
Predatory lenders.., endear themselves with charm and solicitude that mask
their guile. They consciously exude an aura of expertise and success, intimidating
customers from questioning the advisability of the loans they are offering.
Predatory lenders specifically cultivate the appearance of friendship, causing
customers to believe that sales representatives have their best interests at heart.
The seeming show of friendship makes it even harder for customers to ask hard
questions.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1283.
182. Lenders frequently obscure or hide critical terms in loan documents, pressure victims to
sign documents without first reading them, or even forge signatures on documents. Eggert, supra
note 1, at 516.
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to close on the loan or by suggesting that the purportedly favorable terms
are available for a limited time only." 3
2. Predatory Lending Practices
Two central practices of predatory lenders-loan flipping and lending
without regard to ability to repay-represent central and highly profitable
rent-seeking tactics by predatory lenders. They have no legitimate
economic or underwritingjustification and drain equity from homeowners.
a. Loan Flipping
Loan flipping refers to the repeated refinancing of a borrower's loan
(typically within the first five years of the loan) through another fee-loaded
loan and without any reasonable benefit to the borrower." 4 Cash-strapped
borrowers are typically urged to undertake such loans when faced with
large consumer debt that the lenders suggest should be consolidated into
a home-secured debt. 5 Borrowers are typically offered lower monthly
payments, in the form of longer maturities, but lenders typically finance
additional points and fees into the refinanced loan.' 6 As a result,

183. Id.; see also STOCK, supra note 5, at 23, 28 (presenting data that forty-five percent of
study respondents whose subprime loans went into foreclosure reported that new fees and other
charges which had not previously been discussed were announced at closing and that sixty-eight
percent of those respondents accepted those new charges).
184. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 73. Loan flipping is distinct from
another less prevalent practice of "property flipping," in which lenders falsely appraise a property
to sell it to an unsuspecting buyer. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 41 n.24. Frequently, property
flippers target first-time home buyers who have been denied a loan because of poor credit or low
income. Id. The property flippers will arrange loans well in excess of the real value of the property.
Id. In order to fool the lender about the viability of such a big loan and about the inflated value of
the property, property flippers will use fabricated credit documents and false appraisals. Id.
185. HUD-TREASURY JoINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 73. Or, lenders who issue loans without
regard to a borrower's ability to repay can anticipate that borrowers will not be able to meet
monthly payments and can simply target those borrowers again for repeated refinancing by falsely
promising that each new loan will alleviate their burdens. Id. at 74.
186. See Equity PredatorsHearing,supra note 20, at 31-32 (statement of "Jim Dough,"
anonymous former employee of a predatory lender). "Jim Dough" stated that
we were trained to sell the monthly "savings"--that is, how much less per month
the customer would be paying offifwe flipped the loan. In reality, the "savings"
What the
that we were trained to sell to the customers were just an illusion ....
customer would not figure out, and what we would not tell him, is that he would
be paying for a longer period of time and, in the end, would pay a whole lot more.
Id. The practice depends on the cultivation of a relationship by the broker and lender of the
borrower, with hard sell tactics and false reassurance of the value of the offer to refinance. Id. at
32. As "Jim Dough" explained:
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borrowers will owe more in principal and interest to the lender and have
correspondingly lower value in the home. 187 As equity decreases and loan
balance increases, the borrower becomes less able to refinance with a
legitimate lender.' Indeed, the ultimate goal of certain predatory lenders
is to secure a borrower as a permanent customer: a borrower with an
initially high-priced loan with difficult monthly payments is ready to be
repeatedly "flipped" by the same, or another, predatory lender for more
points and fees. As "Jim Dough," a former employee of a subprime
finance company, testified to Congress:
In my experience in the industry, flipping was a common
practice. We were instructed and expected to flip as many
loans as possible. One of my supervisors imposed a daily
requirement that each branch employee obtain at least two
applications from present borrowers to refinance their loans.
In other words, each branch employee was supposed to try to
flip at least two loans per day.'" 9

For our home equity customers, we stressed that the interest on the loan was taxdeductible. Because the terms of those loans did not usually exceed 15 years, we
told customers that they could retire earlier, because their house would be paid off
sooner. For our debt consolidation customers, we stressed that they could take the
money that they were saving in their monthly payments and invest it in a mutual
fund.
Id.
187. For example, as alleged by the debtor in Carabellese v. Cammarano, a woman obtained
a $28,000 home equity loan from Associates Financial Services Corporation. Defendant/Third Party
Plaintiff's Answer, Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint at 5, Carabellese v. Cammarano, No.
F-13509-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Oct. 17, 1997). After Ms. Cammarano had difficulty
making her payments, Associates Financial Services Corporation initiated contact with her and
refinanced the loan three times in less than two years, increasing her total indebtedness to over
$56,000, which was primarily comprised of points and fees. Id. at 5-8. Similarly, testifying before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Ms. Podelco explained that she
was flipped a total of seven times in the course of two years by different subprime lenders.
PredatoryMortgageLendingHearing,supranote 51, at 18-19 (testimony of Mary Podelco, private
citizen). Her loan was flipped three times by Beneficial Finance, the originator of the loan, once
by United Companies, twice by Equity One, and once by Cityscape, purporting to be Equity One's
broker. Id. Her initial home improvement loan was for approximately $12,000, which increased
after the repeated flips and fees to over $64,000. Id. at 19. In the course of two years, the home that
she once owned free and clear was foreclosed upon. Id. at 18-19; see also Stevenson, supra note
4 (describing cases of elderly homeowners who sought small loans for minor home repairs being
flipped serially into increasingly high-fee, high-interest loans until their mortgages overwhelmed
their ability to pay).
188. Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 375-76.
189. Equity PredatorsHearing,supra note 20, at 32 (statement of "Jim Dough," anonymous
former employee of a predatory lender); see also CAL. REINVESTMENT COMM., supranote 5, at 37
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In a related practice, some lenders and brokers encourage a would-be
borrower to default on their mortgage in order to refinance with them. 9 '
The practice not only hurts a borrower's credit risk, but also makes her
vulnerable to that creditor's unreasonable loan products offered as part of
the refinancing.
b. Lending Without Regard to a Borrower's Ability to Repay
Some subprime lenders make loans based on the amount of the
homeowner's equity, even if it may appear that the borrower has
insufficient income to make monthly payments.' 9 ' Also called "assetbased" or "equity-based" lending, the practice has caused a substantial
number of residential foreclosures. 92 Beyond its troubling ethical
dimension, 93 the practice may, because of the high transaction costs
typically associated with foreclosure, appear to contradict rational
economic behavior. Nevertheless, unscrupulous lenders do find ways to
make asset-based loans profitable by collecting high points and fees at
closing' and even to make foreclosure profitable where there is
significant equity in the home.' 95
(finding that sixty-four percent of subprime borrowers in the study had refinanced their home from
two to six times, that thirty-one percent have refinanced three or more times, and that
approximately thirty-six percent of refinances took place within two years of a prior loan).
190. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 10, at 692-93.
191. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 61; OCC ADvISORY LETrER 2003-3,
supra note 7, at 2 (describing central predatory lending behavior as underwriting a loan
"predominantly on the basis of the liquidation value of the collateral, without regard to the
borrower's ability to service and repay the loan according to its terms, absent resorting to that
collateral"). Indeed, studies of the subprime market have shown that there is little incidence of
subprime loans extended to borrowers with high loan-to-value ratios, even though such a ratio is
a strong indicator of risk. See, e.g., Courchane et al., supra note 118, at 369. This suggests the
prevalence of subprime and predatory lending that is based on the basis of a borrowers' equity. See
id. A related, but analytically distinct, problem is issuing loans that exceed the value of the home.
Unscrupulous lenders may accomplish this by obtaining a fraudulently high appraisal. The
borrower is then locked into higher debt payments and fees and cannot refinance thereafter for a
lower rate. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 40.
192. HOD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 76-77; PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS,
supranote 5, at 23 (contending that foreclosure rates in Chicago area are rising because "loans are
being pushed upon borrowers who are not able to repay them").
193. According to testimony heard by the HUD-Treasury Task Force, many of these loans are
"made to older borrowers living on fixed incomes, replacing low-cost, low-principal loans these
borrowers had previously held." HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
194. OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3, supranote 7, at 2-3 (explaining that a lender extending
credit without regard to a borrower's ability to repay can expect to recover high fees or satisfy the
outstanding obligation through foreclosure). Because brokers and lenders can generate substantial
fees from the refinancing of loans, they have an incentive to exaggerate a borrower's income to
consummate the loan and collect fees before the lender can detect any problem with the
underwriting risk. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
195. Id.; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1262 n. 11. Engel and McCoy explain:
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c. Home Improvement Contractor Abuse
Unscrupulous home improvement contractors are a prime source for
predatory loans. Such contractors may troll a low-income neighborhood
looking for a home in need of repair and aggressively encourage
unnecessary or overpriced repairs."' The contractor will then arrange
financing with a prearranged lender that is complicit in the scheme, issuing
a loan with abusive terms.'9 7 These lenders may pay contractors directly,
leaving the borrower with no control over the quality of work. Indeed,
work is often incomplete or shoddily performed once the loan is closed
and the lender has paid off the contractor's fees.' 9 8 In this case, the
borrower is left with a heavy loan, unfinished repairs, and no remedy.
C. UnfairLoan Structures
Typically, in connection with the practices just described, subprime
loans include loan provisions that are nonexistent in the conventional loan
market, extract unreasonable rents, undermine the fluidity and efficiency
of the subprime market, and generally threaten borrowers with an
unreasonable risk of default or foreclosure.
1. Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties are charges that a borrower must pay to a lender
if the borrower wishes to refinance the loan, either through the same lender
or through a different one. 99
' In theory, lenders do not want their loans paid
off early because that would force them to reinvest the full amount of the
loan in a market bearing the lower rate of return, which is presumably
what motivates a borrower to refinance in the first place. Prepayment
penalties are typically triggered if a borrower prepays within a period of

If borrowers have sufficient equity in their homes when they default, lenders can
repeatedly refinance the borrowers' loans upon default, each time tacking huge
fees onto the principal. When the borrowers have leveraged all their equity and
default, the lenders receive their proceeds at the foreclosure sale; typically these
proceeds greatly exceed the amount of cash the lenders initially provided to the
borrowers.
Id.
196. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 79.
197. See id. at 80.
198. See id.at 39; SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 52. These loans are particularly
problematic because they may lead a homeowner with no mortgage or a low-interest loan into a
high-interest subprime loan, simply because the borrower sought to make an inexpensive home
repair. Mansfield, supra note 29, at 557-58.
199. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 93.
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years from the closing of the loan (usually no greater than five years).2"'
In the conventional mortgage market, however, market competition has
made prepayment penalties virtually nonexistent: only one to two percent
of prime loans contain prepayment penalties.2 ' In sharp contrast, in very
recent years, up to eighty percent of subprime loans contained prepayment
penalties, 0 2 which regularly represent approximately five percent of the
loan balance.20 3 The disparity between the prevalence of prepayment
penalties in conventional and subprime markets undercuts any suggestion
that borrowers genuinely choose prepayment penalties, perhaps in
exchange for another favorable loan term. 2 4 Indeed, borrowers are
frequently either mislead or at least not fully informed about the future
consequences of a prepayment term in their loan document and may find
out only after they have been flipped into a refinance loan.205
Subprime loans can be a device to permit those who are facing a
temporary credit crunch and are willing take a chance on a high-cost loan
until they are in a position to refinance to do so with a lower-cost loan.
Prepayment penalties, however, create serious problems for subprime
borrowers so inclined. First, prepayment penalties strip significant equity
from borrowers. Lehman Brothers has estimated that over half of
borrowers (the overwhelming majority of whom are subprime) prepay
loans with prepayment penalties within the standard five year "lock-out
period" and that prepayment penalties typically cost borrowers the value
of six months interest, or for many borrowers, about four to five percent
of the value of the loan.2 °6 When a borrower refinances a loan with a

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See GOLDsTEIN & SON, supra note 65, at 2 n.4.
203. Id. at 3. This proportion of subprime loans that contain prepayment penalties appears
directly attributable to changes in governmental regulation in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) interpreted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982
(AMTPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-05 (2000), to preempt states from enforcing prepayment penalty
restrictions against finance companies. See Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, 67 Fed.
Reg. 60,542, 60,548 & n.36 (Sept. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 560, 590, & 591).
Because finance companies make up the vast majority of subprime loans, the OTS action caused
the prevalence of prepayment penalties to increase from ten percent in 1995 to eighty percent in
2001. GOLDSTEIN & SON, supranote 65, at 2 n.4. In 2002, the OTS revised its interpretation and
concluded that state regulation of prepayment penalties were no longer preempted by AMTPA. 67
Fed. Reg. 20,468 (Apr. 25, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 560, 590, & 591). As a result,
approximately thirty-five state laws limiting prepayment penalties will be given full effect.
GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 65, at 6 n.23.
204. GOLDSTEIN & SON, supranote 65, at 6 ("Rational subprime borrowers with market power
should prefer [prepayment penalties] no more often, and probably less often, than conventional
borrowers so that they can refinance into a conventional loan at a significantly lower rate as soon
as credit improves.").
205. Id. at 7.
206. Goldstein & Son, supranote 65, at 3 (citing A. Chu & K. Kwan, Lehman Brothers, Asset-
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prepayment penalty, the amount of penalty frequently gets financed again,
driving up the overall cost of the loan to the borrower and stripping more
equity as a percentage of the now greater total of the loan.2" The Stein
study estimates that prepayment
penalties drain $2.3 billion annually from
°
equity.20
home
borrowers'
In addition, and in part as a result of the resultant loss of equity,
prepayment penalties significantly inhibit a subprime borrowers' ability
to graduate into conventional financing or to otherwise take advantage of
falling interest rates. 2 9 The securitization process largely drives the
prevalence of prepayment penalties in the subprime market 2 0 because the
secondary market makes a substantial amount of money from securitizing
such payment streams.211
2. Balloon Payments, Default Interest Rates, Call Provisions,
and Advance Payments
A balloon payment is a lump-sum payment that occurs at a designated
point in the repayment period where monthly payments have not fully
amortized the loan principal.21 2 A borrower in theory may be willing to
Backed Securities, MBS AND ABS WEEKLY OUTLOOK, July 17, 2000, at 2, 8). In addition, to the
extent that lenders need prepayment penalties as a hedge against losses from borrower refinancing,
lenders frequently impose penalties for a period of time from the origination date of the loan longer
than necessary to cover losses. Id. at 4.
207. Assuming a subprime borrower with a prepayment penalty wishes to refinance her
$150,000 mortgage with a 10% interest rate, she would face a prepayment penalty of 5% or $7,500.
STEIN, supra note 105, at 8. According to one estimate, this amount represents more than the total
lifetime net worth for the median African American family. Id. This comparison is powerful
because, as noted previously, African Americans are almost five times more likely to obtain a
subprime refinance loan. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 153.
208. STEIN, supranote 105, at 9 (estimating 850,000 families per year pay such penalties).
209. See HUD-TREASURYJOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 94 (noting that prepayment penalties
"can be especially problematic in cases where a good payment history may allow the borrower to
'graduate' to a lower-cost loan"); John Hechinger, Home Bound: Nasty Surprise Haunts Some
Folks'Mortgage:A Prepayment Penalty, WALLST. J., Aug. 1,2001, at Al (recounting case of one
couple who could not refinance their eleven percent mortgage with a six percent mortgage because
they could not afford the three thousand dollar prepayment penalty and of another couple who
could not avoid foreclosure by selling their house because sale price would not cover prepayment
penalty).
210. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 95 (concluding that "secondary
market models have been built around the existence of these penalties" and proposing that
prepayment penalties in high-cost loans be prohibited in order to dampen the incentive to securitize
high-cost loans with abusive terms); STEIN, supra note 105, at 9 (describing class of securities
specifically tied to cash flow from prepayment penalties).
211. According to a Lehman Brothers report, prepayment "penalty cash flows themselves are
substantial." STEIN, supra note 105, at 9 n.26 (quoting Chu & Kwan, supra note 206, at 2).
212. KIDER & HALPERN, supra note 78, § 2.02[2][f]. Because balloon payments almost
universally require refinancing, they are, in a sense, the opposite of prepayment penalties.
Notwithstanding this, however, both can exist in the same subprime loan.
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include a balloon payment in exchange for a lower interest rate and take
a chance that she will be able to refinance at a favorable rate or sell her
house sometime before the balloon payment becomes due; however, like
prepayment penalties, many balloon payments are not a product of a
meaningful choice by a borrower.213 Many subprime borrowers are
unaware that their loans have a balloon payment.214 Predatory lenders
frequently use the existence of a balloon payment, sometimes due in three
to five years, as an opportunity to flip a subprime borrower and extract
additional points and fees.2 15
Default interest rate provisions cause borrowers to pay a substantially
higher interest rate-sometimes up to forty percent-should they default
on the loan.216 The provisions are profoundly unjust because, at best, they
make it enormously difficult for a borrower to cure default; at worst, they7
force a borrower into foreclosure or a refinancing with outrageous terms.
Discretionary call provisions entitle a lender to simply demand payment
of the full loan amount at the lender's sole discretion, thereby ensuring
lenders enormous leverage over subprime borrowers."' Advance payments
require a borrower to prepay certain percentage of interest payments up
front, at closing, rather than during the expected amortization of the
loan.2" 9 Like balloon payments, these three provisions are frequently
included without the borrower's knowledge or understanding.220 They also
provide lenders with an excuse to initiate contact with borrowers and flip
them into new high-fee loans, ostensibly to avoid application of these
abusive terms.22 '
3. Negative Amortization
Negative amortization is a loan structure where monthly loan payments
are not large enough to cover the outstanding interest, causing the loan

213. See HUD-TREASuRY JoINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 97. About ten percent of subprime

loans originated in 1999 included balloon terms. Id. at 96. In a study of 866 subprime loans in
foreclosure in Dayton, Ohio, fourteen percent had balloon payment terms. STOCK, supra note 5,
10. The incidence of balloon terms increased at higher interest rates, however: only two percent
loans with interest rates below nine percent had balloon payments, while twenty-three percent
loans with interest rates above twelve percent had balloon payments. Id. at 11.
214. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 5, at 54.
215. Id.
216. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH

at
of
of

IN

LENDING § 10.4.3 & n.179 (4th ed. 1999).
217. See id.
218. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 10, at 661-62.
219. STOP PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 136, § 3.2.2, at 46 (noting that this practice
"disguise[s] the real amount ofcredit extended and... increase[s] the consumer's obligation to pay
interest").
220. Azmy & Reiss, supranote 10, at 661.
221. Id. at 661-62.
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principal to actually increase over time.2 22 It is almost never in a
borrower's interest to structure a loan this way because she will lose more
equity in her home each month. Unscrupulous lenders typically sell such
loans by misleadingly emphasizing these low interest payments. Not
surprisingly, however, most borrowers do not understand that their loan is
negatively amortized until they notice that their balance goes up.223
4. Financing Unnecessary Single Premium Credit
Insurance (SPCI)
Predatory lenders frequently "pack" the cost of unnecessary and
overpriced insurance policies into subprime loans without the borrowers'
knowledge or informed consent.224 The insurance comes in several forms,
all of which are linked to the specific debt or loan; the forms of insurance
will pay off the remaining debt in the event of illness (credit health
insurance), death (credit life insurance), or job loss (credit unemployment
insurance).225 Credit insurance is rarely promoted in the prime market, but
it is aggressively marketed in the subprime market in a "single-premium"
form. Unlike traditional insurance, where the insured makes periodic
(usually monthly) premium payments to sustain coverage, single-premium
policies .collapse the full premium charge into one up-front payment.22 6
The policies typically provide coverage for only five years, but because the
premium is directly added
to the loan amount, the premium is financed
227
over the life of the loan.
An industry study demonstrated that forty percent of borrowers
receiving such credit insurance did not realize it was financed into their
loan or otherwise believed that such insurance was either required or
strongly recommended. 2 Packing such loans can be very profitable for
lenders because the financed insurance generates larger points and fees.229
However, the insurance is empirically of almost no benefit to borrowers.23 °
Estimates suggest that financing of single premium credit insurance costs

222. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 91.
223. Id. at 91-92.
224. Id. at 88.

225. Id. at 89.
226. Id. at 90.
227. Id. at 89-90.

228. STEIN, supra note 105, at 6-7.
229. PredatoryLending Practices in the Home-Equity Lending Market: Before the Bd. of
Governors ofthe Fed.Reserve Sys. pt.A. 1. (Sept. 7, 2000) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade
Commission) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/predatorylending.htm). As a
result, lenders also have no incentive to shop around for a lower-priced policy for the borrower.
Moreover, lenders receive a commission of thirty percent from an insurance company on the sale
of the single premium product. STEIN, supra note 105, at 7.
230. CONSUMERS UNION & CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT INSURANCE: THE $2 BILLION A
YEAR Rip-OFF 13-14 (1999).
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up to five times as much as does unfinanced credit insurance paid
periodically by the borrower.23 The Consumer Federation ofAmerica calls
financed single-premium credit insurance a rip-off; the practice costs
American borrowers $2.1 billion a year.232
D. PredatoryImpacts: Explosion of ResidentialForeclosures
The explosion of subprime and predatory lending has had real,
measurable impacts on the communities in which such lending is
concentrated. Several studies of residential foreclosure patterns in
municipal regions document a staggering rise in residential foreclosures
and demonstrate the causal role that subprime and predatory lending has
played in that rise. These studies also suggest that overpriced loans are
what cause high foreclosure rates in these communities and not, as many
suggest, that high foreclosure rates in these communities drive up loan
costs.
First, in many communities, the increase in the number of residential
foreclosures in periods corresponding to the growth of subprime lending
has been staggering. For example, in the Chicago metropolitan area, the
number of residential foreclosures on borrowers with subprime loans grew
from a total of only 30 in 1993 to 1417 in 1998.233 This represented a
4600% increase at a time when mortgage foreclosures on conventional
loans increased by only 25%.234 In Atlanta and Boston, subprime
foreclosures increased dramatically over comparable periods at the same
time that conventional mortgage foreclosures actually decreased.235

231. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 10, at 659. Because the insurance is collateralized against the
home, each time a borrower refinances, all of the terminated insurance premiums are stripped from
the homeowner's equity. STEIN, supra note 105, at 5-6.
232. CONSUMER FED'N OFAM. & CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT INSURANCE OVERCHARGES
HIT $2.5 BILION ANNUALLY (2001), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/credins.pdf;
CONSUMERS UNION & CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
now refuse to purchase loans with financed single-premium insurance, and a number of reputable
lenders have agreed to cease packing such insurance into loans. STEIN, supra note 105, at 6.
233. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 17.
234. See id.at 17-18 & tbl. 4. During this time, the proportion of total foreclosures in the area
attributable to subprime lenders increased from 1.4% to 35.7%. Id. at 17 tbl.4.
235. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 265 tbl. 2. In Atlanta, between the years 1996 and 1999,
subprime foreclosures increased by 232% at the same time that conventional mortgage foreclosures
decreased by 15%. Id. In Boston, between 1995 and 1999, subprime foreclosures increased by
158% while conventional mortgage foreclosures decreased by 50%. Id. In Akron, Ohio, between
1994 and 2000, foreclosures increased four-fold-an increase which city officials attribute to the
rise of unscrupulous lending practices. Gloria Irwin, Akron, Ohio, Neighborhoods Lead Area in
Foreclosures,AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 27, 2003, LEXIS, Business News, Knight Ridder/Tribune
Business News File; see also Gargi Chakrabarty Gargi, HoosiersFaceBite ofPredatoryLending:
Foreclosuresin State Soar, INDIANAPOLuS STAR, Mar. 17, 2003, at 1C (describing a large increase
in subprime foreclosures in the state, and quoting a community activist as saying, "[w]e estimate
70 percent of all foreclosures in this area are a result of predatory lending"); Teresa Dixon Murray,
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One might expect the number of subprime foreclosures to increase as
the overall number of subprime loan originations increase. Significantly,
however, the growth of subprime foreclosures has substantially outstripped
the growth of subprime originations and the speed at which subprime loans
have gone into foreclosures has also increased dramatically. These data
suggest, at best, great inefficiency in the subprime mortgage underwriting
process; but, more troubling, they also suggest that predatory terms and
practices produce these rates of foreclosure. In Chicago, for example, the
proportion of subprime mortgage originations increased from 3% to 24%
between 1991 and 1997; during roughly the same period, however, the
subprime share of foreclosures increased from 1.3% to 35.7%.236 Similarly,
in Baltimore, the subprime share of foreclosure petitions was 45%, more
than double the 21% subprime share of mortgage originations.237
Moreover, the speed at which subprime loan originations wind up in
foreclosure is remarkable, suggesting that many subprime mortgages were
never realistically affordable in the first place. In Chicago, foreclosures on
mortgages less than four years old tripled between 1993 and 1998, while
foreclosures on mortgages more than eight years old decreased
substantially over the same period.238 In Atlanta and Baltimore during
comparable periods, the average age of subprime loans in foreclosure was
under two years and occurred roughly twice as fast as foreclosures for
conventional and FHA loans.2 39 In the northern New Jersey region, which
includes Newark, the average age of foreclosures on subprime loans

Ohio Home Foreclosures Soar Economy, Predatory Lenders Blamed for Rising Rate, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 10, 2003, at Al (reporting dramatic rise of foreclosures in Ohio
communities due in part to predatory practices and subprime loans made to persons unable to afford
them); Chris Poynter, StudyLinks PredatoryLoansandHomeLoss: PracticeFoundin Many Local
Foreclosures, Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY), Nov. 30, 2003, at lB (describing study of
foreclosures in Louisville metropolitan area and finding up to one-third had predatory
characteristics); Orla O'Sullivan, New ForeclosurePhenomenon, ABA BANKING J., Nov. 2003, at
77, 77-78 (attributing rise of foreclosures during period of low interest rates in large part to growth
of subprime and predatory lending).
236. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 49; see also DAN IMMERGLUCK&GEOFF
SMITH, RISKY BUSINESS: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBPRIME

LENDING AND NEIGHBORHOOD FORECLOSURES 7-10 (2004) [hereinafter RISKY BUSINESS]
(concluding that foreclosures in Chicago metropolitan area between 1997 and 2002 were twenty
times more likely for subprime than for prime loans, even after controlling for neighborhood
demographics and economic conditions).
237. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 266.
238. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 23.
239. Bunce et al., supra note 35, at 264-65. In Baltimore, subprime loans foreclosed after an
average of 1.8 years while conventional mortgages foreclosed on an average of 3.2 years. Id. at 264.
In Atlanta, the median age of foreclosed subprime loans was two years, compared to four years for
conventional mortgages. Id. at 265. In Boston, the median ages of foreclosures of subprime loans
and conventional mortgages was three years and seven years, respectively. Id.
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decreased dramatically from 6.7 years in 1995 to 4.0 years in 2000.240
Moreover, the dramatically faster rates of foreclosure occurred at higher
interest rates. 24' These data suggest that, contrary to the standard
description of subprime pricing behavior, excessive interest rates tend to
drive unnecessarily higher risk of foreclosure, not the other way around.
Rashes of foreclosures have transformed once vibrant neighborhoods
into tracts of abandoned property.242 The resulting externalities are broad
and serious: the value of surrounding homes decreases, costing neighbors
equity in their homes, and gangs, drugs, and general crime increases,
driving up a need for increased government services and making future
reinvestment or rehabilitation more difficult. 243 Predatory lending,
therefore, is not only hurting tens of thousands of American families
annually, it is also slowly and steadily draining a major source of wealth
from poor, minority, and elderly communities in the form of home
equity-the very source of wealth that should offer the security and
prosperity so centrally connected to the narrative of the American Dream.
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES

Prior to the recent proliferation of state anti-predatory lending
legislation, 2 " only an ineffective patchwork of remedies, primarily federal,
existed to combat predatory lending practices. Not surprisingly, predatory
lenders aggressively exploited these regulatory gaps to great profit, in the
ways previously described. In opposing further legislative reform,
however, the subprime lending industry repeatedly argues that laws
currently on the books could, if adequately enforced, do away with

240. ZIMMERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 8.
241. In Chicago, the fastest growth in foreclosures was for loans with rates four percent or
more above the Treasury rate, representing more than an 840% increase between the years 1993
and 1998. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 18, 20 fig.6. In Atlanta, loans with
interest rate spreads greater than four percent represented almost half of those subprime loans
entering foreclosure. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
242. See ZIIERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 23 fig.5 (showing distribution of foreclosures
heavily concentrated in minority neighborhoods of Essex County, New Jersey).
243. Equity PredatorsHearing,supra note 20, at 88 (statement of William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Director, Home Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society); RISKY BUSINESS, supranote
236, at 4-5 ("Cities, counties and school districts lose tax revenue from abandoned
homes.... Foreclosures in struggling, low- or moderate-income and minority neighborhoods may
have greater negative impacts than those in middle- and upper-income areas. In the latter case, the
foreclosures are less likely to lead to abandoned buildings, blight and crime."); STEIN, supra note
105, at 12-13 ("These additional costs from resulting social externalities may well dwarf other
estimates made in this report."); Eggert, supra note 1, at 582 ("Foreclosed homes often stay vacant
longer than other homes, with less maintenance, becoming wrecked hulks that are breeding grounds
for crime, depressing property values and economic development.").
244. See infra Part V.A. & Appendix 1.
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virtually all predatory lending behavior.245 In this section, I will explain
what experience has already demonstrated-that neither the market nor
currently constructed federal consumer protection laws can effectively
combat predatory lending.
A. Market Responses
The subprime market within which predatory lenders operate is largely
distinct from the prime market. As a result of the historic underservicing
of low-income and, particularly, minority neighborhoods, the steady
increases in minority-owned property values, and the boom in available
financing created by the securitization of subprime loans, significant
market opportunities for subprime lenders have emerged. 2" In addition, in
recent years, prodded by Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's increasing
commitment to purchase loans originated in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods conforming to GSE underwriting criteria, some traditional
lenders have begun to enter the subprime market.247 On the whole,

245. See LITAN, supra note 7, at 2 (highlighting that predatory lending abuses "already are
prohibited under existing federal law"); Letter from Carl V. Howard, General Counsel, Citigroup,
Inc., to Office of Thrift Supervision 2 (July 25, 2000) ("Adequate legislative and regulatory tools
already exist to eliminate predatory lending."), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/
48265.pdf. In addition to aggressively enforcing existing laws, certain parts of the industry also
have suggested that compliance with certain "best practices" would be sufficient to eliminate
supposedly isolated instances of predatory lending, and they include, among other things:
compliance with all state and federal laws; company-wide training in fair lending and training of
correspondents and vendors; maintenance of a work environment that encourages compliance with
best practices; and a commitment to treat customers fairly regardless of race, gender, and similar
characteristics. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N OF AM., "BEST PRACTICES" FOR SUBPRIME LENDING
(2000). The National Association of Mortgage Brokers advocates increased enforcement ofexisting
laws in combination with industry self-regulation and increased consumer education. Predatory
MortgageLendingHearing,supra note 5 1, at 257 (statement ofNeill A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate
Past President of National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67 (discussing the underservicing of minority
communities by traditional banks); supra text accompanying notes 78-98 (discussing the role of
securitization in the growth of subprime lending).
247. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae began purchasing subprime loans in 1997 and 1999,
respectively, limiting their purchases to the most creditworthy subset of borrowers. GAO REPORT,
supra note 8, at 74. According to a HUD study, which admits to some imprecision, Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae purchased about fourteen percent of subprime loans originated in 2002. Id. at 7475. HUD has set goals for these entities to increase their purchases of loans for low-income and
underserved communities, which should increase their share of subprime loan purchases. See id.
at 75 & n.3. HUD hopes that the increased participation of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will help
standardize subprime loans and thereby decrease interest rates on this set of loans. Id. at 75. And,
although Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have established guidelines to limit their purchases of loans
containing abusive terms, those guidelines are still quite general and have not yet been endorsed
by nine of the Federal Home Loan Banks that also have committed to purchasing supbrime loans.
HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 108. In addition, although the Community
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however, the brisk competition and regimented underwriting criteria in the
prime market, which prevent lenders from imposing disadvantageous
terms and which both moderate interest rates and keep them accurately
calibrated to a borrower's credit risk, have not emerged in the subprime
market. Despite the considerable profits to be captured in servicing
subprime borrowers, legitimate lenders do not seem to be entering the
subprime market in sufficient volume to eliminate abusive practices. In
short, the market has not and cannot eliminate the abuses of the subprime
lending industry on its own.
First, banks and thrifts perceive obstacles to substantial investment in
subprime lending. Because subprime loans generally carry a greater risk
of default, banks and thrifts are wary of damaging their cultivated
reputations as community-friendly institutions if they start lending to, and
foreclosing upon, lower-income and minority families. 248 At the same
time, the subprime lending industry (and predatory lenders in particular)
focus on minority communities in part because traditional lenders have
largely abandoned them on the premise that race correlates with
creditworthiness. 49 Moreover, the underwriting of subprime loans is
traditionally more difficult because of greater uncertainty about a
borrower's creditworthiness and the barriers to entering this market.250
Most banks and thrifts offer a wide variety of services and do not
specialize in the way that subprime lenders do in evaluating and servicing
riskier borrowers; as a result, many prime lenders perceive that costs
associated with establishing underwriting criteria and implementing them
do not justify the potential benefits of infiltrating the subprime market. 25 '

Reinvestment Act created incentives for banks and thrifts to originate loans in low- and moderateincome neighborhoods in order to increase their government merger approval ratings, id.at 105,
it does nothing to prevent lenders from accumulating their CRA credits through the purchase of
predatory loans, Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1277 n.95. As a result, the remedial effects of
increased participation by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and of the CRA are still highly speculative.
248. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1289-90.
249. See Harold A. Black, Is There Discriminationin Mortgage Lending? What Does the
Research Tell Us?, 27 REv. BLACK POL. ECON., Summer 1999, at 23, 23 (1999); Fred Galves, The
DiscriminatoryImpact of TraditionalLending Criteria:An Economic and Moral Critique, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1474 (1999); Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination:Is the
Secondary Market Helpingto Make the "AmericanDream" a Reality?, 36 GONZ.L. REv. 153, 16273 (2000-2001); Peter P. Swire, The PersistentProblem ofLending Discrimination:A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REv. 787, 792-802 (1995).
250. Barr, supranote 164, at 125 ("[B]anking the poor is unlikely to be seen as sufficiently
profitable for many banks to incur the up-front costs of entering this market, particularly because
most banks are not institutionally organized to focus on this market segment."); see supra text
accompanying notes 27-28.
251. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1292; see also Barr,supranote 164, at 183 ("Financial
institutions may be reluctant to expend the resources for research, product development, training,
marketing, and education, which are necessary to expand financial services to lower-income
clientele."). In addition, because banks and thrifts are heavily regulated, in a way that the majority
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Moreover, most of the banks and thrifts that have subsidiaries or affiliates
engaging in subprime lending have no processes in place to allow
to move "up-stream" to the parent bank's prime lending
borrowers
25 2
product.
Second, the combination of specialized marketing techniques employed
by predatory lenders and the persistence of information asymmetries
between subprime lenders and borrowers gives predatory lenders a strong
incentive to exclude legitimate lenders-prime and subprime-from the
portions of the subprime market that they exploit. As described, predatory
lenders rely on direct marketing techniques, usually full of misleading
enticements, to prey upon persons who are financially unsophisticated and
disconnected from the economic mainstream, even if those persons are not
serious credit risks.2 53 Indeed, predatory lenders employ aggressive and
deceptive measures to ensure that a deal is closed quickly and before a
vulnerable borrower has an opportunity to compare loan packages with a
competitor.254 Moreover, once victims are signed onto a loan, predatory
lenders ensure that they cannot graduate to a conventional loan, thus
making the borrowers vulnerable to being flipped into another predatory
loan. 255 Legitimate subprime lenders typically refrain from such
unscrupulous marketing methods and, by contrast, attract borrowers who
are sophisticated enough to shop around among the competition.256 The
barriers to entry experienced by legitimate subprime lenders, combined
with the slow emergence of bank and thrift participation in the subprime
lending market, are significant. This suggests that elimination of predatory
lenders might slowly encourage the lenders to service those who otherwise
would be trapped with predatory loans.
Finally, the transformation of the mortgage market in the past decade
has made it difficult for market participants to police each other or exert
sufficient pressure to prevent fraud and abuse in the market. As described,
the securitization process provides mortgage brokers with incentives to
of subprime lenders are not, they must document and justify their underwriting decisions in detail
to bank regulators. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 42-45. Indeed, banks and thrifts have
decreased their presence in low-income and minority neighborhoods at the same time studies have
indicated the importance of such a physical presence to enable low-income and minority borrowers
to access credit. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supranote 5, at 45-46. Re-establishing such a presence
would present an additional cost to traditional prime lenders.
252. Cf HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supranote 8, at 105 (urging prime banks to develop
loan products that will allow more subprime borrowers to "graduate" to prime mortgage loans).
253. See supraPart III.B.1.
254. See supra Part III.B.I.
255. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
256. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1297; cf PredatoryMortgageLending Hearing,supra
note 51, at 57 (prepared statement of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa) ("The
notion of consumers shopping for a refinance loan or a home improvement loan, comparing prices
and terms, is out of place in a sizeable portion of this [predatory lending] market. Frequently, these
are loans in search of a borrower, not the other way around .... ").
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extort fees, steer borrowers into higher-cost loans, and extend loans
without regard to a borrower's ability to repay; and, similarly, it allows
lenders to pass off many of the risks associated with this behavior to the
secondary market noteholders." 7 Moreover, loan underwriters perceive
that their primary obligation-and financial incentive-is to sell
mortgage-backed securities on behalf of the issuer, rather than ferreting
out abusive loan terms or practices.258
At the same time, secondary market noteholders also fail to seriously
police predatory lending activity. Information asymmetries between loan
originators-who are most familiar with the borrower but may not actually
care about the high credit risk of a loan that will be securitized-and
secondary market purchasers of loans-who know far less about the
borrower but are concerned about risk associated with their
investment-generally make it hard for some secondary market purchasers
to identify abusive loans.259 While secondary market participants may be
concerned about the costs associated with foreclosure, the holder-in-duecourse doctrine gives them little reason to worry that underlying fraud or
disclosure violations by loan originators would impede their ability to
foreclose and recoup costs. 260 In any event, whatever nominal financial
incentives may exist for secondary market participants to deter predatory
lending, they have yet to counteract the even stronger incentives to fimance
the extremely profitable securitization of high-cost loans, or to come close
to matching the risks to borrowers caused by predatory lending. Any
aggressive antipredatory lending efforts should as a result account for the
financing of unscrupulous lenders and brokers by the secondary market. 26'

257. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
258. See Tanoue, supra note 103 ("Securities must be attractive and marketable to investors,
and the underwriter's compensation is based on a percentage of the sales proceeds. Accordingly,
the underwriter's motivation appears to be to receive the highest price and best execution possible
on behalf of the issuer ....).
259. See Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary
Markets, 13 J. HOUSING RES.31,35 (2002) (arguing that information asymmetries in the subprime
market "are driven by the lack of... sophisticated evaluation models being used by originators,
making it more likely that information is lost as the mortgage moves from originator to the private
conduit in the secondary market").
260. See infra Part IV.G.
261. See HUD-TREAsURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 108. The report indicated:
While the secondary market could be viewed as part ofthe problem of abusive
practices in the subprime mortgage market, it may also represent a large part of
the solution to that problem. If the secondary market refuses to purchase loans that
carry abusive terms, or loans originated by lenders engaging in abusive practices,
the primary market might react to the resulting loss of liquidity by ceasing to
make these loans.
Id.; see also Eggert, supra note 1, at 617 ("If such disreputable lenders lose their access to the
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B. DisclosureRegimes: TILA and RESPA

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)2 62 requires mortgage lenders to
disclose to borrowers certain information deemed necessary to understand
the true cost of a loan and "shop around" for the best financing deal.263
Before the consummation of the loan, lenders must disclose to the
borrower the loan's annual percentage rate (APR) (a standardized
valuation of credit cost), finance charges, the total amount financed
(including points and fees), the number of payments, and the payment
schedule. 2" Penalties available in civil suits for disclosure violations
include statutory damages of twice the amount financed, actual damages,
and attorneys' fees.2 65 The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA)2 6 6also requires lenders to disclose details of the cost of settling

a loan in a uniform settlement statement (HUD-1) and prohibits certain
charges and kickbacks to third parties.267

secondary market and are forced to keep their loans themselves and attempt to collect from their
own, often angry, borrowers who retain their defenses to the loan, these unscrupulous originators
would, for the most part, be driven out of business."); Tanoue, supra note 103 ("To effectively
combat predatory lending, we must sever the money chain that replenishes the capital of predatory
lenders and allows them to remain in business.").
262. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (2000).
263. Id. § 1601(a) (announcing congressional purpose to "assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit").
264. Id. § 1639. The lender also must include the cost of credit life insurance as a finance
charge, unless the lender notifies the borrower that coverage is optional, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
§ 22.6.4(d) (2004), and disclose the borrower's right to cancel the loan within three days of closing.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)-(b).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (authorizing statutory damages of double the finance charge or up
to one thousand dollars per violation). For damage actions, TILA contains a short statute of
limitations period of only one year. Id. § 1640(e). TILA does provide an extended, three-year right
to rescind a loan transaction for material violations, a right that extends to actions against an
assignee. Id. § 1641(c); 12 C.F.R. 226.23(a)(3). Criminal penalties of a maximum five thousand
dollar fine and one year in jail are also available for knowing or willful violations of TILA. 15
U.S.C. § 1611.
266. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § § 1831 b, 2601-2617 (2000).
267. See id. § 2601. After some initial uncertainty, courts have made it more difficult to
demonstrate that a yield spread premium constitutes an illegal kickback under RESPA. See, e.g.,
Hirsch v. Bankamerica Corp., 328 F.3d 1306, 1307-09 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (per curium) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant lender because plaintiff failed to show that the broker, in
receiving the yield spread premium, did not provide "goods or services of the kind typically
associated with a mortgage transaction" and because there was no evidence that the compensation
was unreasonable) (quoting Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1263
(11 th Cir. 2002); Levine v. N. Am.Mortgage, 188 F.R.D. 320, 328-29 (D. Minn. 1999) (denying
summary judgment to plaintiff borrower because plaintiff failed to meet his "heavy burden" of
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Disclosure regimes, such as TILA and RESPA are heavily favored by
the classical liberal economic theory that has driven modem federal
consumer regulation.268 In theory, by increasing consumer information
about comparable loan terms, disclosure decreases the consumer's
opportunity cost associated with the transaction, enhancing overall market
efficiency. 69 Classical liberal theory also suggests that disclosure enhances
the social welfare of all market participants by ratifying consumers'
freedom to choose products that consumers deems to be in their best
interests.27° This normative preference for disclosure may be well-justified
for products such as groceries, personal electronics, and even larger
purchases like automobiles, because consumers can compare products
within those categories relatively quickly and with few or no transaction
costs. In the context of the subprime mortgage market, however, the
theoretical premises of disclosure regulation seem quaint and utterly
insufficient.7 '
The overwhelming market power that the predatory sector of the
subprime market has over its customers makes it nearly impossible for
them to compare price terms. In the first place, there is little price
competition in the predatory lending market that might provide a customer
the opportunity to compare the cost of a particular loan against one offered
by another lender.272 Predatory loans often are deliberately made so
complex 273 and contain so much information that comparing loan products
is altogether confusing.274 Further, TILA disclosures often are presented

demonstrating that HMD's interpretation of RESPA, setting forth a difficult two-prong test for
determining the legality of yield spread premiums, is "irrational, arbitrary, or manifestly contrary
to the language of the statute").
268. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding,andHigh-Cost Consumer Credit: The
HistoricalContext of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 883 (2003).
269. Id. at 881-83.
270. Id. at 883.
271. According to one idealized description, the Truth in Lending Act serves to promote "the
traditional Yankee faith in the shrewdness of the consumer, and his ability to police the marketplace
and choose the best buy." Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on
Consumer Market Behavior:A Critiqueof the Criticsof Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REv. 117, 120 (1984) (quoting Johnathan M. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending,
1977 ILL. L.J. 669, 669-70).
272. See supratext accompanying notes 257-65.
273. See Peterson, supranote 268, at 891 & n.635 ("[I]n the high-cost credit market, many
creditors inject complexity into their contracts and the negotiation process preceding them simply
for the strategic value of the complexity itself.").
274. Id. at 894 (describing significant costs often involved in investigating high-cost loan
products, including paying for credit reports, application fees, and even deposits, which prevent
comparison shopping). In addition, many lenders take advantage of ambiguities in TILA regarding
what costs must be included in the "amount financed" so that true loan costs are not, in fact, fully
disclosed; lenders frequently "unbundle" certain fees such as underwriting fees, document
preparation fees, sellers' attorneys' fees, administrative fees, traditional title-related fees, and credit
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to the borrower on the day of the loan closing, when a borrower has
psychologically committed herself to the loan, and among stacks of other
documents totaling hundreds of pages, all of which belies the idealized
image of an informed consumer acting on rational economic preferences
among comparable loan products.275
Indeed, although it initially protested what it claimed would be the
prohibitive costs of compliance, the lending industry now recognizes legal
and political advantages to disclosure regimes. For subprime lenders,
compliance with simplified TILA disclosure requirements may be a way
to mask underlying loan complexity and also to defend against otherwise
legitimate allegations of oral misrepresentations.276 The disclosure
paradigm also provides political cover against charges that high-cost loans
are too expensive or abusive and a shield against calls for more regulation
of substantive loan terms.2 77
C. DirectLimitations on High-CostLoans: HOEPA
In 1994, recognizing that borrowers of high-cost loans are particularly
vulnerable to certain exploitative lenders unaffected by TILA disclosure
regulations, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act (HOEPA).27 s HOEPA designates a special class of nonpurchase,
closed-end "high-cost" loans and prohibits lenders originating them from

insurance from the calculation of "points" that are the hallmark of loan transparency. KATHLEEN
E. KEEST & GARY KLEIN, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 3.2.2, at 77 (3d ed.
1995).
275. See Guttentag, supra note 121, at 19-20. The huge amount of complex documents is a
problem of its own. Id. at 19. Guttentag states:
So many documents are required [at closing] that specialized firms have arisen
that do nothing but provide documents. The flood of documents overloads the
attention spans of many borrowers, allowing unscrupulous loan providers to take
advantage
Anyone who has gone through the process will understand. The TIL is one of
a flood of documents that the borrower receives, "Prepayment" is one of many
items on the TIL sheet, and the penalty warning is anything but clear.
Id. at 19-20.
276. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH INLENDING ACT AND THE
REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 1 (1998).
277. Peterson, supra note 268, at 881 (noting that "high-cost creditors have advocated
disclosure rules to deflect legislative pressure for more substantive rules").
278. HOEPA was passed as an amendment to TILA. Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1648 (2000). The Federal Reserve Board is authorized under TILA
to promulgate regulations, collectively referred to as Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31, 226.32
(2004).
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employing specific loan terms or practices.279 Specifically, HOEPA
protections apply if a loan meets one of two high-cost loan triggers: (i) the
APR exceeds by eight percent the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity for first-lien loans, or above ten percent for
subordinate lien loans (the "rate trigger" or "APR trigger"); or (ii) the total
of all the loan's points and fees exceeds eight percent of the loan total or
$400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever is greater (the "points and fees
trigger"). 280 Regulation Z, which implements HOEPA, specifies which
charges count as points and fees to be included in the fee trigger28 ' and
includes compensation to a mortgage broker in the form of a yield spread
premium182 and, after recent amendments to Regulation Z, optional credit
insurance.283
2 84
In addition to imposing supplemental disclosure requirements,
HOEPA prohibits the inclusion of certain loan terms that tend to be
279. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1639.
280. Id. § 1602(aa)(l), (3); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i), (ii). The fee trigger was lowered by
the Federal Reserve Board in 2001 from ten percent above comparable Treasury securities (for
either first- or second-lien loans). Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,606, 65,608-10 (Dec. 20,
2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
281. Those charges include:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a point,
discount, or other system of additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting the
creditor against the obligor's default or other credit loss.
(6) Borrower-paid mortgage broker fees, including fees paid directly to the
broker or the lender (for delivery to the broker) whether such fees are paid in cash
or financed.
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(6).
282. Id. § 1602(aa)(4XB); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(l)(ii) (requiring that "[a]ll compensation paid
to mortgage brokers" be included in the points and fees calculation).
283. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(l)(iv). Real estate charges, such as title insurance and filing and
recording fees, must also be included unless the charges are reasonable, offer no direct or indirect
compensation to the creditor, and are paid to a third party unaffiliated with the creditor. Id.
§ 226.32(b)(iii).
284. A lender who originates a high-cost loan must provide to the borrower, at least three days
before closing, notice that the borrower is entitled to cancel the loan despite having started the
application process and that the borrower may lose the home and all equity in it as a result of
nonpayment. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), (b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 l(c)(1); Official Staff Interpretations, 12
C.F.R. pt. 226 Supp. 1, sect. 226.31 (2004). When combined with TILA's three-day postclosing
right to rescind, this provision gives borrowers a total of six days to reflect on the appropriateness
of the particular loan. This notice also must specifically disclose any balloon payment, the cost of
credit insurance, plus notice that it is optional, and, for variable rate loans, the maximum possible
monthly payment. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c).
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predatory when made part of an already very expensive high-cost loan. For
loans that fall into its high-cost loan triggers, HOEPA prohibits: (i)
negative amortization in all cases;285 (ii) balloon payments on loans that
balloon within five or fewer years of loan origination;. 6 (iii) default
interest rate loan terms;287 and, in certain cases, (iv) prepayment penalties
for financially vulnerable borrowers.2"8 Creditors are prohibited from
engaging in asset-based lending-lending without regard to a borrower's
ability to pay 289-but only if there is proof of a "pattern or practice" of
such activity. 29° Recent amendments to Regulation Z also place limits on
loan flipping: creditors or their affiliates are forbidden from refinancing a
HOEPA-covered loan within one year unless the refinancing is "in the
borrower's interest., 29' Damages for violations of HOEPA include all
those available under TILA plus enhanced statutory damages in the
amount of the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer.292
Importantly, HOEPA includes a provision for limited assignee liability.293
According to this provision, purchasers of HOEPA loans are liable for all
claims and defenses a debtor could have raised against the loan originator
unless the assignee can demonstrate that "a reasonable person exercising
ordinary due diligence" could not have determined that the loan was
covered by HOEPA. 294 HOEPA, like TILA, has a one-year statute of

285. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(1)(i); Official StaffInterpretations, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226, Supp. 1, sect. 226.32 (2004). For loan terms that exceed five years, balloon payments are
permissible but must be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4). Such terms, which sometimes increase
interest rates by forty percent, are unfair because they make it very difficult, and sometimes
impossible, for a borrower to cure a default. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 217, at 615 & n. 179.
288. Prepayment penalties are permitted only if: (i) the loan will not cause the borrowers to
pay more than fifty percent of their income to the monthly payments; (ii) income and expenses are
verified by a financial statement signed by the consumer and supported by a credit report; (iii) the
creditor is not refinancing one of its own or an affiliate's loans; (iv) it occurs within the first five
years of the loan; and (v) the penalty is legal under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c).
289. HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit "based on the consumers' collateral
without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers' current and expected
income, current obligations, and employment." Id. § 1639(h).
290. Id. Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard one
for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in a short period
of time. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The recent
amendments have loosened the requirement somewhat, creating a presumptive violation where the
lender has failed to document and verify the borrower's ability to pay. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4).
291. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3). In considering whether a refinancing is "in the borrower's
interest," Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the borrower's circumstances at
the time the credit was extended. Id. § 226.34 (a)(4).
292. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).
293. Id. § 1641.
294. Id. § 1641(d)(1). Due diligence requires that the purchaser examine all loan
documentation required by TILA plus the itemization of amount financed and any other
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limitations for affirmative suits but can be raised any time-including
against assignees-as a defense to foreclosure.2 95
HOEPA's additional prohibitions on certain abusive loan terms
improve, in important ways, upon the rigid disclosure paradigm governing
TILA. Specifically, HOEPA recognizes that certain practices are
inherently dangerous when connected with very high-cost loans and
usually affect those least able to appreciate their dangers.296 In 2000, critics
made many of the same (incorrect) predictions about ultimately enacted
amendments that lowered HOEPA high-cost triggers as they now do in
reaction to state anti-predatory lending legislation.297 Those predictions
were, of course, wrong, as subprime lending has since continued to
expand.298 Unfortunately, at the same time, HOEPA has had little success
in eliminating those abusive practices it identifies. As consumer advocates
have been arguing for years, HOEPA's points and fees triggers are simply
too high.299 As a result, very few subprime loans-less than one percent in
1999-fall within HOEPA's points and fees trigger and are subject to
regulation."° Predatory lenders have successfully managed to conduct the

disclosures. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 217, § 10.7.2. This is an objective test; however, the
purchaser will be responsible for any subjective knowledge it obtains from outside the written
disclosures. In most cases, whether or not a loan is covered should be apparent on the face of loan
disclosures, particularly because all HOEPA loans that are to be sold must include a special notice
alerting the purchaser that the loan is high-cost and subjects the purchaser to assignee liability. 15
U.S.C. § 1641 (d)(4). As a result, most HOEPA loans will carry assignee liability.
295. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
296. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 53.
297. See PredatoryLendingPracticesHearing,supranote 42, app. at 710 (prepared statement
ofNeill Fendly, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers) (arguing that proposed
HOEPA amendments, including "overly expansive restrictions on certain types of loan terms and
burdensome disclosure and other affirmative obligations, can have unintended consequences. These
include reducing competition in the marketplace by driving participants and investors away and
elimination of consumer access to mortgage financing"); Letter from Howard Glaser, Senior Staff
Vice President, Government Affairs/General Counsel, Mortgage Bankers Association, to Jennifer
J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 15, 2000) ("[T]he
Board must take into consideration that the constriction of credit will be a real consequence of any
downward adjustments of the triggers .... [I]f triggers are dropped, a significant portion of lenders
would altogether refrain from extending credit to that segment of newly covered loans."), available
at www.mbaa.org/resident/lib2000/c_65fr42889.html; Mike Sorohan, Fed Explores HOEPA's
Effect on PredatoryLending, REALESTATE FIN. TODAY ELECTRONIc EDMON, Aug. 21,2000,2000
WL 8249464 (reporting testimony of President of National Home Equity Mortgage Association
before the Federal Reserve Board that "'[l]owering HOEPA's triggers would significantly decrease
access to credit for most lenders .... Changing the covered points and fees would have the same
effect on exclusion.'").
298. See supra Part II.A.2 (documenting enormous growth of subprime lending from 1994 to
the present).
299. See, e.g., RENUART & KEEST, supra note 217, § 10.1.1.
300. HUD-TREAsuRy JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 85 (demonstrating that 0.70% of
subprime loans in 1999 offered rates greater than 16%, the rate at which HOEPA's 10% APR
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bulk of their abusive activities using rates just below the HOEPA triggers
but still high enough to provide enormous room for exploitation and
profitability.3 ' An additional problem is that HOEPA's coverage does not
apply to purchase-money mortgages or open-end loans.3 02 Thus, the twenty
percent of subprime loans issued for home purchases3"3 are automatically
exempt from HOEPA. In addition, lenders offering refinance loans can
evade HOEPA's coverage by constructing, as they frequently do, their
loan as a line of credit secured by the home. Evidence suggests that many
lenders do this specifically to avoid HOEPA's prohibitions. 304
In the end, if a loan falls below the HOEPA high-cost home loan
triggers, HOEPA provides no protection at all.
D. Consumer Education
Representatives of the subprime lending industry suggest that consumer
education can do much to resolve predatory lending without the costs they
believe are associated with aggressive legislative initiatives.30 5 As
described, many targets of predatory and subprime lenders are
disconnected from the economic mainstream and lack basic financial

trigger came into play). The Federal Reserve estimates that the recent lowering of the APR trigger
from 10% to 8% will increase HOEPA's coverage from 1% to 5% of subprime loans. Truth in
Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,606, 65,608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
301. See Reform of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the Truth in
LendingAct (TILA): JointHearing Before the Subomm. on Fin.Insts. And Consumer Credit and
the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunityof the House Comm. on Bankingand Fin. Servs.,
105th Cong. app. at 440 (1998) (prepared statement of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney,
National Consumer Law Center); HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 85; Eggert,
supra note 1, at 587 & n.416 (describing the testimony of a subprime lender who admitted that
ninety percent of his loans would fall into HOEPA coverage if credit insurance had to be included
in calculating the fee trigger).
302. RENuART & KEEST, supranote 217, § 10.1.1.
303. See supra text accompanying note 46.
304. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 217, §10.1.1. Lenders may still be liable for HOEPA
violations if they "spuriously" classify a closed-end loan as an open-end loan. Like a credit card
or line of credit, which traditionally require fewer disclosures, an open-end loan must contemplate
repeat transactions from the extension of credit and replenish the available credit as the borrower
pays down the debt. Id. § 5.2.1.5. Thus, a loan extended only to refinance a home or pay for home
improvements, but that does not allow a borrower to access additional credit as she pays down her
debt, may be, in reality, a closed-end loan subject to HOEPA provisions.
305. LITAN, supra note 11, at 9 ("[S]ubprime borrowers-who tend to be less sophisticated
in financial matters-may be able to benefit from more education and counseling about mortgage
borrowing so that they can make proper use of what information is made available."); James C.
Ballentine, Progress on Predatory Lending, AM. BANKER, Apr. 11, 2003, at 7 (arguing that a
"balanced" approach of enforcing existing state laws and increasing consumer education is the best
approach to solving predatory lending problem); Rick Grant, FirmsSee Educationand Competition
as Antidotes to PredatoryLending, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws, Apr. 20, 1998, at 28.
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literacy.3" 6 Financial illiteracy in this context leads to bad credit products
and further debt, which in turn makes unsophisticated consumers
susceptible to predatory lenders marketing superficially attractive debt
consolidation packages. Studies regarding the effectiveness of financial
literacy programs have, however, been mixed. General educational
programs designed to increase overall familiarity with financial
terminology and operations tend not to have a significant positive impact
on at-risk borrowers.30 7 Targeted homebuyer counseling programs, in
contrast, offer some encouraging results.30 8 Direct counseling of high-cost
loan customers is a desirable, and even necessary, component of
decreasing predatory lending; better educated borrowers may learn, at a
minimum, to ask important questions and realize that alternative loan
options may be available. However, education should be offered in
addition to, not in place of, substantive legislative reform. The market
power of predatory lenders is too great to have confidence that borrowers
would be able to sufficiently comprehend the complex loan packages and
manipulative and deceptive sales tactics they employ.
E. Fraudand Antidiscrimination
The Fair Housing Act (FHA)" 9 prohibits intentional discrimination
against protected classes in connection with renting or selling residential
real estate,310 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) a1" prohibits
discrimination against protected classes in credit transactions, including
mortgages."' Unfortunately, antidiscrimination causes of action are
306. See supratext accompanying notes 179-83. A study ofsubprime borrowers revealed that
twelve percent were unfamiliar with terms such as "loan principal" and "interest rate" and that a
full one-third of subprime borrowers were unfamiliar with the variety of mortgage products and
terms available. HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 58-59.
307. Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, FinancialLiteracy: An Overview of Practice,
Research, and Policy, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 445, 452 (2002).
308. One study of the benefits of prepurchase home ownership counseling demonstrated that
borrowers who had received individual counseling had a thirty-four percent lower ninety-day
delinquency rate than those who received no counseling. Id. at 450. Those who received classroom
and home study training had lower delinquency rates of twenty-six percent and twenty-one percent
respectively. Id.Another study, examining almost 40,000 loans in a five-year period, estimated that
prepurchase counseling reduces rates of ninety-day delinquency among borrowers below the
median income by an average of nineteen percent, and that results were better for groups receiving
individual counseling as opposed to classroom, take-home study, or telephone counseling.
ABDIGHANI HmAD & PETER M. ZORN, A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD THING: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOMEOWNERSHIP COUNSELING 3, 18 (2001),

available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/pdf/homebuyersstudy.pdf.
309. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000).
310. Id. § 3605 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, handicap, or familial status).
311. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91(f).
312. Id. § 1691(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
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notoriously hard to prove in lending cases: it is enormously difficult,
particularly for the financially unsophisticated, to suspect, let alone, later
isolate, the reason for their denial of credit; it is correspondingly easy for
lenders to point to neutral criteria that may have contributed to it.313
F. FederalRegulatory Activity
Federal regulatory agencies have limited jurisdiction over subprime
market players. HUD has authority to enforce the FHA and RESPA, but
it has taken only a "small number of actions" enforcing those laws against
subprime or predatory lenders. 314 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has initiated-and settled-a number of actions against subprime lenders
alleging unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the FTC Act3 since
1998. 3# The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) regulates
national banks and their operating holding companies and subsidiaries; the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulates national thrift institutions as
well as their operating subsidiaries; and the National Credit Union
Association (NCUA) regulates national credit unions.3 17 The OCC has
issued guidance letters to the national banks it regulates, alerting them to
abusive lending practices they should avoid directly engaging in or
religion, sex, marital status, age, or receipt of public assistance).
313. See Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify Federal
MortgageLending DiscriminationLaws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 527, 532, 562 (1993). But see
Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (denying lender summary judgment on claim by African Americans of disparate treatment
or "reverse redlining"). Victims of predatory lending also may be able to assert state law causes of
action such as common law fraud, misrepresentation under a state's Unfair and Deceptive Practices
Act (UDPA), or unconscionability. Because of the difficulty of proving each of these types of
claims, their limited damages remedies, and their inability to reach secondary market noteholders,
case-by-case adjudication of such claims are unlikely to impose a meaningful deterrent to the
thousands of predatory loans originated each year.
314. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
315. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. The Act specifically prohibits unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or parties in or affecting commerce. Id. § 45.
316. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, app. 1; id. at 37-38. For example, in 2002, the FTC
settled a complaint against one of the largest subprime lenders, Associates First Capital Corporation
and Associates Corporation of North America and its successor, Citigroup, alleging that the
corporation deceived borrowers into refinancing debts into high interest rate loans and purchasing
high-cost credit insurance. Id. at 37. That year, the FTC also settled an action against another major
subprime lender, First Alliance Mortgage Company, that alleged that the company misled
customers about loan origination fees, interest rate increases, and monthly payments on adjustable
rate mortgages. Id. In 2000, the FTC recommended to Congress that it be given the additional
authority to enforce violations of HOEPA which it currently does not have. See PredatoryLending
Practices Hearing, supra note 42, at app. 334-35 (prepared statement of the Federal Trade
Commission); see also Josh Davin Morton, PredatoryLending, in Developments in Banking Law:
2002, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 158, 160-61, 164-65 (2003) (describing several enforcement
actions brought by HUD and the FTC).
317. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 50 n. 1.
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indirectly subsidizing through purchasing in the secondary market,318 and
has recently issued a prohibition on making loans based on the equity
value of a loan and without regard to the borrower's ability to repay.319 The
OTS, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, OCC, and NCUA have issued
interagency and independent advisories to institutions they regulate about
avoiding certain abusive or predatory lending practices."'
Overall, however, these regulatory agencies have had a very limited
role in controlling the abuses in the subprime market. First, only
approximately ten percent of lending institutions that primarily engage in
subprime lending are federally regulated depository institutions, such as
banks or thrifts. 3 1 Federal regulators report that there is little evidence of
predatory lending activity in those institutions 322 and, as a result, have not
initiated any formal enforcement actions against them related to predatory
lending behavior.323 In addition, there are significant jurisdictional
limitations to the regulatory oversight by the OCC and OTS.324 These
agencies do not regularly conduct supervisory investigations of operating
subsidiaries (frequently state-chartered) of national banks and thrifts, or of
independent mortgage lenders.3 25 The agencies have taken the position that

318.

See

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,

ADVISORY LETTER 2003-2, GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY
AND ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES 1-2 (2003) [hereinafter OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-2],
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf; OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3,

supranote 7, at 1. The OCC concluded in part that some forms of "flipping" and "equity stripping"
are unfair practices that violate the FTC Act. OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-2, supra, at 5-6.
319. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,904
(Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
320. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON
SUBPRIME LENDING 2 (Mar. 1, 1999); Letter No. 99-CU-05 from the National Credit Union
Administration, to Federally Insured Credit Unions 1 (June 1999), available at
http://www.ncua.gov/letters/1999/99-cu-05.pdf; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OFTHE CURRENCY,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ADVISORY LETTER 2000-7, ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES 1 (2000);
Memorandum 131 from Richard M. Riccobono, Office of Thrift Supervision, to Chief Executive
Officers 1 (Nov. 27,2000), availableathttp://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/25132.pdf; Memorandum
132 from Richard M. Riccobono, Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury, to
Chief Executive Officers 1 (Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/25131.
pdf; Letter No. 01 -FCU-03 from the National Credit Union Administration, to Federal Credit Union
Officials 1 (April 2001), availableat http://www.ncua.gov/letters/2001/01-FCU-03.pdf.
321. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
322. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Final Rules on
Preemption on Predatory Lending: Includes Strong Standard to Keep Predatory Lending out of
National Banks (Jan. 7, 2004) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.)
("Predatory lending is a very significant problem in many American communities, but there is scant
"),availableat
evidence that regulated banks are engaged in abusive or predatory practices ....
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0107.html.
323. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
324. See id. at 50.
325. Id. at 49.
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direct operating subsidiaries do not engage in predatory lending 326 -a
claim disputed by numerous state authorities and consumer
advocates 327 _and, partly as a result, have ruled that state predatory
lending laws that would apply to the activity of both national banks and
their state-chartered direct operating subsidiaries are preempted by OCC
and OTS regulations.328
These agencies also do little to regulate the activities of nonbank
subsidiaries of national bank holding companies.329 According to some
estimates, nonbank subsidiaries originated nearly a quarter of the total
subprime loans made by the top twenty-five subprime lenders in 2003.330
Nevertheless, federal banking regulators do not conduct supervisory
examinations of these entities to check for compliance with consumer
protection laws. 331 They also have no authority over the remainder of
subprime lenders-independent mortgage and finance companies 33 2-that
represent approximately sixty percent of the subprime market.333 In sum,
federal enforcement actions have been insufficient deterrents over
predatory behavior, and OTC and OCC regulatory oversight only touches
a small fraction of the overall subprime lending market from which
predatory behavior emerges.
G. Role of Securitizationand the Holder-in-Due-CourseRule
Ultimately, all state law fraud and contract claims (and some federal
disclosure claims) 334 are of limited use, either as an affirmative claim for
relief or as a defense to foreclosure-because the majority of subprime
loans are securitized and sold onto the secondary market. Purchasers of
those loans can invoke the holder-in-due-course rule, codified in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which immunizes them from
defenses to underlying fraud or unconscionability claims and entitles them
to proceed with foreclosure no matter how abusive the loan terms, if the
holder of the note can demonstrate it purchased the note for value and was
not aware of the debtors' defenses at the time of purchase.335 Suits against

326. Id. at 50-51.
327. See, e.g., CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER, supra note 30, at 7-10.
328. See infra Parts V.C. l.a. (OTS preemption), V.C. 1.b. (OCC preemption).
329. GAO REPORT, supranote 8, at 51. Federal- and state-chartered banks and thrifts, as well
as their subsidiaries, are frequently incorporated as part of a larger bank holding company. Id. That
holding company also may own finance or mortgage companies, making them affiliates, but not
subsidiaries, of the federally regulated bank or thrift. See id. at 50 fig.2, 51.
330. Id. at 52. And, according to HUD, twenty percent of the 178 lenders primarily engaged
in subprime lending were nonbank subsidiaries of holding companies. Id.
331. See GAO REPORT, supranote 8, at 51-52.
332. Id. at 50 fig.2.
333. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Parts II.B-E.
335. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002). The rule applies to purchasers of mortgages if they are: (i) a
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originating brokers and lenders are often futile: predatory brokers and
lenders, often fly-by-night operations, are generally undercapitalized, in
or on the precipice of bankruptcy, or otherwise judgment proof.336
Certain "real defenses" such as duress, lack of legal capacity, and fraud
in the factum (e.g., where a signature was forged by the lender) survive,
but they are extremely difficult to prove.337 The FTC has fully abrogated
the holder-in-due-course doctrine's application to the sale of consumer
goods, thereby making the doctrine inapplicable to assignees of loans for
manufactured homes or loans for home improvements. 3 Plaintiffs may
also be able to pierce the holder-in-due-course rule and assign liability to
the noteholder in certain circumstances, such as where the holder knew of
or participated in an underlying fraud.339 Nevertheless, in the vast majority
of cases, victims of predatory lending whose loans have been sold to the
secondary market will have no affirmative claims against the noteholder
and, more troubling, will have no defense to the foreclosure brought by the
noteholder. The problematic result is that, as Professor Eggert explained,
"the holder in due course doctrine places the risk of loss for most fraud
firmly on the back of the homeowner who signed the note.""
V. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES AND THE MOVE TO
PREEMPT THEM

Since 1999, when North Carolina passed the first comprehensive state
" ' there has been an explosion of
law targeting predatory lending,34
legislation at the state and local level passed in an attempt to fill the many
regulatory gaps. Twenty-six states (including the District of Columbia)
have enacted regulations targeting unfair lending practices.3 42 Partially in
response to studies documenting the ravages of predatory lending in
municipal regions such as Chicago,343 Atlanta, 3" New York,3 45 Northern

holder; (ii) of a negotiable note; (iii) who took the note for value; (iv) in good faith; and (v) without
notice of the defenses to the note. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT A. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-2 (5th ed. 2000).
336. See Eggert, supra note 1, at 522.
337. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 335, § 14-10.
338. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2004).
339. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 335, § 14-10.
340. Eggert, supra note 1, at 613.
341. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (West 2004).
342. See infra Part V.A.
343. See PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supranote 5, at 3-4.
344. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN ATLANTA: INCOME AND

RACIAL DISPARITIES INSuBPRIME LENDING 1 (2000), availableathttp://www.hud.gov/library/book
shelfl 8/pressrel/subpratl.html.
345. See U.S. DEP'T OFHOUS. &URBAN DEv., UNEQUAL BURDEN IN NEWYORK: INCOME AND

RACIAL DISPARITIES INSUBPRIME LENDING 1-2 (2000), availableat http://www.huduser.org/Pub
lications/pdf/newyork.pdf.
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New Jersey 346 and Los Angeles, 4 states in which those municipalities are
located have all pursued comprehensive, "aggressive" legislative responses
to predatory lending, following a model established by the North Carolina
law.348 Other states have adopted minor reforms, while about half have
chosen not to respond legislatively at all. 349 The variety of experimentation
occurring at the state level tends to proceed on two axes: (1) following the
basic "trigger" model developed by HOEPA to focus regulations on
vulnerable, "high-cost" home loan borrowers; and (2) prohibiting loan
terms and practices similar to those in the North Carolina law. The
percolation of state and local regulations is thus generating a sophisticated
invaluable regulatory dialogue between the federal and state
governments-a real value to our federal system-and also demonstrates
why efforts to silence it through complete federal preemption should be
resisted.
A. Rapid and ExperimentalState Responses

In 1999, North Carolina enacted the first comprehensive state predatory
lending legislation, which was modeled upon HOEPA's high-cost loan
framework, but significantly supplemented HOEPA's prohibitions.35 ° The
North Carolina law adopts the same APR trigger as HOEPA (eight
percent), but sets the points and fees trigger a full three points lower at five
percent.35 ' In enacting the law, legislators and consumer advocates in

346. See ZHIWMERMAN ET AL., supra note 5 (examining national and state level data to assess
the dimensions of predatory lending practices in New Jersey and setting forth recommendations to
combat the problem).
347. See CAL. REINVESTMENT COMM., supra note 5 (studying subprime lending in four
California cities and finding that over one-third of borrowers included in the study may have been
victimized by predatory lending practices); PrrKlN & RICHMAN, supra note 175, at 2-3.
348. See infra Part V.A.I.a. In addition, several municipalities either have adopted
"debarment"-style predatory lending ordinances, which specifically define predatory lending
practices and bar lenders who engage in them from obtaining city contracts, or have prohibited use
of certain predatory practices and terms. See, e.g., DEKALB COUNTY, GA., CODE § 2-130 (Supp.
2004); ATLANTA, GA., CODE §§ 58-100 to 58-102 (Supp. 2004); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-32-440
(Supp. 2004); DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 112.40-.44 (Supp. 2004); L.A., CAL.,
MUN. CODE §§ 181.00-.12 (Supp. 2004); OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 5.33.010-.33.120 (Supp.
2004); PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 9-2401 to 9-2407 (Supp. 2004); TOLEDO, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 795.20.25 (Supp. 2004); CLEVELAND, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE § § 178.181,659.01-.06,659.99 (Supp. 2004);
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 6-128 (Supp. 2004). Some of these, however, have since been
expressly preempted by state predatory lending statutes. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A- 11 (2004); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/150 (West 2004).
349. See infra text accompanying notes 420-23.
350. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2 (West 2004). The law adds provisions to
existing usury statutes and applies to all lenders who do business in the state, including national
banks, thrifts, credit unions, their subsidiaries, and all licensed or unlicensed mortgage brokers,
mortgage bankers, and finance companies. Id.
351. Id. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)b.
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North Carolina believed that their priority should be to attack financed
points and fees, which undermine loan transparency and hide costs that
strip equity from home owners."' For loans that are deemed high-cost by
the North Carolina triggers, the law also prohibits, among many other
things, the financing of any points or fees, balloon payments, negative
amortizations, default interest rate provisions, call provisions allowing the
lender to accelerate the indebtedness at its discretion, advance payments,
modification or payment deferral fees, lending without home ownership
counseling, points and fees when refinancing an existing high-cost loan
held by the same lender as the noteholder, direct payments from the lender
to a home improvement contractor, and lending without regard to the
borrower's ability to repay.353 Considering the practices unjustified in any
circumstances, regardless of a borrower's risk profile, the North Carolina
law also prohibits refinancing a loan where there is no "reasonable,
tangible net benefit" to the borrower (loan flipping), encouraging a
borrower to default, financing credit and disability life insurance products,
and charging prepayment penalties.354 Remedies for violations of these
provisions are stringent; significantly, however, the law does not abrogate
the application of the holder-in-due-course doctrine by including an
assignee liability provision.355
1. The Aggressive States: Variations on a North Carolina Theme
North Carolina has acted, as states have in other contexts, as a leader
among states moving toward reform.'35 6 Since 2000, approximately thirteen
352. ProtectingHomeowners: PreventingAbusiveLending While PreservingAccessto Credit:
Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on
Hous. and Cmty. Opportunityof the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (prepared
testimony of George Brown, Senior Vice President, Self-Help, Spokesperson, Coalition for
Responsible Lending) (discussing the choice, embodied in the North Carolina law, to limit points
and fees, not interest rates).
353. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)-(d). There is a presumption that the borrower is able to
repay the loan when, at the time of loan consummation, the borrower's total monthly debts
(including amounts owed under the loan) are less than fifty percent of their monthly gross income
as verified by the lender by statutorily approved sources, such as a credit report or a financial
statement. Id. § 24-1.1 E(c)(2).
354. The prohibitions on loan flipping and lending without regard to ability to repay actually
apply to a category of covered loans broader than the high cost loan category. Id. § 24-10.2(a), (c).
355. Violations ofany ofthe provisions are considered usurious and therefore subject violators
to either forfeiture of all interest and return of twice the interest paid, or treble actual damages and
attorney's fees. Id. §§ 24-1.1 E(d), 24-2,75-1. l(a), 75-16,75-16.1 (indicating plaintiffs may recover
under either section 24-2 or sections 75-16 and 75-16.1). These damages can be sought by the
Attorney General ofNorth Carolina, the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, or a private party.
Id. § 24-1.1E(d).
356. This model corresponds to, for example, a number of reforms in the environmental
context, where certain states took the lead ahead of other states and of the federal government to
pass laws restricting auto emissions and hazardous waste disposal. See Richard L. Revesz,
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"aggressive" jurisdictions have followed North Carolina's initiative by
lowering triggers and banning a variety of abusive lending practices, while
others have more modestly supplemented HOEPA. A taxonomy of the
variety of state experimentation follows.
a. Broader Coverage than HOEPA
Three jurisdictions have set high-cost home loan APR trigger lower
than HOEPA. The District of Columbia set its APR trigger at six percent
above the rate for a Treasury security of comparable maturity, two points
lower than HOEPA's first-lien loan trigger; Illinois and New Mexico set
their APR triggers at six percent and seven percent, respectively, above
rates on comparable Treasury securities.357 The other states that expand
HOEPA's loan coverage-Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and
South Carolina-do so by employing lower points and fees triggers,
although with variations among them. California and Colorado employ a
flat 6 percentage points and fees trigger, while Illinois sets its trigger at the
greater of five percent of the principle amount or $800;358 other states
employ a sliding scale trigger system, so that a lender can collect more
points and fees for the smaller loans that carry proportionately greater
origination and servicing costs.3" 9 In most cases, these states also expand
high-cost home loan coverage by requiring that more costs be included
into the points and fees determination than does HOEPA, such as any
direct or indirect compensation paid to mortgage brokers (e.g., the yield

Federalism and EnvironmentalRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553,
583-608 (2001).
357. D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1151.01(7) (2004); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/10 (2004); N.M.
STAT. § 58-21A-3 (2004). Maryland also has adopted an APR trigger of seven percent, MD. CODE
ANN., CoM. LAW § 12-124.1 (a)(2) (2004), but it prohibits so few practices in connection with the

high-cost loans (no financing single-premium credit insurance or lending without regard to ability
to repay, id. §§ 12-124.1, 12-127, 12-311), that its regulation of high-cost loans should not be
classified as an aggressive predatory lending regulation.
358. Cf.CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970 (Deering 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-101(2) (West
2004); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/10 (West 2004).

359. For example, North Carolina, Georgia, New Mexico, and South Carolina set the points
and fees trigger at eight percent for loans less than $20,000 and at five percent for loan amounts
greater than $20,000. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-3(N)
(Michie 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. 1 E(a)(6)(b); S.C. CODEANN. § 37-23-20(15) (Law. Co-op.
2003); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-103(7)(A)(ii) (Michie 2004) (setting points and fees

trigger at five percent for loan amounts greater than $75,000, six percent for loan amounts less than
$75,000, and eight percent for loan amounts less than $20,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24 (West
2004) (setting points and fees trigger at 4.5% for loan amounts greater than $40,000, 6% for loan
amounts less than $40,000, and the lesser of 6% or $ 1000 for loan amounts less than $20,000); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 6-1(1)(g)(ii) (Consol. 2004) (setting points and fees trigger is five percent for loan
amounts greater than $50,000 and the greater of six percent or $1500 for loan amounts less than
$50,000).
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spread premium),3 60 the cost of single-premium credit insurance (if not
totally prohibited by the statute), 61 and the maximum prepayment
penalties that can be charged.362
Notably, several states exclude up to two "bona fide [loan] discount
points"-points that are charged in purposeful exchange for a slightly
lower interest rate-from the calculation of relevant points and fees.363
This exclusion reflects a sensible impulse to model the interest rate
discounting behavior that occurs when points and fees are assessed in the
prime market but which is generally absent in the rent-seeking predatory
subset of the subprime market. It also suggests, however, that states could
lower the point and fees trigger even further when including a bona fide
discount point exclusion; because so many subprime loans include points,
the exclusion effectively raises the points and fees trigger by two percent.
In addition, and of great significance, unlike HOEPA, all of these state
laws cover home-purchase mortgages and a few cover open-end lines of
credit. 3" Thus, the more aggressive states responding to the predatory
lending phenomenon have supplemented HOEPA by including a greater
proportion of loans to be subject to regulation.
b. Core Lending Prohibitions: Moving Toward a Definition
of Predatory Lending
What emerges from the approximately dozen states that have attempted
to aggressively regulate predatory lending within their borders is a
legislatively constructed consensus, albeit preliminary, on core practices
that make residential mortgages predatory or otherwise unacceptable.
Some consensus prohibitions are categorical and identical; others aim for

360. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-103(6)(A); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(B); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/10; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(1)(f)(iii).
361. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(C); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/10; N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 46:1OB-24.
362. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-103(7)(B); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(D)-(E); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:1OB-24.
363. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-103(3); D.C. CODEANN. § 26-1151.01(3) (2004);N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:101B-24; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21 A-3(B); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 E(a)(3) (2004)

(defining bona fide discount points as "loan discount points knowingly paid by the borrower for
the purpose of reducing, and which in fact result in a bona fide reduction of, the interest rate...
provided the... interest rate reduction.., is reasonably consistent with established industry norms
and practices for secondary mortgage market transactions"); see also N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6l(1)(c) ("[A] point is [presumed to be] a bona fide loan discount point if it reduces the interest rate
by a minimum of twenty-five basis points provided all other terms of the loan remain the same.");
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.32(2)(c) (2004) (stating the presumption that "a point is a bona
fide loan discount point if it reduces the interest rate by a minimum of 35 basis points or 3/8 of a
point provided all other terms of the loan remain the same").
364. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-103(5)(A); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746a(4) (West 2003);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1151.01 (7)(A); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(8); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1 OB-24;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-3(I); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(1)(e).
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the same general regulatory ends but employ interesting, observable
variations. The states that share many of the same prohibitions are in effect
imposing basic underwriting standards on a subset of subprime loans that
otherwise do not abide by strict underwriting criteria.365 In other words,
they impose upon high-cost lenders, through legislation, what GSEs and
the force of competition have imposed on loans in the conventional
market.
i. Categorical Prohibitions
All of the "aggressive" states that have expanded high-cost loan
coverage, as well as several states that retain the HOEPA trigger in their
predatory lending statutes-such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and
Kentucky-ban certain practices outright and with little or no variation.3 66
Appendix 1 provides a state-by-state catalogue of prohibited practices in
connection with high-cost loans. Those prohibitions can be generalized as
follows:
No Negative Amortizations-With exceptions for reverse
mortgages, loans must fully amortize interest due, so that the
loan balance decreases over the life of the loan;36 7
No Balloon Payments-Loans may not schedule a single
payment that is more than twice the monthly average
payment either at any
36 time during the life of the loan or for a
set period of years;
No Call Provisions-Loansmay not include provisions that
permit lenders to accelerate indebtedness at their sole
discretion;369

365. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
366. See infra notes 367-73, 420 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 E(b)(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(3); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1152.15.
368. CompareN.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(2), GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(2), and S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-23-30(2) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (prohibiting scheduling payments twice the average
monthly amount for life of loan), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-102(1)(a) (West 2004) (no
scheduling payments twice the average monthly amount for a period often years after closing), and
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(b) (prohibiting scheduling payments twice the average monthly
amount for a period of fifteen years after closing).
369. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-25(e); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(a); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-23-30(1). The "no call provisions" do not, however, apply to provisions that allow
acceleration upon borrower default, which is also common in the prime market. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(l).
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No Advance Payments-Loans may not include provisions
under which two or more periodic payments are consolidated
and paid in advance from the loan proceeds;37°
No Default InterestRate-Loans may not contain provisions
that increase the interest rate upon a borrower's default;3 7 '
No Direct Payments to Home Improvement ContractorsLenders are prohibited from making direct payments from
loan proceeds to home improvement contractors unless
payment is made jointly to the borrower and the contractor,
to a third party escrow, or with an affidavit that the
contracting work has been satisfactorily completed;37 1
Mandatory,AdditionalDisclosures-Lendersmust separately
include a disclosure to borrowers several days prior to loan
consummation that informs borrowers, among other things
that: (a) by agreeing to the loan, the lender will have a
mortgage on the home; (b) default may lead to loss of the
home; (c) the borrower may be able to obtain a loan that is
less costly and should 'shop around' for that possibility; (d)
the borrower should (or must) seek loan counseling to assess
appropriateness of loan; and (e) the borrower is not obligated
to go through with the loan at this point.3 73
ii. Variations on Core Prohibitions
In addition to the categorical prohibitions just described, "aggressive"
states have addressed, in slightly varied ways, other core predatory lending
practices such as lending without regard to repayment ability, assessing
prepayment penalties, packing insurance fees, and flipping. These
variations reflect the belief that the legitimacy of these practices, unlike
the above categorical prohibitions, are more subjective and may ultimately
depend upon the context in which they are engaged. Whatever variations
are employed among them, all these states use the following regulations
to prevent a common predatory strategy (if only for a small category of
loans) of locking vulnerable borrowers into exploitative loans and
pursuing practices that, in combination, repeatedly strip substantial equity
from borrowers until they face an unreasonable risk of foreclosure.
370. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/85 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§ 8-206-A(1 1) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. 1E(b)(5).
371. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746b (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 360.100(2)(e) (Michie 2004).
372. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-53-104(n) (Michie 2003); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(g)
(Deering 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1 OB-26(h).
373. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(f); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-5(P) (Michie
2004); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(1)(ii).
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Lending without Regard to Ability to Repay (asset-basedor
equity-basedlending)-Lendersare generally prohibited from
extending high-cost loans unless they "reasonably" believe
that the borrower, based on circumstances such as current and
expected income, employment status, additional debt
obligations, and financial resources other than equity in the
home, is able to meet her monthly financial obligations.374
Most states create a presumption of ability to repay where the
borrower's total monthly debt obligations, including
obligations for the home loan, do not exceed fifty percent of
the borrower's monthly gross income.375 Others do not
establish any presumption, leaving the question up to a
subjective determination by the courts.37 6 Most require that
lenders specifically verify and keep records of a borrower's
income and obligations through authoritative methods such
as credit reports, tax records, and payroll receipts;377
Prepayment Penalties-Two states ban all prepayment
penalties for any residential mortgage loan-not just a highcost loan-that has a value of less than $150,000.378 Most
states prohibit prepayment penalties on high-cost loans after
a period of two or three years. Of those, some states set
sliding scale limits on the percentage amount of a prepayment
penalty, a scale which attempts to reasonably compensate

374. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(f)(1); N.Y. BANKING LAW
ANN. § 37-23-40(2) (Law. Co-op. 2003).

§ 6-1 (2)(k);

S.C. CODE

375. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(k); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-23-40(2); see also CAL.
FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(0(1) (stating presumption of repayment ability if monthly debt-to-income
ratio does not exceed fifty-five percent); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-127(b) (2003) (stating
presumption of repayment ability if monthly debt-to-income ratio does not exceed forty-five
percent and the monthly gross income of the borrower is less than 120% of the median family
income for the metropolitan statistical area); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-410(2)(c) (West 2004).
376. See, e.g., ARK.CODE ANN. § 23-53-104(l) (stating that creditors cannot lend unless they
reasonably believe that the borrower "will be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the
obligation based upon a consideration of their current and expected income, current obligations,
employment status, and other financial resources other than the borrower's equity in the dwelling
that secures repayment of the loan). Some states that adopt HOEPA's high-cost loan triggers
prohibit the practice and adopt a fifty percent debt-to-income presumption of repayment ability, see
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.100(2)(i), while others also adopt HOEPA's prohibition on engaging
in a "pattern or practice" of lending without regard to repayment ability. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5-3.5-103(l)(b) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-206-A(12) (West 2003);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 456.512(b) (West 2004).
377. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(8) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-23-40(2); see also
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-103(1)(b) (establishing a presumption of lending without ability
to repay if the lender engages in a pattern or practice of making loans without verifying and
documenting a borrower's income and obligations).
378. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.4 (2004); TEx. FN. CODE ANN. § 343.205 (2004).
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lenders for the legitimately higher cost of an earlier prepaid
loan.379 Other states set no maximum rate but prohibit a
lender from collecting any prepayment penalty for
refinancing a loan the lender already holds-a fee that
otherwise encourages the same lender to refinance and strip
equity from a borrower;38 0
Financing Single-Premium Credit Insurance--Of the
substantial number of states that ban financing of singlepremium credit insurance, a significant majority consider it
so unreasonable that they forbid it in all residential
" ' A minority of states limits the prohibition to
mortgages.38
82
high-cost loans;
Flipping-The greatest variation among the "aggressive"
states is in their approaches to prohibiting loan flipping. A
379. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(l) (requiring no prepayment penalty twenty-four months after
loan consummation; two percent maximum penalty for loans prepaid in under twelve months; and
one percent maximum prepayment penalty for loans prepaid in under twenty-four months); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 137/30 (West 2004) (requiring no prepayment penalty thirty-six months after loan
consummation; three percent maximum prepayment penalty for loans prepaid in under twelve
months; two percent maximum for loans prepaid in under twenty-four months; and one percent
maximum for loans prepaid in under thirty-six months); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 360.100(2)(a) (employing HOEPA's high-cost loan trigger but maintaining limits on prepayment
penalties that are identical to Illinois's limits).
380. See CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-102(g); MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.32(4)(f)-(g) (2004). All of these statutes also require that the lender
disclose the prepayment penalty and offer an alternative loan product without such penalty. See
CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(a)(2); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-102(g); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
209, § 32.32(4)(f)-(g) (2004). Arkansas bans prepayment penalties at any time where the same
lender is refinancing a loan. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-104(m). Other states such as New York and
New Jersey have no express limitations on prepayment penalties, perhaps because they have strong
prohibitions on loan flipping that in other ways limit the possibility of unfairly refinancing with
prepayment penalties. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:108-25 0) (West 2004); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(i);
infra Appendix 1. In contrast, California prohibits prepayment penalties in the circumstances
described above, but it has no express prohibition on flipping. See CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(a);
infra Appendix 1.
381. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(l); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(b); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1 OB-25(a) (West 2004). California anticipates lenders' attempts to circumvent the prohibition
by banning the financing of SPCI either at the loan closing or within thirty days later. CAL. FIN.
CODE ANN. § 4979.7. Other states allow insurance premiums to be paid on a monthly basis. See,
e.g., 815 ILL. COW1o. STAT. 137/40; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(h) (Consol. 2004).
382. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 61 -2d- 107 (2004). Some states that adopt HOEPA's highcost triggers, such as Maine and Connecticut, merely require the lender to expressly disclose the
cost of SPCI and offer the borrower a choice of insurance on a monthly-premium basis. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746f(West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-206-A(1 3-C) (2003).
Such disclosure requirements will not deter the many predatory lenders who already are
accustomed to packing such fees by misleading the borrower into believing it is necessary in order
to consummate the loan.
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minority of these states limit only the same lender from
flipping a high-cost loan that the lender already holds with
another high-cost loan.383 The others prohibit refinancings by
any lender within certain time periods-one year, two years,
three and a half years, or five years-and under certain
conditions; lenders in these states are prohibited from
refinancing a loan within a given time period unless the new
loan provides a "reasonable, tangible net benefit to the
borrower" (RTNB)--a term borrowed from North Carolina's
law.384 While several states leave open the question of what
precisely constitutes a RTNB,385 other states attempt to set
presumptions for a loan that would provide one. Those
include: (i) a monthly debt-to-income ratio of not more than
fifty percent; (ii) a beneficial change to the borrower in the
duration of the loan; (iii) the borrower receives a reasonable
amount of cash in excess of the costs and fees associated with
the refinancing; (iv) the rate of interest is reduced by at least
two percent; (v) a change from an adjustable to a fixed-rate
loan;
Counseling-Aggressive responses to predatory lending
typically and correctly include some attempt to respond to
demand-side problems that victims bring-namely a lack of
sophistication with mortgage products.387 Most of the
"aggressive" states include some kind of loan counseling
provision in their predatory lending legislation. Some states
make loan counseling mandatory: before a high-cost loan can
be consummated, the lender must receive written verification
383. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-103(i)(c) (barring a lender that holds a loan from
refinancing a loan within one year unless refinancing is in the borrower's interest); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 6-1(2)(i) (barring a lender that holds a loan from refinancing such loan unless the refinancing
provides a reasonable, tangible net benefit to borrower); N.C. GEN. STAT § 24-1. 1E(c)(3) (barring
a lender that holds a loan from ever charging any points and fees to refinance such loan).
384. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-104(b) (barring refinancing by any lender at any time
unless the new loan provides RTNB). North Carolina believes that the practice of flipping without
a RTNB can never be justified and, accordingly, it bans the practice in connection with any
residential mortgage loan. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-4(a) (barring
refinancing of any loan within sixty months by any lender unless the new loan provides a RTNB);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/45 (barring refinancing by any lender within twelve months of loan
consummation unless the new loan provides RTNB); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 37-23-20(8), 37-23-70(A)
(Law. Co-op. 2003) (barring refinancing of any residential loan by any lender within forty-two
months of loan consummation without RTNB and charging points and fees on a refinancing by the
same lender at any time); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.34(1)(c) (2004) (barring charging points
and fees in connection with a refinancing by any lender within twenty-four months of loan
consummation, except allowing points and fees on any additional proceeds from the refinancing).
385. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-2 1A-4(B) (Michie 2004) (in determining RTNB, a lender
should consider"all of the circumstances, including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans,
the cost of the new loan and the borrower's circumstances").
386. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-23-20(8).
387. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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that the borrower has met with an independent, certified loan
counselor and has been advised about the affordability of the
proposed loan. 388 Other states mandate that originators of
igh-cost loans provide written notice to borrowers of the
advisability of seeking loan counseling before consummating
the loan and also require that the lender provide the borrower
with contact information of third-party credit counseling
agencies should
the borrower choose to seek such
38 9
counseling.

c. Additional, Innovative Proposals
In addition to the core prohibitions described above, some of the
"aggressive" states have other prohibitions that should be observed for
their potential effects on the availability of both good and predatory
subprime credit. For example, in order to increase the transparency of
usually opaque predatory loans, North Carolina prohibits altogether the
39 0
financing of any points and fees in connection with a high-cost loan;
other states have placed caps on the total amount of points and fees that
can be financed. 3 1 Banning the financing of points and fees (and to a
lesser extent, placing a cap on them) forces loan costs to be revealed either
in the APR or, for any origination and servicing costs, as an up-front cash
payment. While such a provision may make it hard for cash-poor home
equity borrowers to obtain subprime loans, the provision would force
lenders to be more honest about charges they will assess and prevent
harmful equity stripping, which many borrowers cannot apprehend at the
loan closing.
California and D.C. are unique in attempting to expressly prohibit
"steering" of borrowers to high-cost loans that are costlier than their credit
risk would justify for the same lender.392 This is a practice endemic to

388. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-104(k); G.A. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(7); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-1.1 E(c)(1). Illinois's counseling program appears the most comprehensive. The Illinois High
Risk Home Loan Act requires the Commissioner of the Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate to
set up a Mortgage Awareness Program that includes a comprehensive curriculum, taught by
certified loan counselors, on all aspects of mortgage financing. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
137/110. Any prospective high-risk loan borrower must: (i) attend a course, unless they sign a
written waiver; (ii) meet in person with the loan counselor; and (iii) after sufficient appropriations
have been made to finance it, have their loan reviewed by a state official as to its affordability. Id.
389. See CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 4973(k)(1) (Deering 2004); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(1)
(Consol. 2004); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32,32(6)(m).
390. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.lE(c)(3).
391. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746e(3) (West 2003) (capping prepaid finance
charges at the greater of five percent or $2,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(l) (West 2004)
(capping financing of points and fees at two percent); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(2)(1) (capping fees
in connection with high-cost loans at three percent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-5(A) (capping the
finance of points and fees at two percent); 209 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.32(1)(a)(2)
(capping financing of points and fees for refinancing at five percent).
392. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(l)(1) (Deering 2004). California's law requires that
[a] person who originates a [high cost] loan shall not steer, counsel, or direct any
prospective consumer to accept a loan product with a risk grade less favorable
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predatory lenders and brokers who seek higher commissions associated
with costlier loans, but it is difficult to prove. Unlike the above-described
prohibitions, steering is not apparent from the face of the loan; it depends
on discovery and a complex consideration of a lender's underwriting
criteria to determine if a more appropriate loan package should have been
offered. Nevertheless, California and D.C. appropriately recognize that
steering represents pure rent-seeking behavior at a substantial cost to
vulnerable borrowers and should thus be deterred.
In addition, several states have experimented with data collection to
attempt to track developments with the subprime industry.39 3 Others have
adopted additional, novel prohibitions particular to the circumstances of
their jurisdictions; such prohibitions include banning door-to-door
mortgage solicitations,"' restricting the content of lender
advertisements,395 and placing catch-all prohibitions on "bad faith" charges
that would further raise the cost of the loan by charging the borrower more
3 96
than the actual worth of services or for services not actually rendered.

than the risk grade that the consumer would qualify for based on that person's
then current underwriting guidelines .... ifit is an appropriate risk grade category
for which the consumer qualifies with the person.
Id. The District of Columbia's law states that
[a] lender shall not steer, counsel, or direct any prospective borrower to accept a
loan product with a risk grade less favorable than the risk grade that the borrower
would qualify for based on that lender's then current underwriting guidelines,
prudently applied, considering the information available to that lender, including
the information provided by the borrower.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1152.06(a) (2004).
393. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/115 (requiring residential mortgage lenders to track and
report to the state banking department data on the number, pace, and size of foreclosures semiannually and to specifically identify foreclosure statistics for loans with interest rates above ten
percent). Other states also require that a borrower's credit history be reported periodically. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 26-1152.07; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.34(2)(h) (requiring lenders to report
a borrower's credit history at least once per year); 63 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 456.513(a) (West
2004) (requiring lenders to report payment history at least quarterly); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53.5-104 (2004) (requiring lenders to report a borrower's credit history every quarter).
394. FLA. STAT. § 494.00791(12) (2004).
395. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746e(6) (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 397A: 14-a (2004); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.34(2)(d) (2004).
396. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746e(10); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 209,
§ 32.34(2)(f).
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2. Remedies and Assignee Liability
a. Remedies Against Loan Originators
Aggressive states have provided for remedies at law and equity in
varying strengths. At equity, virtually all states authorize courts to void
illegal loan provisions, or any part thereof, and to reform the loan so that
it is no longer high-cost.397 Several states also provide for a significant
right to rescind a violating loan. 398 All states provide for statutory damages
of some sort-typically offering a choice of the greater of double the
finance charges already paid or a minimum penalty.399 Several states
recognize that statutory damages of even double the interest paid may not
always amount to much, so they classify a violation of their predatory
lending laws as a per se violation of the state's unfair and deceptive
practices act, which provides for treble damages. 4" Recognizing the reality
of the subprime market, most states include additional provisions. First,
because large subprime lenders originate thousands of loans and, therefore,
may make innocent classification or even calculation mistakes in
originating loans, virtually all statutes offer lenders a defense to assignees
and lenders who act in good faith to abide by the law."° Second, because
victims of predatory lending, particularly those facing foreclosure,
scarcely have money to afford the legal fees necessary to contest their
loans, most states authorize a successful plaintiff to receive reasonable
attorneys fees and costs; 2 unscrupulous lenders cannot, therefore, assume
that violations will go unenforced by the indigent.

397. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-106(c) (Michie 2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 261153.01(c)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-7(b) (2004).
398. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.29 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2350(B)(1)(a) (2003). New York provides for an unlimited right to rescind a loan that violates its law.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(11) (Consol. 2004).
399. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 360.100(4)(c) (Michie 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

9-A, § 8-206-A(16-A) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 598D. 110(2) (Michie 2004).
400. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/135(b) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-29(a)
(West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. l E(d) (2004).
401. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-106(e)(1) (Michie 2003); FLA. STAT. § 494.00796(2)
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-29(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-23-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003). These

statutes generally state that a good faith defense exists if: (i) the lender has reasonable due diligence
procedures in place to prevent origination of high-cost loans with prohibited terms; (ii) despite
those procedures, the lender makes a bona fide error in calculation (not including errors of legal
judgment); and (iii) the lender makes restitution and reforms the loan within a certain period of
time after receiving notice from the borrower of statutory violations).
402. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-106(a)(2)(A)(iv); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-108 (West
2004); FLA. STAT. § 494.00794(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46: 1OB-27(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-7
(Michie 2004).
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b. Assignee Liability Provisions
As previously described, the market dynamic surrounding predatory
lending depends in large part on the securitization process."' This process
not only funds a majority of the subprime originations, it also creates
perverse incentives which insulate loan originators from risk of foreclosure
and, by virtue of the holder-in-due-course rule, insulates secondary market
noteholders from liability or victim defenses to foreclosure." As a result,
victims frequently have no recourse against a noteholder pursuing a
foreclosure. Appreciating this dynamic, a handful of aggressive states have
included provisions that abrogate the holder-in-due-course rule for certain
high-cost loans.40 5 That is, these states would subject good faith purchasers
of mortgage notes to some liability, jointly and severally with loan
originators. These efforts are important, on the one hand, to cut off funding
lines for unscrupulous lenders; on the other hand, as the Georgia
experience has demonstrated, if assignee liability provisions are perceived
to be too broad and aggressive,
4 they may drive out risk-averse financers
of legitimate subprime loans. R
Georgia's original predatory lending statute, 7 passed in 2002, was at
the time regarded as the strongest in the nation, particularly because of the
strength of its assignee liability provision.4 ' Ambiguities in the statute,
however, appeared to subject purchasers of "covered home loans"-a
category of loans with a lower points and fees trigger than high-cost loans
(and therefore containing more loans than that latter category) 409 -to
uncapped and unpredictable liability. This caused bond-rating agencies,
such as S&Ps and Moody's, to conclude that they could not rate a vast
proportion of home loans originated in Georgia.4 ' 0 As a result, many

403. See supra Part II.B.2.
404. See supra Part IV.G.
405. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a)(2); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1153.05 (2004); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27(b) (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-1 I(A) (Michie 2004).
406. See infra notes 407-14.
407. Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (2002).
408. Id. § 7-6A- 1; see also Diana B. Henriques & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Bankers Opposing
New State Curbs on UnfairLoans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2003, at C1; Ernest Holsendolph & Robert
Luke, Mortgage Lenders Push to Rewrite FairLending Act, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 23, 2003,

at LA.
409. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(6) (2002) (a "covered home loan" is a residential mortgage
transaction with a four percent APR trigger for first-lien mortgages and a points and fees trigger
of three percent).
410. Specifically, the Georgia law: (i) appeared to create assignee liability for abroad category
of "covered home loans," a category which itself was not very precisely defined; (ii) subjected
assignees to punitive damages and broad class action liability; and (iii) provided no defense to
purchasers who, despite the exercise of reasonable due diligence, inadvertently purchased a
regulated loan. See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's to Disallow Georgia Fair
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lenders, fearful that they could not sell their loans to the secondary market
without critical agency ratings, threatened to stop financing Georgia home
loans entirely.41' Georgia quickly thereafter amended its statute to alleviate
industry concerns by: (i) limiting assignee liability to holders of high-cost
loans only;4 12 (ii) eliminating the possibility of class action or punitive
damages liability;4" 3 and (iii) providing an affirmative defense to liability
for noteholders who can show that they exercised "reasonable due
diligence" in order to avoid the purchase of a high-cost home loan.414 The
amendments reassured the credit-rating agencies that risk could be limited
and predicted, and those agencies agreed to rate Georgia home loans.415
Several other states have modeled assignee liability provisions on the
Georgia experience in order to cut off funding for predatory loans while
making subprime credit plentiful under the high-cost loan triggers. States
like New Jersey, D.C., Arkansas, Maine, and Illinois have assignee
liability provisions that entitle the borrower to assert against a purchaser
all claims and defenses available against the originator, thereby largely
abrogating the holder-in-due-course rule of high-cost home loans while
providing a safe harbor for investors exercising due diligence to avoid the
purchase of high-cost loans.416 States like Colorado and Florida incorporate
explicitly HOEPA's assignee liability provisions. 7 In addition, however,
these states limit subprime lenders' exposure to liability by prohibiting

Lending Act Loans (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0116b.
html; Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans
in RMBS Pools Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 5,2003), available
at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0205b.html; Press Release, Moody's Investors Services,
Moody's Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential Mortgages in Securitizations
(Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pdf.
411. See Georgia Fair Lending Act: The Unintended Consequences 2-3 (2003), availableat
http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf.
412. In fact, the amended Georgia statute eliminated the category of "covered home loans"
entirely. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(7) (West 2004), with GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(6)
(West 2003).
413. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(c) (West 2004), with GA. CODE ANN § 7-6A-7(a)
(West 2003).
414. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(b) (West 2004).
415. See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Fitch to Rate RMBS After
Amendment to Georgia Predatory Lending Statute, GFLA (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/03/0314a.html; Press Release, Standard & Poor's,
Standard & Poor's Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans into Rated Structured Finance
Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003), availableat http://www.standardandpoors.com.
416. ARK.CODE ANN.§ 23-53-105(a) (Michie 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1153.05 (2004);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/135(d) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-209 (West
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1 OB-27(b) (West 2004).
417. COLO.REV. STAT. § 5-3.5-201 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 494.00793 (2004) (incorporating
same assignee liability as in 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2000)).
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class action suits, limiting damages," 8 and offering noteholders a
"reasonable due diligence" defense similar to Georgia's and HOEPA's.
Pursuant to this provision, a note purchaser can avoid liability if the
purchaser can demonstrate that it exercised reasonable due diligence to
avoid the purchase of any high-cost home loans or otherwise has in place
policies and procedures to avoid the purchase of regulated loans.4 19
As the Georgia experience demonstrates, legislators will have to at
least consider the effect of their regulation on the secondary market to be
careful that they do not undermine the assurances, processes, and risks
necessary for residential mortgage lending overall. Nevertheless, the states
that have adopted assignee liability provisions to abrogate the holder-indue-course doctrine for regulated loans have recognized the importance of
severing the connection between predatory lending and the securitization
process. By subjecting secondary market actors to liability for knowingly
purchasing high-cost loans, such laws provide an incentive to avoid buying
loans from unscrupulous lenders; and, indeed, in order to take advantage
of the reasonable due diligence defense contained in the statutes, these
actors will likely stop purchasing any high-cost home loans. At the same
time, mortgage originators who can no longer sell predatory loans to thirdparty purchasers previously insulated by the holder-in-due-course rule will
be forced to internalize the risks of their abusive lending practices.
3. Supplemental and Hesitant State Approaches
Other states have acknowledged that lending abuses are occurring
within their borders but have not adopted "aggressive" responses. Several
"supplemental" states, such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Kentucky,
adopted high-cost loan triggers identical to HOEPA's. Although their
statutes do not cover any more home loans, they do outlaw certain
additional practices, akin to those banned by aggressive states, which are
out of HOEPA's reach.42° Many others, however, have taken very

418. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a)(2)(B) (limiting the assignee's liability to the
remaining indebtedness ofthe borrower); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1153.05(c) (limiting the assignee's

liability to actual damages for violation of high-cost loan provisions and to the remaining
indebtedness for all other causes of action); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/135(d) (2004) (limiting the

assignee's liability to the amount required to extinguish the borrower's liability under the high-cost
home loan and to recover costs, including attorney's fees, but not allowing class action suits); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit.9-A, § 8-209(4) (same).
419. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a)(2)(A)(ii); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
137/135(d)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27(b).
420. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746 to 36a-746g (West 2004) (prohibiting call

provisions, balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest rates, and direct payments
to home improvement contractors, but not regulating the financing of credit insurance or
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hesitant approaches. Some such as Maryland, Minnesota, Michigan,
Nevada, and Virginia choose only one or two practices to regulate, such
as financing of credit insurance or the assessment of prepayment
penalties;42 ' others such as Washington merely establish a licensing
scheme for mortgage brokers or finance companies and impose reporting
and regulatory requirements upon them;4 22 still others merely authorize and
finance the broad study of predatory lending.423
These hesitant states may perceive that predatory lending is not as
significant a problem in their jurisdiction or, even if they do perceive it to
be, simply prefer an incremental solution until results start to appear in
neighboring, aggressive states. Nevertheless, these states-as well as those
who have yet to enact any legislation-provide an essential point of
comparison for evaluating the federalist response to predatory lending.
Specifically, federal and state regulators should observe the
effects-positive and negative-that aggressive state predatory lending
statutes have on the legitimate subprime market before proposing a
uniform solution. The federal system is particularly well-suited for
resolving the amorphous problem of predatory lending, in large part

refinancing low-cost mortgages with high-cost mortgages); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.100 (Michie
2004) (prohibiting call provisions, balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest rates,
advance payments from loan proceeds, and lending without regard to ability to repay, but not
regulating loan modification or payment deferral fees or counseling disclosures); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 456.511-.512 (West 2004) (prohibiting balloon payments under five years, negative
amortization, and financing credit insurance, but not regulating prepayment penalties or asset-based
lending).
421. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 12-124.1(b)(1), 12-127(b) (2004) (prohibiting
financing of single-premium credit insurance and lending without regard to ability to repay); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 58.137(2) (West 2003) (prohibiting prepayment penalties during the first forty-two
months of the loan in certain circumstances); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1631-.1637 (West
2004) (prohibiting charging fees for services not rendered and balloon payments during the first
five years of the loan but requiring the borrower be provided with a borrower's Bill of Rights and
the availability of counseling); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 598D. 100 (Michie 2004) (prohibiting
mandatory property insurance, lending without regard to ability to repay, financing of prepayment
penalties, and credit insurance); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 343.101,343.104, 343.202-.205 (2004)
(barring refinancing a low-cost home loan with a higher-cost home loan, financing single-premium
credit insurance unless notice is provided that monthly premiums are available, balloon payments
during the first five years of the loan, negative amortization or prepayment penalties, and lending
without regard to ability to repay); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2d- 103, 61-2d- 104, 61-2d- 105, 61-2d107, 61-2d- 110 (2004) (prohibiting prepayment penalties after three years, prepayment penalties
that exceed eighty percent of the total interest paid on the preceding six payments, negative
amortization, financing points and fees greater than eight percent of the loan amount, singlepremium credit insurance, and encouragement of default); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-422,6.1-422.1
(Michie 2004) (prohibiting call provisions, recommending of default, and flipping by refinancing
a mortgage loan within twelve months, unless the refinancing is in the borrower's best interest).
422. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 31.04.035,31.04.102 (West 2004).
423. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-12-1 (Michie 2004).
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because successful or unsuccessful responses-like recognition of the
problem itself-depends largely upon analysis of empirical data for which
the various states taking aggressive or hesitant approaches provide the
perfect laboratories.
B. Assessing the PreliminaryResults of State Experiments
Critics of state predatory lending reforms have continued to argue that
the reforms are too restrictive-that they will drive up the cost of credit so
much that legitimate creditors will find much lending unprofitable and
subprime borrowers will not have access to sufficient credit.424 Identical
arguments were made by industry representatives in oppossing the 2000
amendments to make HOEPA stronger.4 25 These arguments were proven
incorrect by the subsequent expansion of subprime credit. 426As previously
described, this belief is premised on the incorrect assumption that the
subprime market is efficient.4 27 The real inefficiency in the market,
however, suggests that many borrowers are priced higher than their risk
criteria would merit.4 2' Thus, the elimination of much of high-cost homeloan lending should mean that there would still be sufficient subprime
credit available, just at lower rates.
Subprime loans average nationally about two to four percent higher
than prime loans, and average even higher for lower-grade subprime
borrowers.42 9 Most high-cost home-loan APR triggers for aggressive states
are set, like HOEPA's, at eight percent above the Treasury rate.43° Only
Illinois, New Mexico, and D.C. are set lower.4 31 At this date, the Treasury
rate for a bond with a thirty-year maturity is 5.02%.432 Thus, most
aggressive state laws cover, via the APR triggers, a very small proportion
of extremely expensive loans at APRs of 13.02% and higher. Also at this
date, the conventional mortgage rate for a thirty-year fixed loan-the rate
a prime borrower would, on average, receive-is 5.327%. 433 Between the
conventional rate and the APR trigger set by the aggressive states, a
significant margin of profitability should certainly remain by which
424. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 297.
426. See supra Part II.A.2.
427. See supra Part III.A. 1.
428. See supra Part III.A.I.
429. See supra notes 29-33.
430. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
432. See Thirty Year Treasury Securities' Yield Outlook, at http://www.marketvector.com/
interest-rate/30-yr-t-bond.htm (Feb. 13, 2005).
433. Real Estate Journal, The Wall Street Journal Guide to Property, at http://www.realestate
journal.com/toolkit_com/moneyandrates.html (Jan. 12,2005) (concerning a standard fixed, thirtyyear conventional rate for Fannie Mae conforming loan, delivery within thirty days).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/3

84

Azmy: SquaringSQUARING
the Predatory
Lending Circle: CIRCLE
A Case for States as Labor
THE PREDATORYLENDING

lenders can accommodate the vast majority of subprime borrowers; and,
indeed, it would remain if the APR trigger were set even lower.
This APR spread between conventional loan rates and rates at which
loans become regulated as "high cost" in aggressive states also suggests
that the points and fees thresholds could be set far lower than those set by
the aggressive states. By lowering the points and fees thresholds, lenders
could simply shift the costs purportedly associated with higher-risk
borrowers into the more transparent and comprehensible interest rate
figure.434 Furthermore, contrary to industry suggestion, the predatory
lending regulations employed by aggressive states will hardly require a
radical restructuring of the residential mortgage market. Rather, the
emerging consensus among aggressive states regarding core prohibitions
effectively imposes underwriting standards in the very high-cost sector of
the subprime market, where few existed, and pushes those lenders to adopt
some of the risk prevention underwriting criteria deemed necessary and
common in the conventional market.
Industry representatives have leveled particularly vigorous opposition
to the assignee liability provisions contained in many of the aggressive
state statutes.4 They argue that these provisions create unreasonable and
unpredictable risks for assignees, so much so that credit-rating agencies
will refuse to rate a broad swath of lending in regulated jurisdictions and
eventually stifle the financing of the legitimate subprime lending
pipeline.436 Following the experience of Georgia, however, states that
include assignee liability provisions have structured them to limit the
liability to noteholders of high-cost home loans only, and to provide a
defense if the purchaser has procedures in place to avoid purchasing highcost home loans.437 There is a developing consensus about the procedures
that residential mortgage purchasers can take in order to avoid the
purchase of high-cost or regulated loans, thereby easily satisfying the
"reasonable due diligence" criteria to avoid liability under the majority of
assignee liability provisions.438 As a result, credit-rating agencies have

434. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2.a (describing how points and fees represent hidden costs
to borrowers, particularly when they are financed as part of the loan principle).
435. See supra Part V.A.2.
436. Kelly K. Spors, Subprime BillAims to Mute State Laws: Republican'sProposalto Police
PredatoryLending Would Set Weaker NationalStandards,WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at A4.
437. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 23-53-106(b), (e) (Michie 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-1153.05
(2004); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.137/135(d) (West 2004); ME. REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-208
(West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1 OB-27(b) (West 2004).
438. See OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-3, supra note 7, at 8 (advising national banks to
undertake certain investigatory procedures in order to satisfy a reasonable standard of due diligence
that they are not purchasing a predatory loan); GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 78 ("Before or after
the sale, purchasers may review electronic data containing information on the loans, such as the
loan amount, interest rate, and borrower's credit score. Purchasers also may physically review a
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come to a workable position that should allow subprime lending below
state high-cost home-loan triggers to proceed at a healthy pace.4 39 Assignee
liability provisions will have the predictable, and not entirely undesirable,
effect of decreasing secondary market financing for all high-cost home
loans (not only ones with prohibited terms) and decreasing incentives for
originators to create and sell predatory loans to third parties who bear no
liability risk.
Finally, industry representatives have pointed to a recent study of the
subprime market in North Carolina, which they believe demonstrates that
regulation of residential mortgages are counterproductive and supports
arguments for federal preemption of more stringent state regulations. 40
This view is likely incorrect and certainly premature. This study, conducted
by researchers at Georgetown University's School of Business (the
Elliehausen Study), concluded that the North Carolina predatory lending
law caused a fourteen percent decline in subprime originations in the state,
a decline the study found fell disproportionately on the state's lowestincome borrowers. 4 ' The results of the Elliehausen Study are, however, far
from determinative. A subsequent study conducted by researchers at the
University of North Carolina (the Quercia Study) found that the law
operated almost exactly as intended. 42 The Quercia Study concluded that
loan originations with predatory features decreased substantially in North
Carolina after the law's enactment" 3 but did not materially decrease either
sample of individual loans, including items such as the loan applications and settlement forms.");
Tanoue, supranote 103, at 2 (arguing that, if secondary market purchasers "were to ask about the
extent to which measures are taken to ensure the underlying loans do not contain any predatory
characteristics, and made their purchase contingent upon receiving satisfactory answers to those
questions, the underwriters' incentives could change" and suggesting a series of inquiries to be
undertaken).
439. See CrystalBall Reveals Strength in the Subprime MRS Market, INSIDE B&C LENDING,
Jan. 12, 2004, at 4 ("Fitch [credit-rating agency] anticipates few problems from pending or existing
predatory lending laws, as both sellers and issuers have stepped up their due diligence efforts.").
440. ELLIEHAUSEN& STATEN, supranote 130, at 14-15 (suggesting that data in North Carolina
reveals that allegedly predatory loans are priced to reflect risk).
441. Id.
442. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT OF NORTH
CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT 1 (2003), available
athttp://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC NC Anti- PredatoryLawImpact.pdf;
see also KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA'S SUBPRIME
HOME LOAN MARKET AFTER PREDATORY LENDING REFORM, at iii (2002), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ state _update/2002/nc/ncstudy_0814.pdf.
443. See QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 442, at 18-20, 36-38 tbls.l 1-13 (documenting North
Carolina's comparative decrease in loans containing prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and
exceedingly high loan-to-value ratios); see also ERNST ET AL., supranote 442, at 8-9 (documenting
postenactment decrease of seven percent in flipped loans without reasonable, tangible net benefit
to the borrower, decrease of twenty-five percent in "excess fees," decrease of twenty percent in
single-premium credit insurance, and decrease of thirty-five percent in incidence of loans with
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the supply of subprime credit to low-income borrowers or the diversity of
subprime mortgage products traditionally extended to them. 4'
The Quercia Study improves upon the methodology employed by the
Elliehausen Study. For example, the Quercia Study relied on loan data
covering an additional period of almost two years after the North Carolina
Act's enactment. 445 More importantly, in lamenting the general decrease
in subprime lending in North Carolina, the Elliehausen Study failed to
distinguish between a decrease in desirable and undesirable subprime
loans. The North Carolina law prohibits the practice of flipping borrowers
from one loan into a new high-cost loan where the new loan offers no
reasonable net benefit to the borrower. 6 Thus, part of the reduction of
subprime mortgage originations in North Carolina documented by the
Elliehausen Study may well be attributable to a decrease in unreasonable
refinances that the law intentionally targeted." 7 On balance, it appears that
predatory subprime originations have declined in North Carolina at the
same time that the overall subprime market remains healthy."
prepayment penalties and estimating that the law saved North Carolina homeowners a total of$ 100
million).
444. See QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 442, at 12-21 (concluding that the subprime lending
market in North Carolina is still large and vibrant after the law's enactment, that a substantial
portion of the limited decrease in subprime lending is attributable to the decrease in predatory
loans, and that subprime purchase loans actually increased after the law's passage); see also ERNST
ET AL., supra note 442, at 3-7 (concluding that the subprime market in North Carolina is still very
strong after the Act's passage, that the proportion of subprime lending to lowest-income borrowers
actually increased after the law's passage, and that there has been no increase in the pricing in
subprime loans since the law's passage that might have been associated with a decrease in loan
availability).
445. Compare QUERCIAETAL.,supra note 442, at 10 (analyzing loans originated from 1998
to 2002), with ELLIEHAUSEN & STATEN, supranote 130, at 9 (analyzing loans originated from the
first quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 2000). Since the publication of both studies,
commentators have criticized a variety of aspects of the studies' methodologies and data sets. See
ROBERT E. LITAN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, NORTH CAROLINA'S
ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: STILL A PROBLEM DESPITE NEW STUDY 2 (2003) (criticizing
Quercia Study); NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY: BANKING ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS; REAL ESTATE LENDING AND APPRAISALS

38-39 (2003) (criticizing OCC Working Paper), availableat http://www.naca.net/CommentsOCC
NatBnkPreempt.pdf; OCC WORKING PAPER, supranote 6, at 2 (criticizing Quercia Study). But see
MICHAEL A. STEGMAN ET AL., AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDES,NC'S ANTI-

PREDATORY LENDING LAW: DOING WHAT IT'S SUPPOSED TO Do: A REPLY 1 (2003) (responding
to criticism of the Quercia Study and reaffirming that North Carolina's antipredatory lending law
is working as intended), availableat http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=299.
446. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
447. See Keith D. Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do PredatoryLending Laws Influence Mortgage
Lending? An Analysis ofthe North CarolinaPredatoryLending Law, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON.
435, 452 (2002) (attributing the limited decline of subprime lending in North Carolina to the
decrease in loan application rates, not to loan denial rates).
448. See Lenders Will Try to Pin Down Effects of NC MortgageLaw, INSIDE B&C LENDING,
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C. The PrematureMove Toward FederalPreemption
The United States purports to maintain a "dual banking" system,
sharing and dividing regulatory authority over the complex banking
system between the federal and state governments." 9 Traditionally, the
federal government, through Congress and regulatory agencies, has
heavily regulated national and state depository institutions to insure their
financial stability and integrity, while states have maintained their
traditional police power authority over contract, tort, and consumer
protection law.45 As lending institutions have increasingly become
national in their scope, however, they have sought and obtained the federal
government's preemption of state laws affecting the lending activities of
these entities in an attempt to circumvent the need to comply with a
multiplicity of allegedly complex, conflicting, and confusing state laws.45 '
Indeed, in the past year, state legislators and consumer advocacy groups,
recently successful in overcoming opposition to predatory lending
legislation, are now engaged in another serious battle against previous
opponents from the banking industry and preemption minded federal
regulators and legislators; the state legislatures and consumer advocacy
groups are battling to preserve their successful efforts and, more generally,
their power to implement state policymakers' conception of the best
consumer protection regime.
Federal regulators at the OTS and OCC have already, with some
controversy, preempted state predatory lending laws as they apply to
institutions that the federal agencies regulate and to the operating
subsidiaries of those institutions.452 Meanwhile, a leading proposal in

Mar. 5, 2001, at 3 (reporting that North Carolina lenders were offering a full range of mortgage
products after the Act's enactment and that there was "little or no variation" in pricing of those
products as compared with other neighboring states).
449. John P.C. Duncan, The Course of FederalPre-emptionof State Banking Law, 18 ANN.
REv. BANKING L. 221, 222 n.5 (1999).

450.
451.
emption
'national

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225 (stating that financial institutions "are creating great pressure for federal preof the innumerable, often conflicting, state financial services laws in order to achieve
uniformity'). There are generally three ways an agency or court can find that a state law
is preempted by federal law or regulation. First, courts or regulatory agencies will ask if Congress
"explicitly" preempted state law in the text of the federal enactment. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72, 78 (1990). Second, courts or agencies will see if the scheme of federal regulations is so
pervasive that Congress can be said to have exclusively "occupied the entire field" of regulations
related to a particular area. See id. at 72, 79. Third, they will ask if the state enactment "conflicts"
with a particular federal law, either because there would be a physical impossibility of complying
with both or because the state law "stands as an obstacle" to the achievement of federal objectives.
Id. at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
452. See infra Part V.C.l.
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Congress would regulate the entire subprime lending market-not just
national institutions-and preempt all remaining state predatory lending
legislation. 53 Much of the regulators' decisions are correct as a matter of
law, but much else is discretionary and far from compelled by Congress.
Similarly, though some congressional legislation appears promising,
enactment of any federal proposals would be premature. Both Congress
and federal regulators should forebear on preempting the remarkable
response of state legislators to this country-wide crisis.
1. Regulatory Preemption
OTS and OCC have recently issued opinions and orders preempting the
application of state predatory lending laws to the institutions the agencies
regulate, as well as those institutions' operating subsidiaries.454 Their
decisions will affect at least ten percent of the entities that primarily
engage in subprime lending-federally-chartered banks and thrifts.45 5 As
described below, this decision is largely a plainly correct interpretation of
congressional intent; much else is far from obvious and, therefore,
represents little more than a discretionary choice by agency regulators. In
exercising that choice, the agencies appear to give excessive regard to
industry claims, stressing the value of uniformity at the expense of the
countervailing interest in protecting the thousands of individual victims of
predatory lending.
a. OTS Preemption
The Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA)4 56 authorizes OTS to provide for
the incorporation, organization, and regulation of federal savings
associations-called thrifts. 457 Based on this authority and a Supreme
Court determination that HOLA grants OTS "cradle to . . . grave"
rulemaking authority,48 OTS has concluded that it has "plenary and

453. See infra Part V.C.2.
454. Federally-chartered thrifts and banks can request an opinion from these agencies about
whether a particular state law is preempted by federal law and can choose to rely on the opinion
in conducting their business. Letter from U.S. General Accounting Office, to the Honorable James
A. Leach, Chairman, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs 2 (Feb. 7, 2000)
(letter No. 13-284372). If the entity is charged pursuant to a state law that an agency has deemed
preempted, the court adjudicating the merits of the entity's preemption defense will give the
agency's preemption interpretation great deference. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496
(1996) (holding that courts should give deference to agencies regarding determinations over the
scope of their preemptive authority).
455. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
456. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68c.
457. Id. § 1464(a)(1),(2) (2004).
458. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982).
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exclusive" authority and thereby "occupies the field" of regulation of
federal savings and loan institutions.45 9 According to OTS, this preemption
authority entitles federal savings institutions to engage in business
"without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect
their credit activities. 460
Pursuant to this broad authority, OTS has issued letters concluding that
predatory lending laws in Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New
Mexico, which regulate any aspect of terms of credit, loan-related fees,
disclosures, or the ability of a creditor to originate or finance a loan, are
preempted as they apply to savings institutions." In addition, the OTS
ordered that operating subsidiaries of federal savings associations also
enjoy the same benefits of preemption as their parent institutions.462 The
OTS regulations ultimately may have little impact. Because of heightened
underwriting requirements imposed upon thrifts as a consequence of the
1990 savings and loan crisis, thrifts have done very little subprime
lending.463

459. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2004); see also id. § 560.2(a) (stating that OTS "occupies the entire
field of lending regulation for federal savings associations" in order to "enhance safety and
soundness and to enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in accordance with
best practices").
460. Id. § 560.2(a). OTS regulations related to loan activity suggest, for example, that the
following categories of state laws are preempted: (i) state licensing, registration, and reporting laws;
(ii) state laws governing the specific terms of credit agreements and loan-regulated fees; and (iii)
state laws requiring lenders to comply with disclosure and advertising rules. Id. § 560.2(b). OTS
regulations related to deposit-taking suggest that state laws related to the following activities are
preempted: (i) abandoned and dormant accounts; (ii) disclosure requirements; (iii) fund availability;
(iv) service charges and fees; (v) state licensing and registration requirements; and (vi) checking
accounts. Id. § 557.12. Certain categories of state laws, that only incidentally affect lending or
deposit-related activities of federal savings institutions, are not preempted, including, for example,
those related to contracts, real property law, tort law, and criminal law. Id. § 560.2(c).
461. CAROLYN J. BUCK, PREEMPTION OF NEW MEXICO HOME LOAN PROTECTION ACT 1-2
(Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't ofthe Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6,
2003) [hereinafter OTS Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6]; CAROLYN J. BUCK, PREEMPTION
OF NEW JERSEY PREDATORY LENDING ACT I (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003-5); CAROLYN J. BUCK, PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK
PREDATORY LENDING LAW 1 (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion
of Chief Counsel P-2003-2); CAROLYN J. BUCK, PREEMPTION OF GEORGIA FAIR LENDING ACT 1
(Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003-1).
462. See OTS Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6, supra note 461, at 2 n.4 ("OTS has
consistently concluded that state laws purporting to regulate the activities of a federal savings
association's operating subsidiary are preempted by federal law to the same extent such laws are
preempted for the federal savings association itself.").
463. See WEICHER, supra note 22, at 43-44.
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b. OCC Preemption
The National Bank Act (NBA) 46 provides for the creation and
operation of national banks, enumerates national bank powers regarding
core banking functions such as lending and deposit taking, and further
grants national banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking." 465 In 2003, the OCC issued a broad
ruling in which it determined that the Georgia Fair Lending Act-and by
implication all other state predatory lending laws-was preempted as
applied to national banks and, most controversially, to their state-chartered
bank subsidiaries.' Unlike the OTS, the OCC does not claim it occupies
the entire field of regulation affecting national banks. Rather, it exercised
its preemption authority because of a purportedly direct conflict between
the state laws and federal regulations. 467
In support of its broad preemption order, the OCC relied upon federal
regulations, promulgated pursuant to the National Bank Act. Section
34.4(a) of OCC regulations expressly preempts state laws related to five
areas of fixed-rate mortgage lending, two of which are relevant to the
predatory lending context."' Pursuant to the first of these two, which
expressly preempts state laws concerning the "schedule for repayment of
principle and interest," 9 the OCC reasonably concluded that state
prohibitions related to the following areas were preempted: balloon
payments, negative amortization, advance payments, late fees, and
prepayment fees (on the theory that both categories of fees are considered
interest under OCC regulations).470 Pursuant to the second regulation,
which preempts state laws concerning the "term to maturity of a real estate
loan," the OCC determined that state law prohibitions related to the
following areas were also prohibited: acceleration of payments at the
lender's discretion and, again, prepayment penalties (on the theory that
both sets of regulations frustrate a national bank's ability to structure
incentives to control loan maturity dates and rates).47'
464. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000).
465. Id.
466. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5,2003). Although this
OCC Order was limited to national bank-lending activities in Georgia, the OCC issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking on the same date that would preempt all state predatory lending laws as
applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,904, 1,904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 7, 34); see also Donald C. Lampe, Federal Preemptionand the Future of Mortgage
Loan Regulation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1212 (2004).
467. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,270.
468. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(1)-(5) (2004).
469. Id. § 34.4(aX4).
470. 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,276.
471. Id.
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After this uncontroversial analysis, the OCC's determination becomes
far less convincing. First, the OCC relied upon an additional regulation,
section 34.4(b),47 2 which purportedly gives it broad authority to preempt
additional state predatory lending law provisions pursuant to "recognized
principles of [f]ederal preemption" as determined on a case-by-case
basis. 47 3 Pursuant to this authority, the OCC claimed that it would preempt
state laws that affect "the manner and content of the business of banking
authorized for national banks" and thereby concluded that state laws
related to the following practices were also preempted: loan flipping;
lending without regard to a borrower's ability to repay; financing credit
insurance; mandatory arbitration clauses; encouraging borrower default;
lending by home improvement contractors; giving adequate notice to
borrowers; counseling for high-cost loans; and, extending liability to
assignees and contractors. 47" These preemption determinations are
premised on the theory that these state rules would stand in the way of the
fluid operation of national banks and impede national uniformity in the
national banking system.475 It is a premise that elicited angry reactions
among consumer advocates 476 and that is otherwise problematic in a
number of ways.
First, it is hard to understand how compliance with the state predatory
lending prohibitions and requirements would impede the efficient
functioning of national banks. They are, for the most part, limited
regulations directed at stopping a set of plainly abusive lending practices
that would affect only a small portion of the subprime market-those loans
that meet narrow high-cost home-loan triggers. Indeed, the OCC itself
insists that national banks do not engage in predatory lending.4" Second,

472. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b).
473. 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,277, 46,278.
474. Id. at 46,276-78.
475. Id. at 46,277.
476. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Spitzer Tangles Again with FederalRegulators: New York Official
Says Bank Overseer Hampers Predatory-LendingProbes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A6
(describing the New York Attorney General's charges that the OCC is inhibiting state response to
predatory lending); Deborah Lagomarsino & Rebecca Christie, OCC Preemption Move Blasted:
Congressto HoldHearings,DOWJONESNEWSWIRES, Jan. 7, 2004 (quoting Neil Milner, president
of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, as saying, "'[tihe arrogance and audacity of the
comptroller's actions are astounding .... State bank regulators and law enforcement officials are
the first line of defense against unscrupulous lending practices"'); Barbara A. Rehm, Critics Are
Many, but Hawke Isn't Budging, AM. BANKER, July 23, 2004, at 1, 1 (describing the barrage of
criticism leveled against OCC Chairman by state officials and consumer advocates); see also
Lagomarsino & Christie, supra (quoting Representative Sue Kelly, Chairperson of the House
Financial Services Committee on Oversight and Investigations, as saying '"I am concerned that
exclusive federal regulatory oversight of these entities will result in lesser, not greater, protections
for consumers,"' and promising hearings to evaluate the OCC decision).
477. It also has issued guidance to the institutions it regulates to refrain from engaging in
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the OCC's claim that many of the state prohibitions will unreasonably
increase compliance costs or dry up the overall availability of subprime
credit is little more than over-certain speculation or hypothesis, 478 and of
a kind previously proven false with the passage of amendments to
strengthen HOEPA in 2000."'9 As described, because the subprime market
is not efficient, regulations can be effective in eliminating predatory
4 80
behavior without undermining the flow of legitimate subprime credit.
The second unpersuasive component of the OCC preemption
determination is its conclusion that state-chartered national bank
subsidiaries would also be covered, on the theory that bank subsidiaries
engage in the same conduct and are subject to the same terms and
conditions governing their parent institutions. 481' Nothing in the OCC's
short analysis supports this conclusion. The OCC appears to have
transformed the limited grant of federal authority of banks-to own and
operate state-chartered banks for the purpose of advancing the national
banking system-into a complete exemption from state regulation of their
chartered banks' activities. 48 Further, the OCC' s conclusion unnecessarily

certain of the practices its preemption order claims would interfere with uniform functioning of
national banks if prohibited by state law. OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2003-2, supra note 318, at 1
(regarding lending without ability to repay).
478. See 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,278; see also id. at 42,670-01 (claiming that state
antipredatory lending laws materially increase compliance costs for national banks or materially
limit their actual lending activities and that "bank lenders will conclude-and have concluded--that
they simply are unable to effectively cover these increased costs and risks" and will "reduce their
product offerings to avoid subprime mortgage lending"). In support of this proposition, the OCC
does cite to the OCC Working Paper, a document the agency issued one month before its
preemption determination. The OCC Working Paper, however, uncritically adopts the industry
position in evaluating the effects of the North Carolina antipredatory lending law and concludes
that that law has significantly dried up subprime credit in North Carolina. See OCC WORKING
PAPER, supra note 6, at 20-22. As described earlier, that conclusion is far from certain and likely
not true. See supra text accompanying notes 440-48. Some consumer advocates have called the
OCC's evaluation of the evidence regarding the efficiency of the subprime market and the effects
of the subprime law biased toward industry. See, e.g., CRL COMMENTS ON OCC WORKING PAPER,
supra note 30, at 16.
479. Supra note at 297.
480. See supratext accompanying notes 113-38.
481. 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,280. Significantly, the OCC order does not conclude that nonbank
mortgage-lending institutions that are subsidiaries of national bank-holding companies (ones that
are structured as affiliates, but not subsidiaries, of national banks), see supranote 329, benefit from
its preemption decision. Accordingly, the approximately twenty percent proportion of total
subprime lending that this market sector engages in is still subject to state predatory lending
legislation.
482. See Letter from Martin D. Eakes and Mark Pearce, Center for Responsible Lending, to
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 12 (Oct. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLCommentonOCCProposedRulemaking03-16.pdf
("Congress intended to prevent national banks from using their operating subsidiaries to avoid the
conditions placed on national banks by its federal charter. This proposed rulemaking improperly
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undermines state regulatory authority, the possibility of innovative
policymaking power embodied in state consumer protection statutes, as
well as the dual banking system as a whole.4 83' Subsequent to the OCC
decision, several major banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase, the country's
largest state-charted institution, have successfully converted their state
charters into federal ones, at least in part to take advantage of the OCC's
preemption rule and to avoid the need for compliance with the state
antipredatory lending laws that would have applied to the prior statechartered institutions." 4 Finally, as described below, the decision
artificially elevates the value of "uniformity" to a rule of decision rather
than one admittedly important factor in the balance of regulatory banking
power between the federal and state government.
2. Congressional Preemption
In the past five years, several federal laws have been proposed to
address the nationwide predatory lending problem.485 Two leading House
proposals are currently under consideration. The bill proposed by
Congressman Robert Ney from Ohio would preempt all state predatory
flips this intention to mean that Congress wanted to remove these state-chartered entities from state
regulation.").
483. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 449, at 225 (concluding that preemption of traditional state
banking regulations "interferes with the exercise by the states of their traditional police powers to
implement their policymakers' customer protection and other financial services agendas");
Lagomarsino & Christie, supra note 476 (quoting Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney General, as
stating that "the OCC's actions 'would prevent the states from... enforcing almost any law against
national banks' and represent an 'unprecedented' expansion of OCC's powers."); Arthur E.
Wilmarth Jr., Editorial, Dangerof OCC 'sPreemptionMoves Is Not a Myth, AM. BANKER, May 21,
2004, at 10 (arguing OCC's preemption rule will accelerate the drive of state-chartered banks to
flip to national charters and that, therefore, "our banking industry will no longer enjoy the
flexibility, innovation, and responsiveness that have been hallmarks of our dual regulatory
system").
484. Rehm, supranote 476 (stating that J.P. Morgan obtained approval for a federal charter);
see also Press Release, HSBC, HSBC USA Receives Approval for National Charter (June 24,2004)
(reporting that HSBC Bank USA successfully converted from a state to federal charter), available
at http://www.us.hsbc.con/inside/news/pressreleases2004jun_24.html; Predatory Lending in
2003, Hits Runs and Errors (Dec. 16, 2003) (story summarized from AM. BANKER) (noting that
"[S]ome large mortgage companies [including Wachovia and J.P. Morgan] took advantage of the
OCC's impending preemption by moving their mortgage activities into their nationally chartered
banks" to avoid state lending restrictions), athttp://www.housingchoice.org/news%20stories/2004/
12162003.htm; Chris Sanders, J.P.MorganPlansNewBank That MayAvoidLocal Laws, REUTERS
NEWS, Sept. 12, 2003 (describing plans to create one national bank to avoid state banking laws).
485. See S. 2415, 106th Cong. (2000) (lowering HOEPA's APR trigger to six percent and its
points and fees trigger to five percent, and banning a series of core predatory loan terms and
practices akin to those banned in "aggressive" states without preempting them); S.2405, 106th
Cong. (2000) (lowering HOEPA's points and fees trigger on a sliding scale and prohibiting similar
loan terms and practices); H.R. 3901, 106th Cong. (2000) (lowering HOEPA's APR trigger to five
percent and prohibiting similar loan terms and practices).
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lending laws with less stringent regulations,486 while the bill proposed by
Congressmen Brad Miller and Melvin Watt builds upon North Carolina's
lending law without imposing a preemptive effect on any state
predatory
4 87
laws.

The Ney bill improves on HOEPA only marginally, by lowering the
points and fees trigger two points for first-lien loans to six percent, by
limiting slightly the amount of prepayment penalties that can be charged,
and by prohibiting advance payment provisions and a lender's
encouragement of borrower default.488 However, it fails to address many
predatory lending practices that states regulate, including balloon
payments, negative amortization loans, loan flipping, asset-based lending,
and others.48 9 Most problematic, the bill would preempt all state predatory
lending legislation, not just laws affecting OCC and OTS regulatory
scope. 490 Not surprisingly, the lending industry supports preemption efforts
in general, and the Ney bill in particular, because it would impose a
uniform national solution that undercuts many of the prohibitions the
industry has been fighting against at the state level.49 '
The more recently proposed Miller-Watt bill, by contrast, offers much
more consumer protection without any express preemptive effect.4 92 What
is particularly interesting about the Miller-Watt proposal is that these
North Carolina representatives base their federal proposal in large part on
the vanguard North Carolina predatory lending law. The bill lowers the
HOEPA points and fees loan trigger to five percent above the Treasury
rate and includes important additional costs in the calculation of the trigger
such as yield spread premiums, insurance costs, and prepayment
penalties. 493 It also contains many of the high-cost loan core prohibitions
from the North Carolina and other aggressive state predatory lending laws,
such as those relating to balloon payments, negative amortizations,
financing of single-premium credit insurance, lending without regard to a
borrower's ability to repay, and capping prepayment penalties at two
percent.494 In particular, the bill adopts the philosophy of loan transparency

486. Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 833, 108th Cong. § 104 (2003).
487. Prohibit Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 3974, 108th Cong. (2004).
488. H.R. 833 §§ 101(a), 102(g), (n),(r).
489. In places, the bill actually weakens federal home-loan protections. For example, the bill
would amend RESPA to eliminate the required disclosure of yield spread premiums. H.R. 833
§ 101(b).
490. H.R. 833 § 104.
491. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, MBA ISSUE PAPER: SuBPRIME LENDING, (2002), at
http://www.mbaa.org/library/isp/2002_5/01_ 17.html (supporting preemptive effect ofthe Ney bill);
supra note 483 (suggesting that industry prefers federal preemption to variety of state laws).
492. H.R.3974.
493. Id. § 2(a), (c).
494. Id. § 3.
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and many of the predatory loan regulations originated by, and in some
cases still unique to, North Carolina such as a ban on the financing of any
points and fees in connection with high-cost loans and the prohibition on
flipping, which is defined according to North Carolina's definition: a
refinancing at any time if there is no "reasonable, tangible net benefit" to
the borrower.495
Unlike the Ney bill, the Miller-Watt bill takes advantage of the
significant value that regulatory experimentation adds to our federal
system. It represents an important but rare process of interaction, learning,
and adaptation between federal and state units of government by
incorporating the experience of state legislatures, which in turn had relied
on an interactive process among themselves in their goal of building upon
the now insufficient baseline set by the federal government. The MillerWatt bill, and other aggressive federal responses, likely would not have
been possible without North Carolina's initiative, ratification of its action
by many other reform-minded states, and the encouraging empirical results
following its implementation. There is still much more to learn from
experiences of other states, including for example, the effects on predatory
lending and the legitimate subprime market of assignee liability provisions
in states like New Jersey and Illinois. Thus, as much as the bill benefits
from state experimentation, its enactment would still be premature.
VI. THE VALUE OF STATE EXPERIMENTATION IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM

In recent years, noted scholars have attempted to look beyond some of
the more abstract expositions about the virtues of federalism produced by
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the years since United States v.
4 97 in order to question the value of
Lopez496 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
federalism in a real, practical sense. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has
complained that "discussions about federalism are the ones where the
underlying values are least discussed and are the most disconnected from
the legal doctrines. 498 He urges that courts and commentators employ a
"functional analysis" to explore why state autonomy matters and to answer
the basic question of when and how to allocate power between the federal

495.
496.
497.
498.

Id.§§ 4(m), 8.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values ofFederalism,47 FLA. L. REv. 499,501 (1995); see also

id. at 501 ("The Court's decisions about federalism rarely do more than offer slogans about the
importance of autonomous state governments."); Alan R. Greenspan, The ConstitutionalExercise
ofthe FederalPolicePower:A FunctionalApproachto Federalism,41 VAND. L. REv. 1019 (1988)

(analyzing federalism in the context of commerce clause jurisprudence).
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government and state governments.49 9 Professor Barry Friedman has also
suggested that the doctrine of federalism "lacks a coherent vision of when
national authority or state authority should be exercised, as well as a clear
understanding of the true worth of federalism," and argues that
quantifiable values should be ascribed to the various traditionally
identified advantages or disadvantages of federalism. 5" Similarly,
on a realistic, descriptive theory of
Professor Larry Kramer has focused
501
"how federalism really works."
I attempt to meet this type of challenge by demonstrating that, because
of the tangible benefits associated with decentralized political
experimentation (states as laboratories), regulatory responses currently
occurring at the state level should be left undisturbed and even
encouraged. My argument proceeds on a mutually reinforcing descriptive
and normative loop. I explicate the theoretical arguments in favor of
allowing the states to act as laboratories of democracy; and, I attempt to
demonstrate how those benefits are actually being realized in the context
of predatory lending reform and how efforts by banking industry groups,
federal regulators, and some in Congress to preempt state reforms are both
premature and rely too reflexively on federalism's polar value, uniformity.
I am not concerned here with the vexing question of when the theory of
federalism should prompt judicially enforced limits on federal action.
Rather, I intend to demonstrate that federal and state policymakers should
themselves choose not to preempt the percolation of state regulatory
activity so that the best public policy may emerge-which, in the end, I
believe is the primary value of federalism.
A. A Happy Incident of Federalism:States as Laboratories
of Experimentation
There are a handful of values traditionally cited in support of ensuring
that states have significant decisionmaking autonomy in the federal
system, though they are typically presented in the context of whether and
when the judiciary should pass on the constitutionality of federal action.
First, autonomous state governments can impede the aggregation of power
in the central government, minimizing the likelihood of tyranny.50 2 A

499. Chemerinsky, supranote 498, at 534.
500. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 324 (1997).
501. Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994).
502. D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The
Alternative to JudicialReview of FederalismIssues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577 (1985) (suggesting that
multiple levels of accountability limits and diffuses power); Merritt, supra note 16, at 5-7 (1988)
(suggesting that states limit and balance federal authority through their ability to lobby and regulate in
areas untouched by federal government); Rapaczynski, supranote 16, at 385-90 (suggesting that the
result of oppression should the federal government be captured by an authoritarian movement would
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second asserted value of federalism is that it promotes the democratic ideal
because state governments are more closely in tune with their citizens and
therefore more accountable and responsive to local constituent needs." 3 A
variation on this value, favored particularly in the law and economics
literature, is that, unlike the federal government, states can compete with
one another productively in order to attract desirable citizens and
businesses to aid in economic growth."°
A third and often related value is that decentralized decisionmaking
promoted by federalism allows for more and better opportunities for
innovation and experimentation with social and economic policy than does
one centralized bureaucracy." 5 The argument for encouraging states to
serve as laboratories of democracy and experimentation comes from, of
course, Justice Brandeis's famous proclamation in a dissenting opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is
a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one
be much worse than if the same happened in any state).
503. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that federalism "increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"); SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 91-92
("[O]ne of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is that, to the extent the
electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to
individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals
are more fully realized."); Merritt, supra note 16, at 7-8 (suggesting an important advantage of
federalism is the ability of state governments to "draw[] citizens into the governmental process,"
which, in turn, increases representative accountability and voter confidence); Rapaczynski, supra
note 16, at 396 (noting a traditional justification for federalism is that it enhances citizen
participation which creates a "means of strengthening the representativeness of governmental
institutions and enhancing the perception of its legitimacy").
504. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism "makes government more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"); Ann Althouse, Variations
on a Theory of Normative Federalism:A Supreme Court Dialogue,42 DuKE L.J. 979, 1003-13
(1993); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152,
161 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1498-99 (1987) (book review) (arguing that, because states will compete for additional
taxpayers to reduce each citizen's share of the tax burden, "competition among governments for
taxpayers will be far stronger at the state and local than at the federal level").
505. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (federalism "allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government"); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The
Court's decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators
frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new
social, economic, and political ideas."); SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 85-86 (suggesting it is more
likely for decentralized actors to experiment); Chemerinsky, supranote 498, at 528-29 (noting that
the "states as laboratories" argument is frequently cited in support of federalism); Merritt, supra
note 16, at 9 (citing empirical examples in support of state experimentation value).
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of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. 5"
To list these as advantages of federalism in the abstract, however,
offers little guidance on when or how these arguments should be valued in
a debate about whether to leave regulation to the state, rather than the
federal, level. As Professor Chemerinsky noted about the state
experimentation rationale in particular: "when is it worth experimenting
and when is experimentation to be rejected because of a need to impose a
national mandate?"5 °7 In fact, there are several compelling reasons why the
variety of predatory lending reforms occurring at the state level should
remain undisturbed by federal preemption efforts or, in other words, why
experimentation with predatory lending legislation demonstrates real,
quantifiable value to federalism.
First, as described, predatory lending is an elusive and hard to define
concept.5 °8 The current trend is taxonomic: state legislatures continue to
help identify lending practices and loan terms regarded as predatory, a
trend that should continue before the federal government adopts, perhaps
prematurely, a singular definition. The state democratic process is
operating as a kind of encyclopedia to catalogue and describe an otherwise
ambiguous phenomenon. Second, the many state responses, by definition,
reflect the particular needs of their communities. Some states may respond
to strong progressive reform traditions or community advocacy groups as
in New York, New Jersey, or California; some may have large urban
communities hurt by predatory lending, such as Illinois; some may be
responding to harm done to their elderly, rural, and African American
populations, such as Arkansas. Others still, out of a concern for banking
interests or because they do not perceive the problem to be serious enough,
have refrained from enacting legislative reform.
Finally, because of the many unique attributes of the predatory
lending program, no uniform national solution should be imposed until
more data is available to evaluate whether the state reforms have worked
or will work. More specifically, evaluation factors should include: (i)
whether the variety of state options have worked in their jurisdictions to
ameliorate predatory lending or whether unscrupulous lenders have been
successful, as they often are, in circumventing state restrictions" °9 and (ii)

dissenting).
506. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
507. Chemerinsky, supra note 498, at 529.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
509. See HUD-TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 8, at 69-70 (noting that bad actors are
constantly developing new abusive practices, sometimes to evade government regulation); cf.
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whether state laws have been or would be counterproductive, as the
banking industry has suggested, by increasing compliance costs and
liability risks so greatly that legitimate subprime credit is driven out of the
communities which the predatory lending laws were intended to help. The
federal government may thereafter assess the results of the multiplicity of
state regulatory activity and adopt what it believes is the single best
version, pick and choose features among the many, or based on empirical
evaluation regarding the remaining availability of subprime credit, push
regulatory restrictions even further.
1. Innovation and Experimentation
Although the Brandeis notion of states as laboratories is firmly lodged
in the federalism canon, the opinion was for Justice Brandeis a typical
dissent from a Lochner-era invalidation, on substantive due process
grounds, of a state licensing requirement."' The opinion obviously reflects
the budding faith of the day in technological and scientific progress, 1 but
it is also rich enough to suggest three perspectives for the application of
his theory to the federalism debate. First, states will often react to social
and economic problems more immediately and responsively than the
federal government.5" 2 Second, in a country as broad, diverse, and
constantly changing as the United States, courts, and to a lesser extent the
federally elected officials, must not interfere with states' attempts to meet
the various, particular needs of their communities.5" 3 Finally, as a "happy
incident" of our federal system, states may serve as laboratories for an
omniscient federal government, which can observe experimentation in
state petri dishes and choose the version it likes best.5" 4 All three
interpretations are implicated in the predatory lending preemption debate.

Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law andEconomicsofConsumerFinance,4 AM. L. &ECON.
REV. 168 (2002) (arguing that much consumer protection legislation is rendered ineffective by the
targets' ability to circumvent black letter prohibitions).
510. The Court held that "a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably
curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as that under review,
cannot be upheld consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." New StateIce Co., 285 U.S. at 278;
see id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
511. See id. at 310 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The discoveries in physical science, the
triumphs in invention, attest the value of the process of trial and error.").
512. See id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., disssenting) ("I cannot believe that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the states which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to
correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive capacity which have
attended progress in the useful arts.").
513. See id. (Brandeis, J., disssenting) ("There must be power in the states and the nation to
remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social
and economic needs.").
514. Seeid. at310-11.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/3

100

Azmy: SquaringSQUARING
the Predatory
Lending
Circle:CIRCLE
A Case for States as Labor
THE PREDATORY
LENDING

a. Filling in Gaps and Staying Ahead
The incentive for states to innovate or experiment has two facets. In the
first instance, will state governments respond more quickly than the
federal government to a widespread problem? If,as scholars suggest, states
are more intimate, responsive, and accountable to their constituents, then
one would expect them to respond more quickly to a perceived problem in
their jurisdictions. Moreover, to the extent that states enjoy a respected
zone of autonomous decisionmaking free from federal preemption in
which they can construct public policy,515 it is inevitable that fifty-one
decentralized units will frequently act more quickly than the federal
government. In the predatory lending context, a number of states have
moved with great speed to fill in regulatory gaps left open by the federal
government: following North Carolina's lead, twenty-five jurisdictions
have acted within a five-year period. 16
A second facet of the innovation hypothesis proposes that some number
of state units are more likely to adopt creative, original, or innovative
solutions to economic and social policy problems than would the federal
government. Scholars have suggested that state politicians are more likely
to be risk- averse to experimentation because experimentation will only
alienate important special interest groups without offering them any shortterm political gains.517 This view is wrong as a matter of logic, intuition,
and experience. One central risk factor absent from a state policymaker's
calculus is the possibility that a mistake will affect the entire nation5"8 or,
on the other hand, that the greater regional, social, or political opposition
extant at the congressional level would either defeat or at least
substantially water down innovative initiatives. 9 Without facing these
risks, states may remain flexible, creative, and competitive with one
another in solving mutually shared problems. 2 The federal government,

515. See Rapaczynski, supra note 16, at 399-405.
516. See supra Part V.A.
517. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reflection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 593, 614-16 (1980); see also Rubin & Feeley, Federalism:Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 923-26 (1994) (arguing that real
experimentation could happen at the federal level only by employing decentralized units
deliberately to try a variety of solutions). For criticisms of Rose-Ackerman's conclusion, see
Friedman, supranote 17, at 398, stating that the "spirit of state experimentation is one of creative
response to immediate necessity, often addressed to solving a real problem staring [an] official in
the face," and Merritt, supra note 16, at 9 n.47, arguing that Rose-Ackerman's model ignores
"several important incentives for innovation in the federal system."
518. See Greenspan, supra note 498, at 1043.
519. See id. at 1041-42.
520. McConnell, supranote 504, at 1498. McConnell believes that
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by contrast, as is evident in the predatory lending debate, faces no
comparable competitive force, is slowed by core bureaucratic problems
associated with centralization,52 ' and is the preferred target for industries
that want to preempt progressive state reforms.522 Ifnecessity is the mother
of invention, it must follow that multiple jurisdictions fighting a similar
problem will react more quickly and come up with original solutions more
frequently than one central government.523
Indeed, states have pioneered innumerable social and economic
experiments, many of which were ultimately adopted in some form by the
federal government. State governments were responsible for major
innovations in workman's compensation, minimum wage laws,524
unemployment compensation in Wisconsin,525 public education in
California, Massachusetts, and New York, welfare reform in New Jersey,
health care, and a variety of issues surrounding taxation, criminal justice,
and penal reform.526 States have also surpassed the federal government in
responding to many environmental concerns.5 27 The wave of state

[i]f innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable. This
statistical proposition is strengthened, moreover, by the political reality that a
smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with preferences
that depart from the majority's. It is, therefore, more likely to try an approach that
could not command a national majority.
Id.
521. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1992) (arguing that even if it makes sense to have one national policy, it
may not be efficient to control some subjects, such as schools, hospitals, and roads, from a single,
central source); Greenspan, supranote 498, at 1042 (noting regulators' claims that they have little
incentive to consider alternative or innovative approaches to problems); Richard B. Stewart,
Madison'sNightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 343 (1990) (arguing that national regulations are
"inevitably procrustean in their application").
522. See Gerald E. Frug, Why Neutrality?,92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 (1983) (industry typically
seeks preemption to thwart local rules); Richard J. Lazarus, DebunkingEnvironmentalFeudalism:
Promoting the Individual Through the Collective Pursuitof Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1739, 1772 (1992) (describing industry efforts to seek federal preemption of state
environmental laws); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy ofDistrustin the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315-17 (1991) (arguing that those with
influence in existing power structure will resist reforms at local level); see also supra Part V.C.
(describing banking industry efforts to preempt state reforms).
523. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 85-86 ("[I]t seems clear that... fifty state units.., are
more likely to engage in experiments than one national unit, especially in a country with as many
regional and social differences as ours.").
524. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982)
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
(O'Connor, J.,
525. Louis B. Kaden, Politics,Money, and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 847, 853-57 (1979) (describing unemployment insurance experiments in Wisconsin).
526. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 87-88.
527. Lazarus, supra note 522, at 1772; Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
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predatory lending legislation represents perhaps the most compelling
example of the speed and creativity with which state units in our federal
system can respond to a pressing public crisis.
b. Responding to Local Needs
Brandeis' dissent implicitly suggests that experimentation is valuable
because it allows states to adopt policies particular to their jurisdictions'
needs-a suggestion that scholars have since made explicit.528 As just
described, the existence of varying local conditions in the states is a
contributing cause of legislative action and experimentation. The variety
of solutions born of particular jurisdictional needs is also the efficient
result of experimentation because the variegated process can maximize
divergent preferences.529 State governments also frequently possess
superior substantive knowledge of how a problem is shaped by the
particular economic, political, or social circumstances of their
jurisdiction.53 The states that legislated most quickly against predatory
lending appear to have responded to strong evidence and community
advocacy efforts related to circumstances in their own jurisdictions;53

Regulation:A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 583-630 (2001).
528. See supra note 503.
529. See McConnell, supra note 504, at 1493. McConnell believes:
The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that
local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national
government must take a uniform-and hence less desirable-approach. So long
as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various
localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision making than by
a single national authority.
Id.
530. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A ViEw FROM THE STATES 2-9 (3d ed.
1984) (arguing that best public policy emerges when states can tailor programs to meet local
conditions).
531. In North Carolina, the legislature has benefitted from the research and advocacy of a
leading proponent of predatory lending reform located in the state, The Center for Responsible
Lending. For numerous studies on subprime and predatory lending in North Carolina undertaken
by the Center for Responsible Lending staff,see http://www.responsiblelending.org/predlend-nc/
index.cfin. In New Jersey, the legislature had before it a report entitled PredatoryLending in New
Jersey, which documented particular harm of predatory lending in northern New Jersey. See
generally ZIMMERMAN ET AL., supra note 5 (examining national and state level data to assess
predatory lending practices in New Jersey). Similarly, in Illinois, the legislature had the benefit of
the report, Preyingon Neighborhoods, which documented the effects of predatory lending in the
Chicago metropolitan area. See generally PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5 (seeking to
estimate the size and impact of the subprime market in the Chicago area). In Georgia,
Massachusetts, New York, and Arkansas, press coverage persistently documented human stories
of victimization by predatory lenders. See, e.g., D.L. Bennett, Losing a Home So Easy, It's Scary:
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other states preempted local ordinances because of the perceived
deleterious effects legislators thought those ordinances would have on the
state.532
c. Eventual Adoption at the Federal Level
Finally, Brandeis's opinion suggests than an additional advantage of
the experimentation model is that it permits the federal government to wait
until states have acted to respond, adopting a uniform solution based on
the results of state activities. Under one metaphor, the federal government
can act like an omniscient scientist, picking and choosing parts of the best
state reforms out of the variety offered that are best for national policy.533
Another, more appropriate metaphor, is one of natural selection, where the
states themselves build on previous efforts of other states and the federal
government, tweaking solutions as they go along to suit their particular

Metro Foreclosure Reaching Record Highs, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 28, 2001, at 1A
(documenting explosion of foreclosures on high cost home loans in the Atlanta metropolitan area);
Russell Grantham, Senator TargetingPredatoryLenders, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 30, 2001, at

D8 (describing Georgia state senator's response to the community's outrage and devastation
resulting from predatory lending); Thomas Grillo, PredatoryLending on the Rise, Study Says
Activists Say State's New Rules Not Enough, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2001, at J I (describing the
efforts of community activists to force legislators to respond to increasing reports of predatory
lending in the Boston area); Thomas Grillo, Retirement PanelUrged to Attack PredatoryLending
City Council Vote Targets Stock of Household's Parent, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 2002, at HI
(describing the efforts of local community organizations to lobby the Boston City Council, and the
City's resolution condemning the actions of large a predatory lender); Dolores Kong, Borrowers'
Backlash Costly Fees, High Interest Rates Spur CampaignAgainst Subprime Lenders, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2002, at H1 (describing the efforts of a government agency to respond to and
investigate citizen complaints regarding predatory lending in the Boston area); Jordan Rau, Stalking
the Predators:State LegislatureEyes More Restrictionson Lending, Newsday, June 27, 2001, at
A06 (describing the efforts of a coalition of consumer groups to push the New York legislature to
adopt stricter home lending laws); Jill Vejnoska, The Loan Trap: Lenders Prey on Unwary 2nd
Mortgages Often Put Borrowers in Poor House, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 11, 1992, at 1A.
532. See Mortgage Bankers and Brokers and Consumer Equity Protection Act, 63 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 456.301-.314 (West 2004); Mark Scolforo, Pa. 's PredatoryLending Law Lacks
Teeth of New, Tougher Laws Elsewhere, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 8, 2004 ("Consumer advocates
say Pennsylvania approved industry-friendly regulations that did little more than help insulate
lenders from civil suits and pre-empt a Philadelphia city ordinance that offered far more substantial
protections for borrowers.").
533. Cf Rubin & Feeley, supra note 517, at 923-26 (arguing that the good experimentation
can happen only in a decentralized system, not a federal one, where a central decision-maker
manipulates and evaluates controlled experiments). But see Friedman, supra note 17, at 398
(criticizing Rubin and Feeley's decentralization controlled experimentation model as unrealistic
in light of the federal system we have inherited because the "spirit of state experimentation is one
of creative response to immediate necessity, often addressed to solving a real problem staring [an]
official in the face").
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circumstances or changed conditions 534 so that, as Professor Shapiro
explains, "[u]ltimately, the experiences of the range of states will reflect
back on, and redefine, the policy itself."535 As described, this has been the
course of experimentation in the predatory lending context, as states build
upon, but alter, the work of other jurisdictions.536 Patience with policy
experimentation, like patience with natural selection, may produce for the
federal government the solution best adapted to the times. 537
2. Without Risk to the Rest of the Country
As Brandeis noted, states have the advantage of being able to undertake
experiments without their policy choices posing a "risk to the rest of the
country. '5 3' This advantage provides both an incentive for states to act
quickly and make innovative choices and, in the predatory lending context,
a reason for the federal government to avoid preemption in order to
evaluate the results of the flurry of state regulatory activity.
Much of the debate about the value of state predatory lending
legislation turns on empirical questions posed by competing sides of the
debate. First, will these laws successfully stem the rash of foreclosures and
related abusive lending practices in the neighborhoods most affected by
predatory lending, or are current reforms too modest still to meaningfully
solve the problem? Similarly, will unscrupulous actors find creative ways
around state enactments in order to continue to prey on vulnerable
borrowers? Or, will the more aggressive of the state regulations and the
presence of assignee liability provisions significantly increase lender
compliance costs and liability risks to the extent that they will dry up
valuable and legitimate subprime credit, thereby hurting the very
communities the laws were intended to help? Multiple studies have been
conducted on the effects of the North Carolina law.539 Supporters contend
that the law worked exactly as intended, by decreasing abusive lending
practices while preserving a healthy subprime lending market.540
Detractors argue that the law has driven out large swaths of subprime
534. See Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REv. 541, 551 (1995)
("Despite his pseudo-scientific language, it is doubtful that Justice Brandeis expected states to
engage in controlled social experiments. Instead, experimentation in a federal system is akin to
natural selection.").
535. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 77.
536. See supra Part V.
537. Significantly, the federal government followed the lead of vanguard states in enacting a
variety of environmental reforms. See Revesz, supra note 356, at 584-600 (describing the leadership
of states like California in developing auto emissions standards and New Jersey in developing
hazardous waste disposal regulations to push the federal government to create national policy).
538. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
539. See supra text accompanying notes 441-48.
540. See, e.g., ERNST ET AL., supra note 442, at 12.
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credit.5 4 ' Indeed, industry representatives appear to believe that the
conclusions of the study are dramatic enough to inspire the federal
government to act quickly to pass uniform, preemptive laws that are less
restrictive. 42
This strategy is certainly counterproductive. The best analysis currently
suggests that the North Carolina law is having its desired positive effect,
with little collateral harm. At worst, however, the competing studies are
inconclusive, rendering conclusions about the effectiveness of the
aggressive state actions are premature. The federal government should take
advantage of the mix of solutions currently occurring at the state level and
wait for more conclusive, comparative results before it takes action that,
if too accommodating of industry concerns, can pose a risk to the rest of
the country.
B. The Countervailing,but Insufficient, Value of Uniformity
On the other side of the debate about the relative advantages of state
experimentation are arguments about the virtues ofuniformity. Uniformity
is, like federalism, a fundamental constitutional and political value,
pursued by the framers through various constitutional provisions, which
they hoped would create political bonds across the union.543 The value of
uniformity also emerged where there was a need for the imposition of
national moral norms against racial discrimination or in favor of baseline
constitutional criminal procedure protections. In the economic and social
policy context in which the predatory lending debate is situated, however,
these stated virtues of uniformity add no more to arguments about the
value of preemption or experimentation than do recent Supreme Court
paeans to state autonomy or dignity. In the more concrete public choice
and economic context, a primary justification for adopting uniform federal
solutions is to eliminate negative externalities associated with independent
state action or to interrupt, via a federal baseline, a state "race to the
bottom." 5" Neither of these has been cited or is implicated in the debate

541. Seesupra note 441.
542. Donald C. Lampe, supra note 21, at 151-52.
543. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison).
544. See McConnell, supra note 504, at 1495 ("Externalities present the principal
countervailing consideration in favor of centralized government."); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom "Rationalefor Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1234-42 (1992) (explaining and refuting the
"race-to-the-bottom" rationale for federal regulation in the environmental context). Others have
argued that it is unlikely, because ofpressure on states to competitively attract wealthy citizens and
businesses to bolster their tax base, that states will adopt serious redistributive measures that
inevitably attract poorer constituencies. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 81. Although the state
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about which unit of government should assume regulatory authority over
the predatory lending problem.
Instead, federal regulators appear to have adopted the industry mantra
about uniformity, accepting without substantial evidence the argument that
being subject to a variety of state laws would make national bank
compliance overly costly and would cause a substantial decrease in the
overall availability of subprime credit. 45 That identical position was taken
by industry in opposing the 2000 amendments to HOEPA,54 and
disproven by the enormous subsequent growth of subprime lending. 547That
position has also brought some suspicion that the OCC is beholden to
industry.548 At the same time, Congress is being heavily pressed by
predatory lending reforms are not classically "redistributive," the aggressive, state consumer
protection regulations and resistance to industry threats to pull out of jurisdictions with heavy
regulations discount both the redistribution and the race-to-the-bottom theories.
545. Compare supra note 478 (regarding OCC statements about uniformity), with, e.g.,
Sanders, supra note 484, at 489 (quoting a J.P. Morgan representative as saying, "'[a] patchwork
of local and state regulation does not best serve the interests of consumers or the industry and can
only result in reducing the availability of credit and increasing its cost"'). Not surprisingly, the
OCC preemption decision also has pleased the national banking industry. See Todd Davenport,
Standardon PredatoryNearerAfter OCC's Moves, AM. BANKER, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1. Davenport
generally describes the industry's elation at the OCC ruling and quotes an industry lobbyist as
saying:
The OCC has issued a very strong declaration that it is fully empowered to, and
stands ready to supervise and regulate all aspects of national bank operations ....
The OCC doesn't require the uninvited assistance from the attorneys general and
banking departments of the 50 states to carry out its mandate.
Id.; Michele Heller, In Congress,It's Been a Banner Yearfor Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 2003,
at 1 (describing numerous legislative and regulatory victories obtained by the banking industry to
preempt state laws and move toward a uniform "national standard").
546. See supranote 297.
547. See supra Part II.A.2.
548. See FederalPreemptionIncreasingly Occupies Center of PredatoryLending Debate;
OTS, NCUA Carve out Exceptionsfor Savings Institutionsand CreditUnions, CRA/FAIR LENDING
BULL., Jan. 2003 at 1, 2 (noting that the OCC "has aggressively asserted federal preemption in
other areas"); Stacy Mitchell, Rogue Agencies Gut State Banking Laws, NEW RuLES, Fall 2001, at
4 (describing the history of unjustified OCC preemption of state laws and quoting Ed Mierzwinski,
Consumer Program Director for the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, calling the OCC more
an "indentured servant of the industry than a regulator concerned with the will of Congress"). Some
in Congress also suggested that the OCC may have acted with imperfect motives. See Michele
Heller, Senate Democrats Assault OCC's Preemption Rules, AM. BANKER, Apr. 8, 2004, at 3
(quoting Senator Sarbanes as saying that the OCC preemption decision is "at best, misguided and,
at worst, a blatant attempt to increase the power of the OCC at the expense of homeowners, the
sovereignty of the states, and the intent of Congress"); Greg Ip, Fed Chief Says Deflation No
Longer Remains a Risk; Treasury Bond Yields Surge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2004, at A2 (noting
Alan Greenspan's expressed concern about "maintain[ing] the appropriate balance between state
and federal [banking] regulators" and that the states' role in the dual banking system not be
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industry representatives with the same generalities regarding the benefits
of uniformity that motivated federal regulators.549
The arguments on behalf of uniformity as a dispositive rule in this
context are not persuasive. First, there is no limiting principle associated
with the goal of national uniformity, permitting federal regulators to
increasingly marginalize the role of states in the "dual banking system."
Indeed, arguments about the inefficiencies or increased compliance
burdens associated with state regulation, taken to their logical conclusion,
would simply justify the elimination of fifty-one separate jurisdictions and
the inherent inefficiency produced by the federal system. Second, federal
regulators and industry representatives have never attempted to quantify
the increased compliance costs they face as a result of variegated state
requirements. Nor have they demonstrated that such varying requirements
are marginally or substantially more burdensome than a host of other
regulatory requirements that banks must regularly comply with already. To
the contrary, evidence indicates the subprime industry has been very
healthy in recent years and is growing as strong as ever, in spite of the
purportedly burdensome patchwork of state predatory lending
regulations.55 ° As previously argued, many of the core prohibitions
contained in state predatory lending laws apply to a narrow category of
very high-cost loans and for that category merely impose certain uniform
underwriting standards that should reduce lender profitability no more than
the underwriting requirements imposed on lenders in the prime market by
the strong forces of competition and GSE's conforming loan criteria.
Most importantly, the principle of uniformity advanced by the banking
industry and some congressional legislation and understood by the OCC
leaves little room to assess the critical, countervailing value at
stake-namely, the serious harms associated with predatory lending that
state laws are attempting to remedy. Indeed, it seems safe to say that the
lending industry would support the value of uniformity only so long as a
proposed uniform, preemptive law impose substantially weaker
requirements than those that are in place among the aggressive states.
Uniformity in this context, thus serves no benefit to the federal system;
instead, arguments on its behalf represent little more than the current
"undercut").
549. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 491 (endorsing the Ney bill in particular
because it would preempt a variety of state predatory lending laws); supratext accompanying notes
484, 498 (demonstrating strong industry support for federal preemption in general and the Ney
House bill in particular); see also Revesz, supranote 356, at 607 (describing industry attempts to
pursue federal preemption of state environmental regulations).
550. See CrystalBall Reveals Strength in the Subprime MBS Market, supra note 439, at 4
("Fitch [credit-rating agency] anticipates few problems from 'pending or existing' predatory
lending laws, as both sellers and issuers have significantly stepped up their due diligence efforts.");
supra Part II.A.2.
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policy preference for less regulation over more.551 And, in exchange for
relieving lenders of the marginal-but not yet quantified--costs of
compliance with state laws, the arguments for uniformity ignore real,
significant costs: the continuation of predatory lending practices in a
number of states that have caused and, left unregulated, will continue to
cause emotional and financial devastation to borrowers trapped by them,
and impose substantial externalities associated with foreclosures on the
communities in which these disproportionately low-income and minority
borrowers live.552 The arguments, without data regarding the anticipated
positive and potentially negative effects of the state responses, should not
yet be considered.
Even from the perspective of reforming the predatory lending problem,
my suggested approach does bear risks. The approach suggests a tolerance
for a system in which nearly half the states have taken no or minimal
formal action to respond to the predatory lending crisis and which
therefore leaves thousands of borrowers in those states still vulnerable to
abusive lending practices. The tolerance is justified. As an initial matter,
the risk of state inaction is not as troublesome in a social or economic
policy context as it would be when considering fundamental constitutional
norms, such as ending racial discrimination, for which a uniform
constitutional or moral consensus emerges that requires uniform legal rules
to be imposed across the country, regardless of state preferences. 53 The
risk, moreover, is tempered by a faith in the state democratic process.
Currently, a number of additional states are also considering predatory
lending legislation in order to protect homeowners in their jurisdictions,
some of which should become law in upcoming legislative sessions.554
However, my approach must include a willingness to accept legislative
judgments in various jurisdictions that either reform is not urgently needed
under the particular conditions of a state or that legislation would benefit
from evaluating the experience of other state jurisdictions that have

551. Wilmarth, supranote 483 (arguing that because the OCC will not preempt state laws that
"promote" the national banking business, "the OCC will recognize only state laws that it believes
are helpful to national banks").
552. See supra Part III.D.
553. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (explaining
a principle of constitutional law that state legislatures are entitled to substantial deference when
courts are considering economic or social policy legislation but are subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny when fundamental rights are at issue).
554. For example, in the past year, legislatures in Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington have introduced some form of
predatory lending legislation. See 2004 Detailed Status Summary Chart of State and Local
Predatory Lending Legislation (Oct. 1, 2004), at http://www.butera-andrews.con/legislativeupdates/directory/State/Legislature/Bills/sbc/State%20Bill%2OChart/o202004.pdf (cataloguing
predatory lending developments in all fifty state legislatures) (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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already taken the lead. In any event, the risk is worth taking if the
alternative is a rush into uniform, national predatory lending reform that
fails to learn and incorporate the wealth of available lessons from ongoing
state experimentation.
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